A built-in advantage for the simplistic conservative
Peace and blessings,
In your last lesson in the series ‘Thinking about Halacha’, you dealt with conservatism, and you made a division between ‘simple conservatism’ and ‘midrashic conservatism.’ In the lesson, you claimed that there is a tendency among people to think that when they express ‘simple conservatism’ they are ‘playing it safe.’ However, you claimed that this is not accurate. Let’s say, in accepting testimony from women, the ‘simple conservative’ who is not accepting, if he is wrong, then there is a very heavy price for this. So in any case, the prices are in all directions.
I accept this argument, but I do think that there is an additional consideration – do not do it – in cases of doubt, the Shulchan is a consideration that must be taken into account. Thus, the ‘simple conservative’ upholds this rule, while the ‘midrashic conservative’ has the burden of proof, since he is against this rule.
Now, I would like to ask: Do you accept that there is weight to the rule of ‘sit down and do nothing’? That is, sometimes it is thought to be a purely behavioral rule only in the case of ‘playing it safe.’ However, in my opinion, there is an a priori guiding rule here. Namely, that a person who changes the norm has the burden of proof. Agree?
It is important to note that even if we accept that there is weight to this rule, it still does not automatically mean that the preference is always for the ‘simple conservative’, since in cases where the price is high, then the preference is for the ‘midrashi conservative’. Let’s say in a situation where testimony is received from women, not receiving it is a price that I think is too much to bear. Therefore, logic is on the side of the ‘midrashi conservative’, even though he is in ‘rise and do’.
I extended. In short, do you accept that there is a built-in advantage for the simple conservative since he passively continues reality, while the Midrashic conservative who demands active change has the duty of proof (unless, as mentioned, the price for good)?
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Yes, I understand. I completely accept. Thank you very much!
Just another question for clarification: Indeed, the Midrashic conservative offers an explanation, and therein lies his advantage, but his disadvantage lies in the fact that he makes an active change (which requires more ‘broad shoulders’, compared to the sh”t). Hence, the less logical the explanation offered by the Midrashic conservative, the more likely it is that in the final analysis the fact that it has a deficiency of the q”a may outweigh it. Indeed? [That is, the mere fact that he throws out an explanation still does not mean that this explanation will overcome the deficiency of the q”a]. Or do you think that the q”a and sh” are almost unimportant compared to any explanation that is offered?
And now that I am writing this, I think you will conclude that a clear and uniform mechanism cannot be established here. Each case is unique. Although, a priori, most explanations seem to be preferable to considerations of right and wrong.
And now what do you think?
[By the way, regarding the logical status of the Shoa”t – I think that in moral questions – for example, the trolley dilemma – the intuition is stronger towards the Shoa”t and the Ko”a. And that is, where it is quite clear to us that once the decision is to stand up and do something, then it is automatically less preferable to a Shoa”t decision (although, this is also not a blanket rule of course, and can change in practice, and depends on the case). We must examine whether the Shoa”t and the Ko”a apply in the areas of morality – where intuition is clear – indicating that this should also apply in the areas of law. Or should we divide between morality and law. And so on.
Rabbi, maybe it's worth some Torunchik?]
This is an interesting question, in my opinion, conservatism has no weight in itself, meaning that there is no significant advantage to the existing way over new proposals simply by the fact that it exists. Hence, any consideration, no matter how small, should prevail over it. Like a holdover, which is just a default rule and seemingly any evidence, no matter how small, should prevail over it. Although this is not the case with holdovers, probably because legal stability is desired. There is room for argument that this is the case with falsehood rules.
Although there is an underlying assumption that new proposals are always based on some logic, and are not put forward just because it is possible. In any case, when talking about a new proposal, there is always an assumption that it has a logical explanation. It is difficult to discuss a proposal without any reason and compare it to an existing situation. This almost never happens.
Therefore, as you suggested, I think it is difficult to establish a blanket rule. It depends on the state of the system, the quality of the explanations in favor of the new proposals, and more.
Regarding Tur, I will think about it.
Column page (570): https://mikyab.net/posts/81320
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