Gramma Benjakin and the branch

In the 7th Shevat Rav Shlomot, thank you for the more detailed explanation. It certainly helped me understand the rabbi's position (in the sense of: I understand quickly when you explain it to me slowly). At the same time, my disagreement with things has become even more absolute. I do not see how the parable of the surgery that causes pain advances us in any way. It is clear that there are conflicts between values in our world on the right and the left, and we are required to decide between them according to different standards, each according to his belief/opinion/feeling, etc. It is also clear that our standards as believing Jews are the laws of the Torah. They and only they will decide for us how to behave in any situation, and how to resolve any conflict in our lives. The Between us, as I understand it, is it possible for the Torah (after giving it) to oblige us to act in a clearly immoral manner in the name of another value or is the body of the Torah command the highest moral value to which we must rise. My argument is that the Torah is intended to correct our personality/behavior in the most practical and realistic way and to penetrate our lives and straighten them out. However, human understanding is not always at the appropriate and highest level to absorb the moral message of the Torah in such and such circumstances. Human morality is not corrected, but rather is rewarded and progresses from generation to generation. The Torah is the aspiration and summit of world morality. We are slowly moving towards it. In any case, when a human moral value conflicts with a Torah value, it means that humanity has not yet aligned itself with a final, correct moral outlook that needs further refinement and clarification. The words of the Rabbi – No one can convince me that expelling a woman who was raped from her priest husband is a moral commandment – they certainly fit our poor perception of morality. What can we do before we have purified ourselves to connect with our inner and pure world that sees the desecration of the holiness of the priesthood as a more immoral act than the necessity of tearing down a house in Israel to preserve it. And ”he regarding the failure to save a Gentile on Shabbat in relation to the sanctity of Shabbat. I do not offer here a deep and detailed explanation regarding the immoral act of desecrating the priesthood or Shabbat, but the gates of depths and explanations for this are not closed … as for the rabbi's proof of the immoral commandments, such as the prohibition against eating pork. It is not intended to achieve a moral goal (and whoever claims that it is, let him explain. It is always possible to argue that there is a moral goal at the heart of every commandment without explaining. This is just an empty and unreasonable definition, which calls religious values moral values. In the sense of changing the name in vain) as he puts it. Among the most famous (certainly to the Rabbi's breadth of mind and understanding, I am not repeating this to him) are the founding words of the Great Eagle at the end of the Reformation, in which the Rabbi says exactly the same "just an empty and unreasonable definition" that the Rabbi attacks. [Hopefully, the greatness of the Maimonides is not in doubt in the eyes of both sides. Otherwise, there is no common ground at all that allows for discussion]. The great Rambam there: “Even though all the laws of the Torah are decrees, as we explained at the end of the explanation, it is worth looking at them and whatever you can give him a reason for, give him a reason. The first sages said that King Solomon understood most of the reasons for all the laws of the Torah. It seems to me that what the Scripture says is true and it will be and its price will be holy, as in the case that said, "If the one who dedicates redeems his house and adds a fifth of your money to it," the Torah came down to the end of man's thinking and some of his evil instincts, because man's nature tends to increase his possessions and be stingy with his wealth. Even though he vowed and dedicated it, he may have returned it and repented and redeemed it for less than its value. The Torah said that if he redeemed it for himself, he should add a fifth. Likewise, if he dedicated an animal, the sanctity of the body, lest he return it and since he cannot redeem it, he should exchange it for less than it is worth. And if you give him permission to exchange the bad for the good, he should exchange the good for the bad and say, "It is good." Therefore, the Scripture is just in front of him that he does not He will replace, and if he replaced, he said and it was him and his reward will be holy, and all these things are to overcome his instinct and correct his opinions, and most of the laws of the Torah are nothing but advice from afar from the great advice to correct opinions and straighten all actions, and so he says, did I not write to you three in counsel and knowledge, to inform you, a liar, true words, to answer true words to those who sent you. Clear him up the laws of replacement in the S”D”. As is known in the Rambam”, “death” these are the qualities. In fact, this is the basis of the Rambam”s extensive work in the book of the teacher – reasons for commandments. According to the Rabbi – What point did the Maimonides see in wasting his precious time searching for the reasons for all the mitzvot (including the “laws” even), if the entire system of Torah mitzvot is a religious system whose function is to sanctify man by his very observance of them?! Against this system, the Maimonides comes out there in the same way (the words are completely consistent with what is quoted from the above-mentioned Halaal Tmura): “Just as the scholars of the Torah divided among the people of the Torah as to whether his actions are motivated by wisdom or by will alone, not by seeking a purpose at all, so they divided over the very controversy over what He gave us of the mitzvot. There are those who do not seek a reason for this at all and say that all the Torahs are motivated by will alone; and there are those who say that every mitzvot and warning among them is motivated by wisdom and is directed towards a single purpose, and that all the mitzvot have a reason and are commanded for their benefit. And since everyone has a reason, except that we will reject the reason of some of them and will not know the ways of wisdom in them, – our opinion is that all of us are the multitude and the virtues. And the writings of the Torah are explained in this way: “laws and righteous judgments”; “My judgments of the Lord are truly righteous together”. And those that are called ‘laws’ like the fattened calf and the fattened lamb’ about which the wise men wrote, may God bless them and say, “things that I have decreed for you and you have no right to ponder over them, and Satan reproaches them and the nations of the world respond to them– – The multitude of the wise men will not believe that they are matters that have no reason at all and no purpose is sought for them– because this will lead to vain actions (as we have mentioned); But the multitude of sages will believe that they have a reason – I mean to say a useful purpose in any case, but that it has disappeared from it either due to the narrowness of our views or the lack of our wisdom. All the ’mitzvot’ then they have a reason – I mean to say that that mitzvah or warning has a useful purpose, from which the useful side of them has been explained to us. Such as the warning against murder and theft, and from which their usefulness has not been explained, as was explained in the mentions, such as the prohibition of ’circumcision’ and the vineyard gleaners’. And those whose usefulness is explained to the multitude will be called ‘laws‘ and those whose usefulness is not explained to the multitude will be called ‘laws‘. And they always said, "Because it is not just a word; and if it is empty; "from you"; "he means to say that the giving of these commandments is not an empty thing that has no useful purpose. And if it seems to you in any of the commandments that we have answered, then the deficiency is from your attainment. And you already know the famous thing with us that Solomon knew the reasons for all the commandments except the "red heifer"; and likewise they said that God concealed the reasons for the "commandments" so that they would not be disregarded, as happened to Solomon with the three "commandments" whose reasons were explained; and on this the main point all their words continued, and the writings of the books testify to it. But I found something for the wise men, the late in Genesis, that shows from the beginning of thought that some of the commandments have no reason other than the commandment in them alone, and no other purpose or benefit is found in them, and he said there, "And what does the Holy One, blessed be He, care about the one who slaughters from the neck and the one who slaughters from the back of the head? He says, "The commandments were not given except to include the creatures in them," as it is said, "You said, 'The Lord is pure.'" And since this article is so wonderful that no one will find a similar one in their words, I have interpreted it, and you will hear it now, so that we do not depart from the order of all their words and do not deviate from the agreed-upon root, and it is Since all the commandments seek a useful purpose in reality, “for it is not an empty thing,” and he said, “I did not say to the seed of Jacob, ‘I am the Lord, speaking righteousness, teaching upright things.’” And what everyone whose mind is sound in this matter should believe is what I will tell you, and that is that the whole “commandment” has a reason for it necessarily and because of one benefit it was commanded, but its parts are those in which it is said that they are a commandment alone. And the parable in which the killing of animals for the purpose of good food is explained by the benefit, as we will explain; indeed, its being in slaughter, not in snoring, and in the ruling on swallowing and gargling in a special place, these and the like, “to unite the creatures in them.” And so it will be explained to you from the metaphor of "slaughter from the neck to slaughter from the back of the head". And I reminded you of this parable because in their words it came "slaughter from the neck to slaughter from the back of the head". But the truth of the matter is that when necessity brought about the eating of animals, it was intended to cause easy death with ease of action - that the neck cannot be struck except with a sword or the like, and slaughter is possible in any way; and to determine easy death, they provided for sharpening the knife. And what is truly worthy of analogy from the point of view of the parts is the sacrifice - because the commandment to sacrifice the sacrifice has a great and clear benefit (as I will explain), but since one sacrifice is a "lamb" and the other is a "goat" And since their number is a special number, it is impossible to give them a reason at all. And anyone who bothers to give a reason to speak of these parts is, in my opinion, going crazy for a long time and does not remove the distance, but rather adds to the distance. And anyone who imagines that these have a reason is as far from the truth as someone who imagines that the entire “mitzvah” is without any benefit found in it. And since this is the case, I see the division of the “six hundred and thirteen mitzvahs” into many rules, and each rule will include many “mitzvahs” that are of the same type or close in their matter; and I will tell you the reason for each rule of them and show its benefit, which is beyond doubt and does not deny; and then I will return to each “mitzvah” in itself from the “mitzvahs” Those whom that rule will encompass, and I will explain to you its meaning until only a few of them remain. There are very few of them whose reasons have not been explained to me to this day. And so, some of the parts of the commandments and some of their conditions were explained to me, from what could be given by his meaning. And behold, you will hear all this later. The Ramban, in his commentary on the Torah (Deuteronomy 22:6), went even further than the Ramban and believed that even the details of the commandments are all directed towards the moral side of man and elevate him! The sage: “If a bird’s nest calls before you, this commandment is also explained from you, you shall not slaughter it and its son in one day” (Leviticus 22:28). Because the reason for both is that we should not have a cruel heart and not have mercy, or that the Scripture does not permit us to do destruction to uproot the species even though it permitted slaughter in that species, and here is the one who kills the mother and the young in one day or takes them while they have the freedom to fly, as if he were cutting off that species. And the Rabbi wrote in the Teaching of the Confused (3:44) that the reason for sending the nest and the reason for it and the young shall not be slaughtered in one day, in order to warn that the young will not be slaughtered in the eyes of the mother, because the animals have great concern for this, and there is no difference between the concern of man and the concern of animals for their young, because the love of a mother and her affection for the children of her womb does not follow after reason and speech, but is from the operation of the power of thought that is found in animals as it is found in man. If so, the main point of the prohibition is not in the same and its son, only in the son and itself, but everything is distanced. And more correctly, so that we will not be cruel. And the Rabbi said, "Do not answer me from the statement of the Sages (Berakhot 33b) which says, "Your mercy will reach a bird's nest," because this is one of two interpretations. The interpretation is that one sees that there is no reason for the mitzvot except the will of the Creator, and we hold to the second interpretation that all the mitzvot have a reason." And he was further challenged by what he found in the Book of Genesis (44:1) and that what does it matter to the Blessed One between a slaughterer from the neck and a slaughterer from the back? Didn't the mitzvot give us anything but to include the creatures in them, as it is said (Proverbs 33:5): "Every utterance of God is pure." And this is the matter that the Rabbi ruled on the mitzvot that have a reason, it is very clear that in each there is a reason, benefit, and righteousness for the person, in addition to their reward from the mitzvot in which they are performed, may God be blessed. And it has already been asked (Sanhedrin 21b) why were the Torah's reasons not revealed, etc., and they demanded (Pesachim 111a) and for an ancient covering, this is the one who reveals things that were covered from ancient times and from whom are the Torah's reasons. And they have already demanded a red cow (Bemidbar 19:34), as Solomon said, “I have stood by everything, and the story of a red cow I have investigated and asked and searched, I said, ‘I have wisdom,’ but it is far from me” (Ecclesiastes 7:23), and Rabbi Yossi bar Hanina said, “The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses, ‘I reveal to you the taste of a red cow, but to others it is a law,’ as it is written (Zechariah 14:6), and it will be on that day that there will be no light of treasures and a freeze, a freeze, as it is written, things that are hidden from you in this world will be expected in the world to come, as it is written in Samia Datsfi, as it is written (Isaiah 24:16), and I led the blind on a path they did not know, and it is written (there) that these things you have done and have not forsaken, which you have already done to Rabbi Akiva. Here it is clear that there are no Torah motives to prevent it, but rather arousal in our intellect, and that the reason for the severity of them has already been revealed to the sages of Israel, and there are many such in their words, and in the Torah and the Bible many things are known, and the Rabbi mentioned some of them. But these are the Haggadahs that stuck with the Rabbi, in my opinion a different matter for them, who wanted to say that the benefit of the mitzvot is not for the Blessed One Himself to exalt, but for the benefit of the person himself to prevent him from harm or bad belief or obscene conduct, or to remember the miracles and wonders of the Creator, Blessed be He, and to know the Name. And this is “to add to them”, so that they may be like pure silver, because the silversmith does not do his work without reason, but to remove all dross from it, and so are the mitzvot to remove from our hearts all bad belief and to inform us of the truth and to always remember it. And this very phrase of the legend was mentioned in our study (Tanchuma Shemini 8) in the section on this animal, and what does it matter to the Holy One, the Holy One, whether one slaughters an animal and eats it, or whether one snorts and eats it, whether it benefits him or harms him, or whether it matters to Him whether one eats pure things or unclean things, if wisdom is wisdom for you (Proverbs 12:12), did they not give the commandments except to include the creatures, as it is said (Psalms 12:7), “The words of the Lord are pure words,” and it is said, “Every word of God is pure, why, that He may protect you.” Here it is clear that they did not come to say, but that there is no benefit to him who will ascend, that he will need its light as calculated from the menorah, and that he will need the food of the sacrifices and the smell of incense, apparently from their simplicity. And even the remembrance of His wonders that He did, which He commanded to be done in remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt and the act of Genesis, is of no benefit to Him, only that we know the truth and merit Him until we are worthy to be His protector, because our honor and our number in His wonders from nothing and nothingness were considered by Him. And He brought evidence from the slaughterer from the neck and the nape to say that they are all for us and not for the Holy One, since it is not possible to say in slaughter that there is more benefit and honor for the Creator, blessed be He, in the neck than in the nape or the cut, but rather for us to guide us in the paths of mercy even at the time of slaughter. And they brought other evidence, or what does He care between eating pure foods, which are the permitted foods, and eating impure foods, which are the forbidden foods, about which the Torah said (Leviticus 11:28), "They are impure to you," and He implied that He is clean of soul, wise and wise in the truth. And they said, "If wisdom is yours, remind us that the practical commandments, such as the slaughtering of the vesper, teach us good standards, and the commandments of the fences from the species to purify our souls, as the Torah says (ibid. 25), "You shall not defile your souls with beasts, or with fowl, or with anything that creeps on the ground, which I have separated for you to be unclean," so they are all for our benefit alone. And this is just as Elihu said (Job 33:6), "If you have sinned, what will you do to him? If your transgressions are many, what will you do to him?" and he said (ibid. verse 7), "Or what will he take from your hand?" And this is a matter agreed upon in all the sayings of our Sages. And they asked in Yerushalmi Benedir (59:1) whether a person is opened to the honor of the place in the things that are between him and the place, and they answered this question, is not the honor of the place like a sukkah that I do not make a lulav that I do not take tefillin that I do not put on, and we mean the honor of the place, meaning the poverty of its souls, is it a delusion, as if if you have been righteous what will you give it or what will it take from your hand, if you have sinned what will you do in it and if your transgressions are many what will you do to it. Here it is clear that even the lulav and the sukkah and tefillin that were commanded to be a sign on your hand and a memorial between your eyes that with a strong hand the Lord brought you out of Egypt, are not for the honor of the Lord, blessed be He, but to have mercy on our souls. And they have already arranged for us in the prayer of Yom Kippur, You have distinguished a person from the beginning and have known him to stand before You, for who will tell you what to do and if he is righteous what will He give you. And so it is said in the Torah (above 13) for your good, as I have explained (i.e. verse 12), and so it is that the Lord commanded us to do all these laws to fear the Lord our God for our good all the days (above 6:24). And the intention in all of them is for our good, and not for Him, may He be blessed and exalted, but that all that we are commanded should be pure and purified, without any dross of evil thoughts and obscene practices. And so is what they said (Berakhot 33:2), since the practices of the Holy One, blessed be He, are mercy and are nothing but decrees, to say that God did not spare a bird's nest and His mercy did not reach him and his son, that His mercy does not reach those who possess an animal soul to prevent us from doing our need with them, for if so He would have prohibited slaughter, but the reason for the prohibition is to teach us the practice of mercy and not to be cruel. Because cruelty will spread in the human soul, as is known in the butchers who slaughter large bulls and donkeys, who are very cruel bloodthirsty human sacrificers, and because of this they said (Kiddushin 52:1) It is good that among the butchers, Amalek is a partner. And these commandments regarding animals and birds are not mercy for them, but rather decrees for us to guide us and teach us good standards. The Rabbi did end the last mile with the words, “The Mishnah will not move from its place. And all the quotes in the world and hangings on high trees (to strangle them 🙂 ) will not move it,” but perhaps the sources I cited and their explanations on the matter will fulfill the conclusion in his words: “Unless an explanation is presented and the difficulties are answered, or until the day breaks and the shadows flee.” [Especially the conclusion, D’Sifa]. The reason I haven't responded so far was due to many inquiries and studies on the subject. I have come across many and varied sources - far beyond what is copied here. I hope in God to add more and more in the future. Happy and blessed month!

Indeed, it is true. As I have already written, our debate is about the question of whether there is validity for values of a different kind (religious values) beyond moral values. I have no idea why this so outrages you, in my opinion it is a simple fact and not very new. For some reason you prefer to call instructions that we do not understand (such as maintaining the sanctity of the priesthood) moral instructions that our moral knowledge does not grasp, while I think it is much more reasonable and simple to see them as instructions that have a religious and not a moral purpose. But in the end, this is just semantics. Both you and I agree that there are instructions that do not correspond (or are immoral or anti-moral) to morality as we perceive it. What do you call them?
To me, this is similar to someone who sees the teaching of the halakhah in a situation of picun in the face of desecration of Shabbat, and insists on saying that doing the work in such a situation is keeping the true Shabbat. I prefer to say that this is desecration of the Sabbath, but it is rejected in the face of the preservation of the soul. And so with regard to rejected impurity in public, one can insist that this is the true purification (bringing public sacrifices in impurity), whereas I prefer to say that it is impurity that is rejected. Certainly this is true according to the method that impurity is rejected (one can also say yes to the method that it is permitted, and so on).

Don't forget that our discussion began around the exemption of grama from torts. After all, you have no explanation for this, and I suggest that there is a religious trend here, not a moral one. You insist that there must be a moral trend in the background, even though we both don't see it and in fact see exactly the opposite. What is the idea? Why this insistence? It is really delusional in my opinion. It is grasping at the horns of an altar that fails again and again.

Regarding the sources from the Rambam and in general, just a few comments:
1. The Rambam himself contradicts his teaching in several places between the teacher and the reader (such as the reasons for sacrifices in the Sohal Meila). Therefore, there is room to believe that he wrote this for the confused, and for those he thought that these reasons would be more understandable. But one should not necessarily learn his true opinion from this.
2. One way or another, even if this is his true opinion, the reasons he writes do not convince me at all, and in my opinion neither do you (and probably him). Important: Would you be willing to reach the goal that is the reason for the mitzvah in another way and thereby fulfill your obligation? For example, if an easier way for slaughter were found (causing less suffering), would you permit eating without kosher slaughter? I assume not, but if so, then you yourself are not taking the reason that the Rambam wrote for slaughter seriously. If in our opinion this was indeed the reason for the mitzvah, we would have to act accordingly.
[Of course, one could say that you will not do this because of doubt, but in my opinion there is no satisfactory explanation here. After all, if this is the reason for the mitzvah, then the halakha itself instructs us to act in the new way and not in kosher slaughter. If so, the doubt is on both sides, because if you continue to slaughter as usual, you are a criminal. So why don't you consider the reason you found and slaughter in the new way?]
In general, if this is the reason for the mitzvah of slaughter, it seems to me that you should have prohibited the eating of meat today for everyone. The suffering that animals go through today during their growth and on the way to slaughter completely cancels out the suffering of non-kosher slaughter.
3. Most of these reasonings were given about one mitzvah or another, and there are no general statements there that all the mitzvahs are intended specifically for morality and not for religious purposes.
4. I also provided quotes, from the Mehr and the Rah. Although for me the quotes are not important because I am looking for logic and patience and not statements from some authority figure, I do not understand why your quotes are preferable.
5. Even if these quotes were all said according to your method, for me such quotes still have no decisive authority. It is a thought and not a law. If I am convinced, I will accept it, and if not, then I will not.

In the S”d and E”r

Shota Demar said, "I don't know." I can't understand what's not understood. Of course, the blame lies only with me. I'll try to clarify things again.
“In the end, this is just semantics”?!
The whole point of my previous email was to show that in my opinion, – if we work hard on this important profession of the reasons for mitzvot, which has been neglected and neglected for centuries [as Rabbi Kook Zch”l said at the beginning of the article “Talley Orot” in the articles of the Raya. Apparently under the influence of the exile that caused the separation between the Torah and its mitzvot and life. While the redeeming Torah, the Torah of God, has the entire purpose and tendency to connect them and create a Torah of life] – We will be able to produce superior moral insights, by whose light the human race will be perfumed. In contrast to the Rabbi's method, which separates the worlds, and abandons the field of morality to fleeting human insights that change every morning, and the Torah has no place in this field, but rather its function is to make us supreme saints through a system of heavenly commandments that do not illuminate, and do not even have the function of illuminating, our human lives. [In an extreme humorous way, he paraphrases the famous words of the Ramban: "Be holy" - not to be a villain in the presence of the Torah. Rabbi Michael Avraham: Be a villain in the commandment of the Torah. After all, holiness can contradict morality and prevail over it. Although that holiness is a higher value than morality, the actual feeling of the person who lives by it is one of overcoming a contradiction and not of transcendence.]
The same Rambam at the end of the exchange provides us with an excellent example of the dispute between us.
“It seems to me that what the Scripture said was and it was and its exchange will be holy” – Rambam is looking for a reason for a ruling in the laws of sacred things if a person dedicated an animal to the’ and then regrets it and wants to replace it with another animal – even a good one – the Torah constrains him that both will be holy. In this way, the Torah suppresses this good will of his. Why?!
According to the Rabbi's method, the question is primarily lita (as he wrote in the first email). Morality is one thing and holiness is another (certainly, certainly in matters of sacred things…). Morally, there was definitely room to encourage such an exchange [and even if we argue that there is simply no such path for taking an animal that was dedicated to the common people – It is still not clear why both are holy? It would be enough to say that the first remains holy and the second in its integrity, but we are not dealing with morality but with holiness. For this reason, it is not our business to delve into the depths of the Torah and try to understand it, certainly not with moral tools and standards.
This is not how Maimonides believes. He continues and says: “As for the matter that said, "If the one who dedicates his house redeems his house and adds a fifth of its value to it," the Torah has come down to the end of man's thinking and a little of his evil instinct, because man's nature tends to increase his possessions and to be stingy with his wealth, and even though he vowed and dedicated it, he may return it and be comforted and redeem it for less than its value. The Torah said, "If he redeems it for himself, he shall add a fifth." Likewise, if he dedicates an animal, the sanctity of its body, lest he return it, and since he cannot redeem it, he shall exchange it for less than it is worth. And if you give him permission to exchange the bad for the good, he shall exchange the good for the bad and say, "It is good." Therefore, what is written before him is that he shall not exchange it, and he shall be punished if he exchanges it and says, "It is and it is, and its exchange shall be holy."
Thus far is Maimonides' moral-ethical explanation of the law of Torah law, and even more so in matters of holy things!
But Maimonides is not satisfied with this and adds a general principle about all the laws of the Torah: “And all these things are to subdue his instincts and correct his opinions, and most of the laws of the Torah are nothing but advice from afar, from the greatest of advice to correct opinions and to straighten all actions, and so he says, have I not written for you three in counsel and knowledge, to inform you of the truth, to answer the truth to him who sent you.”

Is there not a great difference between the two systems here? If I fulfill the law “and it shall be and its reward shall be holy” as a commandment of God from the world of holiness, without learning from it good guidance for my human life in actual practice; or if I add a lesson from the Torah trend in one law or another to my practical-human life. The difference between heaven and earth [in its simplest form]!

Desecration of the Sabbath by a פקון or impurity was permitted in public – although there are two different points of view on how to define them, it is enough to stay close to our subject and not burden issues that are not simple in themselves and connect them with a thin thread to us.

Indeed, it all started with a gramma in zikikin. The fact that it is difficult in my opinion to explain the moral message that comes from this law does not exempt us from trying. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the rabbi's solution constitutes a mere escape from the intensity of the matter. And in any case, it does not advance us – not in understanding the Torah per se, and certainly not in our lives and our righteousness.

Responses to comments:
1. I assume that the rabbi meant that at the end of the הל’ Maila defines the Maimonides: “And the laws are the commandments whose meaning is unknown, the sages said, ‘Laws are laws that I have made for you and you have no permission to contemplate them, and man’s desires are directed towards them and the nations of the world are subject to them.’ And all the sacrifices are all from among the laws.” This means that sacrifices have no meaning. And in the 27th chapter, the Maimonides finds reasons for sacrifices. So, a carpenter and a carpenter’s son are not needed to make them. The Maimonides himself, in the same place that I quoted above at the end of this chapter, Tmura addressed this directly (!) and replied: “Even though all the laws of the Torah are decrees, as we explained at the end of the explanation, it is appropriate to observe them and give a reason for everything you can give to it, for the first sages said that King Solomon understood most of the reasons for all the laws of the Torah.” End of the explanation: “Everything is decrees; a teacher for the confused.” It is appropriate to give a reason.

2. There is a profound difference between “their teachings are based on the reasons for a commandment” [from the sages and the Rish] and the reasons for a commandment. There is no law as a commandment. That is, they do not demand a reason for a decree and then determine a law. The law is determined from within itself, and in the internal processes of a Beit Midrash. Once a law is determined, no reason in the world can uproot it. Just as not finding a taste will not cause it to be uprooted, God forbid. If so, why seek tastes? Two functions for the law: a) As their name suggests, they are not the body of the food, but the taste that it causes in the mouth. The body of laws are royal decrees, but what taste do we feel in the mouth in life when we fulfill them as their law? These are the tastes of the commandments. With taste, I connect better to the essence [good taste gives a greater desire to eat the food]; b) The taste [this time in the context of reason] teaches me how to behave in completely different life situations that are not related to the halakhic reality of fulfilling one or another mitzvah, but by virtue of the taste of the mitzvah, one can deduce how to behave in them as well.
The word of God will endure forever. Within it there is no end of tastes. Depth within depth. The Rambam's reasons for many of the commandments revolved around uprooting pagan belief from the world and transferring all of humanity to monotheism. Indeed, at the time, when Greek culture was still dominant, and polytheism was an "enlightened" belief, the Rambam's strenuous and enormous work was useful. It would be a little wise to look back in our time and minimize his work. On the other hand, the irrelevance of his reasons in our day requires us to work no less hard than he did to find additional reasons from the depths of God's words that would break through the dominant Western culture with all its "enlightenment," and to show the entire world once again how God's words lead to moral and ethical insights that are more than humanity leads to, or that refine them from all their dross.

3. In the previous email, I already highlighted in bold the statements of the Rambam and the Rambam that prove otherwise. But this is a general trend in all the commandments of the Torah, including the laws. It is just that there is a difference between them whether the details of the laws in each mitzvah also teach morality or only the mitzvah as a whole.

4. Again, I addressed this in the previous emails, which I understand is not the intention of the Rambam and the Maharl themselves.

It is true that one can argue about this, but for the sake of argument, one cannot argue about the approach of the Rambam and the Rambam on the matter. Besides, the greatness of the two “my” It is by all accounts greater than yours, and I would be interested in aligning myself with them more. Moreover, the Rabbi himself noted in parentheses in one of the previous emails that Rabbi Kook believes in this way [and the things are indeed very clear and sharp in the Holy Lights, the Holy Morality. And in other places]. As far as I am concerned, Rabbi Kook is a great scholar and teacher of the Jewish faith in the generation of redemption.
The fact that ancient sources do not “move” the Rabbi, but only logic and patience is itself a fact that is deeply embedded in our minds. I must say that it hurts me and saddens me greatly. No less than saying that it requires repentance and self-examination, according to my belief.

5. Ditto [in the last one and a half verses].

Of course, the Rabbi is welcome to come back and respond, but it seems to me that we have reached the end of the matter and the discussion between us. And the righteous will live by his faith.

All the best,

To Rabbi Y’ Shalom Rav.

Indeed, I also feel that we have reached the point. And yet, from your words, I understand that there are points in my mind that were not understood, and on the other hand, I understood that I had understood your words well before. Therefore, I will comment briefly.

Even if Mr.'s intention was to show that hard work will lead us to uncover moral secrets, I did not see that it would succeed, and therefore I will not deviate from the rule of declaring that we did not depart from it. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no nef”m between our methods. To show nef”m, you must show me two things: A. That there is a moral principle that you learn from examining the reasons for the mitzvot and that is not acceptable to me from the outset from moral considerations that precede the halacha. B. That it truly arises from the reasons for the mitzvat and not from your own explanation (see below). As long as you have not done this, these are empty statements. A person thinks that this is how it should be (that higher moral principles should emerge from the mitzvot) and deludes himself that this is really happening (this is cognitive dissonance in psychology). But in my opinion, this does not happen. You write that over and over again we see from the mitzvot that the Torah has higher morality than the ”enlightenment” of the West. And I, in my poverty, do not notice this at all, and certainly not “over and over”.
I will only comment, of course, that I personally do not accept the existence of “higher moral insights”. Moral insights are familiar and known to every person, and to the best of my understanding, the Torah also assumes this (and I have provided evidence for this).
I must repeat what I wrote, that there is no slander here in the Torah's commandment, but that in my opinion, sometimes fulfilling a commandment requires going beyond moral principles. You can also of course formulate the principle that a person rejects Shabbat: Be a scoundrel (a desecrator of Shabbat) in the presence of morality (the value of life). I prefer the formulation: Sometimes its existence is its abrogation (of morality).

Maimonides' words on the exchange are an excellent example (in general, I am in favor of dealing with examples rather than general statements). I disagree here from beginning to end: 1. Maimonides' consideration that it is a fear that he will exchange for a worse beast is not a moral explanation but a religious explanation. 2. This explanation does not hold water, because one can easily think of better mechanisms to prevent exchange for a worse beast. For example, if I were to impose on myself the great commandment that I would not exchange for a worse one. 3. His explanation in particular is difficult in light of the rule of our recent rabbis that there are no decrees and exceptions from the Torah – And in the Torah, he brought in the words "invisible" and "unique" as exceptions according to some of the first scholars, and the exception proves the rule. 4. In my understanding, a much more reasonable explanation, although not in the moral realm, is that if there is a holy animal, its sanctity cannot be taken away from it (the sanctity of the body does not expire for no reason). The inability to replace is the result of a metaphysical situation and not a moral or other principle. The matter is strengthened in light of the discussion in the Gemara on the law of "not being used for work" that speaks precisely to this point. You hinted at such a point in your words, but your question about why the second is also holy is not difficult at all. This is a penalty for those who try to take away holiness and think that holiness is in the hands of man (as if by embezzlement). Beyond that, it can be said that this rule comes to strengthen our attitude towards holiness, so that we will not think that it is in our hands. All of these are explanations that in my opinion are much better than that of the Maimonides.
Note that the two criteria I suggested above were not met here: A. You did not show that a higher morality arises here. After all, the negation of the reduction in the value of what is given to God is simple and does not require a study of the reasons for the mitzvot to learn it. B. You did not show that this moral principle arises from a study of the reasons for the mitzvot. On the contrary, it seems that it is impossible to derive it from a study of the reasons for the mitzvot. So where does it arise from? From explanation. And that is what I said that moral principles arise from the explanation and not from the mitzvot and a study of their reasons. As stated, as long as these two criteria are not met, there is a declaration and wishful thinking here and no evidence for your method.
This discussion is an excellent example of where one can end up with the erroneous mindset that thinks that behind the mitzvot there are necessarily moral reasons. They arrive at weak and unconvincing explanations and force them onto the mitzvot even though they are not really related to the mitzvot itself and do not arise from it.
Indeed, it is clear that I also disagree with the Maimonides’ conclusion that all the words of the Torah are intended to correct morals and society. It simply does not stand the test of facts (see below, where I will be satisfied with whether Maimonides himself believes this, as he says in the book of the slanderous lie).

Responses to comments:
1. I am puzzled. And why is there evidence here that observers succeed in producing the spies in question? As we have seen, absolutely not. That is precisely what I said when you cannot give a reason, do not try by force. It comes out wrong and unconvincing. See also further in section 2.

2. There is a big mistake here. After all, if principle X is a reason for law Y, there should have been a correspondence between them. If God truly commanded Y because of X, there should not have been any discrepancies in the details. Therefore, if the reason does not truly explain the law, then it is a matter of a mere slander (wort). Such a taste may give a taste in the mouth or cause some kind of psychological sensation (connection to the fulfillment of the mitzvah), but it is not the taste of the law. In any case, it is not right to draw any moral conclusions from it, and if you do draw conclusions, these are not conclusions derived from the mitzvah but only from your own interpretations. By the way, in my opinion, for this very reason there is no logic at all in engaging in this field, because the psychological benefits do not exist either. After all, if I am not convinced that this is the taste of the law, why would such a “taste” make me connect better with it? Am I a fool, or am I engaging in autosuggestion? I wonder!

Regarding my relationship to previous sources, I will examine my ways again and if I come to the conclusion that I was wrong, I will make a rebuttal. For now, I do not see where I went wrong. The fact that a great man like the Rambam makes such weak arguments only reinforces my view that dealing with the reasons for the mitzvot is an unnecessary mistake, and that seeking a moral reason for them usually yields empty promises. I doubt whether the Rambam himself believed all this (as he says in the Suhal Meila), or whether he wrote to answer the confused (as he himself writes in the Piham Rabba on Rasa G). I must say that these confused people really must be unserious people if such things constitute an answer for them.

Best regards,

S”D”H Adar”R

Peace and blessings to Rabbi Michael,

Our discussion is over and we will not finish. “From beginning to end” I do not accept the Rabbi's words.
I see that a deep disagreement exists between us. We will be forced to agree to disagree.
And that is perfectly fine. “The righteous will live by his faith” – The main thing is that faith gives life to its owners, and that those owners are founded on righteousness.

We part as friends who strive, each in his own way, to love the name of heaven in the world, and to bring Israel closer to their Father in heaven!

All the best,