Extension of Sabbath hours in Platte

I don’t have time to discuss this and investigate at length (I’m on the road and don’t have any books), so I will address and comment briefly from memory. When I do, it will certainly be interesting to clarify this ruling.

See Shabbat 4:1 regarding sticking a loaf of bread in the oven. The discussion there is the opposite, if someone stuck a loaf of bread in the oven, is it permissible for him to lower it in order to be saved from the prohibition of baking on Shabbat, which is punishable by stoning? The conclusion is that he is permitted to do so in order to be saved. From the issue there it follows that sticking a loaf of bread in the oven that is completed on Shabbat is punishable by stoning.
According to this, if you prolong the fire so that it becomes creamy, then you only worsened the situation, because without it you would have had to, so when you donated something else in your hands, it certainly won’t absolve you.

This is not true, since you are discussing a situation in which when you glued the loaf, it was not supposed to be covered, and the covering was caused by an action that was done afterwards. Here, the assumption was that there was no prohibition, and after that it is only a matter of law. And this is what you wrote, which depends on whether such a covering on Shabbat itself was obligatory (since, as we have seen, there is no difference when one glues, as long as the covering is done on Shabbat).
Although, from an explanation, it would seem to me that the grama here is about the burning and not about the cooking, since cooking is always done in the grama (you place it on the fire or light a fire under the pot and the fire cooks). Therefore, it seems to be a side to say that if you light a fire in the grama, then you will be exempt from the burning but obligated for the cooking (since in cooking there is no exemption from the grama). And maybe the grama is a degrama that I am.
But on second thought, this situation is like the one in the Bible regarding the issue of burning because of his arrows. There we note that if a person lights a fire in a way that was not supposed to cause harm, and then does an action that allows the fire to go and cause harm (such as shooting an arrow at a shutter and then moving the shutter), the rabbi who believes that the fire is because of him will be liable, but the rabbi who believes that the fire is because of his arrows is exempt. In your case, it is like lighting a fire on his own and not lighting a fire on his friend’s behalf, and in this he is exempt. And see the explanation there that discusses whether lighting Shabbat candles is similar to lighting a fire in terms of tort. This is true with regard to lighting, but with regard to cooking, there is the division I brought above, which also requires liability in the gram.

It seems to me that there is a place to tie this to the discussion of the latter regarding someone who threw a tool from the top of a roof and then broke it just before it reached the ground (or threw a baby and was caught with a sword). There too, some argue for exempting him, since the recipient is exempted from the penalty of breaking, but the thrower is also exempt, since his breaking was done by the one who broke it.
Likewise, in the case of one who kills one’s own dog with the ox of one’s friend, some exempt him (Chazo”a and Pni) according to the rule that one who kills one’s friend’s dog with the ox of another friend is exempt.

The Rashash and the MM and other recent scholars discussed the question of sowing and baking/cooking, in which the manner of doing these two tasks is always in the gram. The person only places the food on the fire or lights the fire, but it is the fire that cooks. The same applies to sowing (assuming that the fulfillment of the prohibition is the growth that comes after, and so on). In such a situation, sticking in the oven beforehand, they discussed the question of whether when one places it on Shabbat and cooks on Satsav, one is obligated or exempt. In the days of Yoma, we saw that it is obligated, but in the days of Yoma, there are sides here and there. The dispute concerns the question of how to define the task of cooking: Is the laying on the fire the task and is there a condition that the baking is finished (and then even if it is finished on Satsav, one is obligated), or is the completion the task and the laying on the task a condition (then it must be finished on Satsav to be obligated).
While the final act is the work and the assumption is a condition, it seems that here he would be obligated, since the final act was and the condition is present in the Grama, and in this there is no exemption. But while the assumption is the work and the final act is a condition, there is an explanation for the exemption because the work itself was done in the Grama (according to this, there is actually no real difference between lighting and cooking, because when one lights the fire, one also goes through cooking and not just lighting. It is true that one can go through cooking even when one places it on a fire that is already lit).

Now, of course, we need to consider all of this and summarize and come to a conclusion (and check if I remembered correctly). That’s not for now. Just another comment that I suddenly noticed.
It seems from your words that if you did not see that an extension was necessary, but that the first assumption would be sufficient, then it is clear to you that it is permissible, and the whole question is because you saw that an extension was necessary and that this is a reason to forbid it. But note that it is exactly the opposite. Without the need for an extension, it is clear that it is forbidden. Sticking to the ground when cooking is done on Shabbat is certainly forbidden by the Torah (the prohibition of stoning is the same as in the case of Sugiya on Shabbat there). On the contrary, the discussion begins only because when it was assumed, it was not supposed to be baked, and that is why I wrote all my Torah babbling above. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Thank you for the detailed answer, I received food for thought and an important source page.
The subject of his being because of his arrows, I definitely need to look into it.
Regarding the last comment, where do you get the idea that he stuck the fatwa from Ba’u’i? After all, the Gemara makes it clear that it is permissible to delay the kidra chaita because then there is no fear of gross misconduct. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: There was a mistake in my words. You are of course right.