Death in the hospital

Good evening
As I have the impression, your honor is not wearing either a rabbinical hat or a doctoral hat, and I certainly have no interest in addressing either of these metaphorical hats in this question, but rather in addressing the scholarly aspect of your honor.
Regarding healing abilities, it should be said that just as a mechanic “cures” vehicles, so your honor “cures” people of their faith problems (based on your honor’s words, which he testified about himself when the trilogy was published, that there are indeed people whose faith is strengthened due to your honor’s philosophical teachings).
Your honor is familiar with the issue of a good that rejects a bad and knows that only a mere no is rejected because of a good, while serious nos are not rejected (except for those detailed in the GMA, which are taught in detail), and therefore it is not appropriate to say that a no is rejected, but rather that it is not said in principle. And therefore I asked where we got this secret that the prohibition flourished and does not exist in the first place. And the examples must be answered, but we are dealing with the category of Talmudic study.
Many thanks and a happy new month ( :

There is no connection to the act of doing something reprehensible or other rules of rejection. Here the Torah explicitly says that the one who commits it shall be put to death, and this nullifies the prohibition of murder in these cases. The rules of rejection are only stated here when both principles are in force and they conflict with each other. Where the Torah itself has ruled, there is no relevance to the rules of rejection.

The rules of rejection are learned and issued from what the Torah said. Just as the Gemara wanted to learn to reject the prohibition of cutting, from Passover always and circumcision. Your Honor is right that there is no relevance to the rules of rejection that are a ‘product’ of Torah law, but the very abolition of the prohibition of murder will teach us what the rules of rejection are. Whereas the Gemara makes no reference to this.
I thought perhaps more in the direction that the Torah explains that a shivum is a mitzvah in this and therefore does not teach other cases and apparently even a mitat yid is a mitzvah in this. But the Torah does not mention at all the difficulties of a mitat yid.
Thank you very much and have a good day

Questions like why the Gemara or Toss did not make something difficult are not strong in my opinion. One can always say that it was indeed possible to make it difficult there as well. But if you insist, one can explain that in the killing of a Sabbath violator or anyone who deserves death, there is no rejection but rather permission. The prohibition is not stated there at all, and therefore one cannot learn from there that he did something wrong. Specifically, in Yibbum there is a prohibition against killing a brother's wife, but it is rejected in the face of the Yibbum commandment. In the killing of a Sabbath violator, there is no prohibition at all against killing him. His life has no halakhic value. On the contrary, there is a concern with eradicating evil.
But as mentioned, all this is gibberish. We have exhausted it.

Thank you. His Excellency once wrote that in his opinion there is no difference between learning and philosophizing. What does "chapuli" mean in your opinion?
Good evening Shabbat Shalom

See column 52.