הטיעון הקוסמולוגי וחוק שימור האנרגיה

שו”תקטגוריה: אמונההטיעון הקוסמולוגי וחוק שימור האנרגיה
רז טוב עלם שאל לפני חודש 1

שאלה על הטיעון הקוסמולוגי: אם האנרגיה הייתה קיימת תמיד (לפי חוק שימור האנרגיה) למה א”א לומר שהנקודה הסינגולרית היא הטעם המספיק וא”כ אלוהים מיותר עפ”י תער אוקאם, או שאלוהים הוא החומר (כדברי שפינוזה באתיקה)?

השאר תגובה

1 Answers
mikyab צוות ענה לפני חודש 1

הסברתי במחברת השלישית את עקרון הטעם המספיק. אירוע אינו יכול לשמש טעם. צריכה להיות יישות בבסיס העניין.

נ הגיב לפני 4 שבועות

ככל שידוע לי הטענה הרווחת היא שבמפץ הגדול בתחילתו לא נשמר עיקרון האנרגיה מסה.
וראה גם פה עוד דברים
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/:
One question that arises with Rundle’s view is whether there could have been more or less matter/energy than there is. That is, if there is n amount of matter/energy in the world, could there be a possible world with +n or−n amounts of matter/energy?

We do not know how much matter/energy existed in the first 10^−35
seconds of the universe. Even if the universe currently operates according to the principle of the Conservation of Matter and Energy, Rundle’s thesis depends on the contention that during the very early phase of rapid expansion, a period of time we know little about, this principle held.
A second significant problem concerns what follows from the existence of necessary beings. If the matter/energy nexus constitutes the necessary being, what causally follows from that nexus is itself necessary, and contingency, even in the composing relations within the universe, would disappear. Everything in the universe would be necessary, which is a disquieting position.
Third, O’Connor (2004) argues that since the necessary being provides the ultimate explanation, there is no explanation of the differentiation of the kinds of matter or of contingencies that matter/energy causally undergo, for example, in terms of space-time location. Perhaps one way to rescue Rundle’s thesis would be to invoke an indeterministic presentation of quantum phenomena, which would allow contingency of individual phenomena but not of the overall probabilistic structure.

נ הגיב לפני 4 שבועות

אני לא בטוח שכולם טוענים שאכן נשמר האנרגיה בהתחלה. בכל אופן ראה עוד פה:
One question that arises with Rundle’s view is whether there could have been more or less matter/energy than there is. That is, if there is n
amount of matter/energy in the world, could there be a possible world with +n or −n amounts of matter/energy? We do not know how much matter/energy existed in the first 10^-35 seconds of the universe. Even if the universe currently operates according to the principle of the Conservation of Matter and Energy, Rundle’s thesis depends on the contention that during the very early phase of rapid expansion, a period of time we know little about, this principle held.
A second significant problem concerns what follows from the existence of necessary beings. If the matter/energy nexus constitutes the necessary being, what causally follows from that nexus is itself necessary, and contingency, even in the composing relations within the universe, would disappear. Everything in the universe would be necessary, which is a disquieting position.
Third, O’Connor (2004) argues that since the necessary being provides the ultimate explanation, there is no explanation of the differentiation of the kinds of matter or of contingencies that matter/energy causally undergo, for example, in terms of space-time location. Perhaps one way to rescue Rundle’s thesis would be to invoke an indeterministic presentation of quantum phenomena, which would allow contingency of individual phenomena but not of the overall probabilistic structure.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/

השאר תגובה