Criteria for a fool

“Maran HaGar”H zt”l used to say that when there is one question in a question, one answers one answer, two questions answer two answers, three questions no longer answer three answers, but one must give one excuse, and that is: “That we are not studying the question correctly”, for the multitude of difficulties proves that something fundamental is not understood by us in the question, and then the excuses will no longer be of any use, but we must study the question from the beginning.

He brought evidence for this from the Daita in Gemara Hagiga, page 3, p”b: “Our rabbis taught: What kind of fool is he? He who goes out alone at night, and beholds the cemetery, and tears his veil…

He who goes out alone at night is said to be a fool, and he who goes to the cemetery is said to be a fool, so that an unclean spirit may descend upon him. If so, he is not a fool. And he who goes out alone at night is said to be a fool, so that an unclean spirit may descend upon him. If so, he is not necessarily a fool. And he who tears his covering is said to be a fool. If so, he is not necessarily a fool. Since he is lost in thought and distracted, he tears his covering, so that he is not necessarily a fool. Since he is a fool, he is like one who strikes an ox, a donkey, and a camel and becomes a fool.

We learn from the Gemara that the first and second time they make an excuse for why he did so, but the third time there is no excuse. Because instead of giving three excuses, it is better to give one excuse, and since this person is necessarily different in essence from others, he is a fool.

One can remain with one question about the Gemara why three answers are not given (a question based on reason) and leave it at that. In the terms of the new columns, there is a probabilistic Anna Karenina principle here (the product of the probabilities of the excuses no longer meets the threshold or is lower than the probability of a fool), and therefore even with three excuses, one must examine the product of their likelihoods against the likelihood of the single excuse. Thus, one quickly returns to the warm embrace of triviality (that one must choose the more probable position).

I completely agree. Moreover, I am convinced that if there were indeed a good/convincing but complex excuse, every rabbi would choose it. The same is true in science. But I do not agree that it is trivial, because it nevertheless illuminates our way of thinking. In particular, you can see this in a situation where you do not have an assessment of the plausibility of the excuses. In such a situation, you would choose one and not three, and there it is a binding and non-trivial criterion.
By the way, there are similar criticisms of the razor principle in general, which is actually trivial. To choose what seems more correct to us. There are also other criticisms that it is a prescription for conservatism, etc.

I understand. Incidentally, I will say that when I heard this in the name of Rabbi Chaim, I immediately wondered why he bothered to write an entire book of excuses for the Rambam and did not make the excuse in many ways that the Rambam was a fool (or was coerced by threats of a dagger. And if there was oversight of the text? We would excuse that there was no oversight and all the difficulties would end at once).

Suddenly I noticed that the rule does indeed illuminate our way of thinking, but this illumination does not concern the proof of the gerach. Because the Gemara deals with completely realistic things and there is a completely reasonable estimate of how many people in the world hold a scepter, how many long for the inspiration of an unclean spirit, how many have thoughts, how many are granted this and that, and also how many are fools. Therefore, the explanation is only according to the probability of the product of the probabilities. And so what is quoted from the Gemara is only an illustration of a torch that illuminates and not an example of light that emanated from the torch in a certain dark way.