Ghetto and hand in hand

I saw that the Avan”Z of the Book of Revelation 22-9 writes that the gittu and the hand in the in-one only apply to the negation of the action and not to a positive action. What is the meaning of his words?

And the rule is with me that in a place where the thing that hinders actually applies only from there, it cannot apply, and since by the thing being applied, the hindering thing is removed, and therefore in the wife's court, which is actually hers only by the wives, it is hers for the fruits. And since in a divorce, the wives are removed, the divorce is valid

1. What is the logic in his words?
2. Apparently, he refers only to the problem of time, but there is also a fundamental problem that the reason depends on the circumstances

On the contrary, it seems that he refers to the cause and the surrounding rather than to the times. In terms of times, there is no difference whether it is a lateral matter or not. But in terms of causality, he claims that there must be a division when the conflict is not frontal. Although this explanation seems to me to be narrow.
It may be necessary to explain it this way (see the lesson I referred you to). In fact, one can buy a get in her own yard, but the husband's ownership will return and displace the property (this is the meaning that the hinderer is lateral) and therefore the divorce. But from the time she bought the get, she is freed from it, and then his ownership of the field also expired, and in any case there is no delay in buying the get (meaning that now there is nothing that will return and displace it).

In his opinion, Cohen HaTos explains that silence is an admission and this is what makes the object his possession, and Ritva writes that the dedication applies retroactively because of nothingness. Is it correct to say that the essential problem does not exist, since the reason (the object being in the possession of the dedicatee) is not activated by the cause (the dedication is activated by the act of dedication). The act of dedication is only a means of interpreting the other person's silence as an admission, but it does not directly cause the object to be defined as the possession of the dedicator. Therefore, the reason does not depend on the cause directly, and it is possible that we are faced with a problem in the order of time only, or that since without the act of dedication the object would not be defined as his possession, this is also an essential problem of the dependence of the cause on the cause?

If you have a question, please phrase it properly. I don't understand what it has to do with us and what it's about.

You said that there are two problems in the case of the one: 1. How does the object precede the cause (the order of time) 2. A fundamental problem - the cause depends on the object. I asked whether when the Ritva in its validity says that the dedicator and the hand are in the case of the one, is this an easier case than the other, since here the reason does not depend directly on the object. The reason why the dedicator applies is because the object is in his possession, and the object is defined in his possession because silence is interpreted as an admission, and the reason why silence is interpreted as an admission is because the other made a dedicator. First of all, there is the act of dedicating, which causes the other to admit, and then it is defined in his possession, and then the dedicator applies. Is there a fundamental problem here that the cause depends on the object or not?
I will rephrase my words, since I am not sure that they are understandable: The act of dedicating must be considered in two ways - a realistic action and a legal action. Silence is interpreted as an admission by virtue of the actual action of the dedication (why are you silent when the other person dedicates) and this makes it possible for the legal action of the dedication to apply. I asked whether in the case of the Gavana this is a fundamental problem or just a problem of the order of time.