Halachic infertility and 7 clean ones

Dr. Rosenk, hello.

Thank you for your words. I am writing the following without sufficient study due to the breadth of the halakhic and factual scope and due to a lack of time. Since you went into detail in your words to me, I felt I needed to address the matters.

It seems to me that there is a big difference between the Legacies and the Clean G’s, and this is mainly in two aspects: 1. The nature of the halakha in question. 2. The reasons for its abrogation.
1. In terms of the nature of the halakhah, seven clean days is a custom or a law (after the women of Israel practiced it, some claim that it became a law, since the Gemara itself calls it a “law matter”). I am not sure that this is a law, but in any case it is not a concern like in the case of legumes (in my column I distinguished between these three categories). Regarding a custom or a law, there can be a problem even if their taste is null, since in legumes it is at most a concern that it is null, as I explained in my article. It is true, and as I also noted in my words, that these problems with the abrogation of customs and laws are not a “wall”, and sages throughout the generations have also abrogated laws and certainly customs. And yet the difference remains in place.
2. In terms of the grounds, in the context of seven clean days, claims arise for annulment due to the annulment of the reason and claims due to distress (halachic infertility, and hormonal intervention). In the case of legumes, the main claim is that there is nothing to annul, since there is no such halakha (it is a concern, not a halakha). The distress is secondary, blasphemy, but not the failure to eat rice. Therefore, the annulment of the reason (that there is no concern) in this context is not a claim for the annulment of the halakha, but rather a claim that in such a situation there is no such halakha.
This is not to say that the claim to abolish the seven clean days is incorrect, of course. I did not go into the details and therefore did not formulate a position on the matter (and I certainly do not know the relevant medical facts). I also certainly identify with the protest against the conservatism that has spread in our regions and the fear that it gives rise to. In this sense, our words are indeed similar.

As for the claim that the reason for seven clean women is nullified, I am not sure that it holds water on its own. Even if it is possible to distinguish between niddah and zaba, in practice this will not always be done (in addition, this also requires tests in cases of doubt, if I understood what you were saying, and we are against unnecessary tests). In other words, the reason for the nullification of seven clean women is a combination of two claims: the reason is weak, and there is a great need. Neither of them stands on its own and in itself cannot constitute a reason for nullification.
Therefore, if I understood correctly, in the background of all the claims you made in your words, which all deal with damages and hardships, the assumption regarding the cancellation of the reason stands. If it were not for it, it seems to me that most of these claims do not hold water. This is difference 2 that I pointed out above.

You raised several claims in your remarks that deal with the hardship and difficulties that necessitate the abolition of the Clean G. I must say that I disagree with some of them, and if we do not accept the assumption that the reason is null and void, I do not agree with any of them. Therefore, we returned to the question of whether the reason is indeed null and void.
Now I will try to elaborate briefly, and as you will see, most of my arguments are only about the presentation of your points. You add reasons that do not really add to the argument regarding the cancellation of the reason. Halachic infertility is the main argument regarding the need for cancellation, and most of the additions that appear here are not helpful to the matter. If there is a fear of infertility, that is enough, and if not – then these reasons add nothing.
I will reiterate that I am writing this without research, as I have not gone into the depth of this issue. I apologize for the brevity and superficiality that is inappropriate for this serious issue.
These were your reasons:
1. Unnecessary hormonal intervention in a woman who is completely healthy.
I don’t know the medical facts, but concerns about interventions do not always justify a change in halakhic law. Almost everything in the world is presented as problematic and harmful in certain contexts (from drinking coffee to smoking). This requires a more serious examination of how problematic such an intervention is. Of course, I do not have the specific information and medical knowledge.
2. Violation of human dignity due to these couples’ need for invasive tests, treatments that they do not need simply because they are healthy people, and the negative stigma of infertility in couples who are not actually infertile at all.
If it is necessary, then such a reason is irrelevant. Infertility is the problem, not the stigma of infertility. Regarding the harm of tests and treatments, see my comments in the previous section.
3. Serious damage to the woman’s physiology, and in effect, her “castration” due to the loss of her desire days, which occur precisely during these seven clean days, in parallel with the rise in estrogen levels in the seven days following menstruation (after which these levels decrease).
I doubt whether there is indeed a significant difference in desire these days. In any case, this taste has always existed and sages were not afraid of it. One must distinguish between differences that may exist academically and their practical significance.
4. Disrespect for a woman’s modesty and her autonomy over her body, as well as causing a great loss of time and money in invasive and unnecessary gynecological examinations by “purity testers” (a new Jewish profession that our verifiers did not know about, founded by the Po’a Institute) in order to differentiate between blood of uterine origin and blood that originates from repeated rubbing of the cervix as a result of 15 “examinations” performed by the woman every month.
I do not rule out new Jewish professions, as long as they are necessary or beneficial. If the tests are indeed required in clean BJ, then why not help a woman distinguish between blood and blood? The disdain for autonomy and modesty does not seem significant to me. Just as a woman goes to a doctor for tests when it is necessary and he gropes her body. The question is whether it is necessary or not. The arguments of disdain are added here unnecessarily. If it is not necessary, then there is no need to reach the point of disdain to say that it should be abolished. And if it is necessary – then there is no disdain here. By the way, this dilemma argument (this is the logical term for the Chazal expression “What is your soul”) touches on some of your arguments here.
5. Harm to domestic peace as a result of the unnatural and unscriptural separation between the two spouses for half of their fertile lives, and sometimes even more.
If this is necessary, then there is no room for such a consideration. It is like not putting on tefillin on the second Yom Tiv of Galyot. If the regulation exists, then the result of not putting on tefillin is not a problem. The exclusion for part of the month can also increase the peace of the home, as many have already written (I did not check the facts. A thorough survey is needed to examine this claim).
6. Failure to comply with prohibitions such as involuntary ejaculation, adultery, and forbidden thoughts due to the partner’s inability to withstand such a distance, especially in light of the reality of the abundance of homosexuals in our day.
Here too, this is only true if the severity is truly unnecessary. A prohibition that is necessary and exists is not abolished because of sinners.
7. The stricture that I have come to know – maintaining a stricture that is doubtful even from the rabbis, which leads to having intercourse without immersion and to a Torah prohibition whose punishment was severe due to the inability of many couples to abide by this prohibition, and due to their belief that one cannot immerse unless seven clean days have passed.
Again, if it is not necessary, then there is no need for this reasoning. And if it is necessary, prohibitions are not abolished because of sinners. This concerns the rule of Rabbi Elai (let him wear black and do whatever his heart desires), and there is simply no rule like it (see Rosh and Rif, Mok. 16).
8. The distancing of large parts of the Jewish people from the mitzvah of purifying the Israeli home, which is the basis for maintaining the purity of the Jewish people.
See my comments in the previous section.
9. The need to offer a “great sacrifice” every month to the temple in the Old Testament, which is clearly a matter of “minority”.
When the Temple is rebuilt, we will examine whether there is a need for this. If the severity was indeed unjustified, the sages in the Sanhedrin will then decide and force them to eliminate the need for the sacrifice.
10. The prohibition is not explicitly stated in the Torah, “You shall not add.”
If there is a need or custom, there is no need to add (otherwise, any custom or ruling of the Sages would be a blasphemy. See Toss, R. 16:22 and R. Shabba there) and if there is no need, there is no need to do so even without a blasphemy. The same is true for a mundane matter in the context of the previous section. In addition, the Maimonides’ approach is apparently that adding details to a mitzvah is not a blasphemy. Only adding new mitzvahs. And even if the public is informed that it is a rabbinical law or custom, there is no need to add at all.

In closing, I will add that the seemingly artificial stack of arguments interferes with the presentation of your argument. If there is no need to maintain this rigor, then it should be discarded, and suffice it to say that. But if there is a need for it, most of these arguments do not stand up to scrutiny.
I once heard from Rabbi Midan (the Rosh Yeshiva of Har Etzion) that he knows of 22 reasons why the Book of Ruth is read on Purim, but only one reason for reading the Book of Esther on Purim. When there are many reasons that all point in the same direction, it raises suspicions of bias.

The main reason you discussed before this list is the question of halakhic infertility. But I understand that there is a debate about that (how widespread the problem of halakhic infertility really is, and whether it can be solved in other ways, and certainly with specific permission for the couple who suffers from it without the need to cancel this hardship in a sweeping manner). I do not agree with what you wrote that “infertility” after already having children is indeed a problem that justifies such a cancellation. Let them be content with three children and raise them in peace. To the same extent, I would not recommend fertility treatments to anyone in such a situation.
If so, the discussion is only about lifelong infertility. Regarding this, if it is indeed a rare problem or a solution in other ways and with local permission as needed without sweeping annulment, the strength of the argument to annul the clean marriage is greatly reduced (because its purpose is not annulled, certainly not completely). As mentioned, it seems to me that only the combination of annulment of the purpose and necessity can provide serious grounds for annulment.

Finally, I am busy with several other things and cannot examine the claims in depth at the moment. In any case, it is clear to me that you mean for heaven’s sake, and the matter certainly requires a much deeper examination than I have done here.

Good luck.

Thank you and Happy Shabbat,
Michi

 

Eric:

Regarding Article 5, why is it really possible to cancel the putting on of tefillin due to the second Yot of cards? I understand that this is how they ruled, I’m just wondering why.

Regarding sections 6-8, I did not understand. After all, the Sages made many regulations and invested a lot of effort to prevent people from falling into sin. Why would this not be considered a great necessity and consideration for the permissibility of a custom whose flavor has weakened? Furthermore, we noted that the Sages removed a mitzvah from the Torah of blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that fell on Shabbat (when there are no nearby Jewish holidays) in order to prevent the rare situation where people would blow the shofar in the Sabbath and supposedly from a rare concern to a reasonable concern and from a mitzvah from the Torah to a custom. Admittedly, since this regulation (abolishing the blowing of the shofar in the Sabbath) also seems puzzling (in my opinion and it seems to me that many people do too), it is possible that we should not learn from it for other laws, assuming that (I and my ilk) did not understand it properly.

Rabbi:

This is a question of authority. As long as they have not abolished the second Yot (something that in the Minyan requires another Minyan to permit, and here it is the law of the rabbis and therefore must be greater in wisdom and Minyan. See Rambam Refaat 2 Memmarim) the regulation not to put on tefillin because it is a Yot of the rabbis has not been abolished.

First, this is again a question of authority. But beyond that, there is a difference between canceling a deed out of fear of a prohibition and canceling a prohibition out of fear of another prohibition of sinners (so why make us all sinners? What have we gained?).
Beyond that, the decrees of the Sages are for unintentional sinners (who transgress, for example, in a brahma). But here we are talking about intentional sinners. Abrogating a halakha to prevent people from sinning intentionally is a very problematic matter.
This matter also pertains to the ruling of Rabbi Elai that if he sees a person whose instincts are overwhelming him, he should wear black, go to a distant place, and do whatever his heart desires. The Rif and Rosh Mok 16 did not rule like him.
And regarding blowing the shofar in the name of God, I wrote in my article – the meaning of blowing the shofar, which is not really abrogation of the rabbinate. In Yerushalmi this is explicit, but in Bavli it also appears so.

Eric:

My question arose from an assumption (which I understood from your words, mainly the answer) that since this is a custom whose taste has weakened, it is not a question of abolishing an actual prohibition and that a great necessity is sufficient to permit it.
In any case, it is clear what we have gained by supposedly turning us all into sinners in order to prevent sins.
First, we replaced the Torah offenses of niddah, the unnecessary ejaculation of semen, and forbidden thoughts (if such thoughts are forbidden by Torah) with an offense for a custom whose purpose has weakened. Second, there is apparently no offense here because it is permissible to cancel such a custom for a greater need.

Rabbi:

I don’t think its taste has weakened. The same problem existed when this custom began. And this is why they don’t open the hagel to blow the shofar (they didn’t allow a muktzeh prohibition so that they could blow the shofar). A rabbinical prohibition is not always rejected due to concerns that they won’t uphold the Torah. That’s why I referred you to the rule of Rabbi Elai, where they supposedly allow a prohibition to prevent a more serious prohibition (of nakedness and desecration of the name of God together). And yet the Rosh and the Rif wrote that there is no such rule.

Eric:

I understood that the rabbi accepted that his taste for the law had been weakened.
“That is, the reason for annulling the 7th Cleansing is a combination of two arguments: the reason is weak, and there is a great need. Neither of them stands on its own and cannot in itself constitute a reason for annulment.”

If this is a complete and clear prohibition similar to Rabbi Elai’s case, what about the more specific case of actual infertility (assuming that there are cases that cannot be resolved in any other way)?
I thought I would say that perhaps refraining from having children would be considered close to protecting the lives of the children (so that they will not be born), but then yes should also be said about those who have given birth to 3 children.
Is it possible that infertility is considered close to the couple’s protection from death (one who has no children is considered dead)?

Rabbi:

This sentence described the questioner’s claims, not my position.
I was not talking about a clear prohibition, but rather about a custom whose flavor has not been weakened. Therefore, the similarity to Rabbi Elai’s ruling is not complete except to sharpen the argument.
For the purpose of permission in specific cases, it is not necessary to reach the Pikkon. After all, there is a positive commandment of the Lord, and an action is rejected by the Lord. Therefore, when the fulfillment of the action is in danger, there is a place to permit prohibitions and certainly customs. It is true that even a great need, such as the need for children, can permit violating a custom.

Eric:

That is, I understand that a doha is not done only in a positive mitzvah and not in an existential mitzvah (meaning that charity is not done if you gave something, and so is it permissible for someone who has children to do not do it?

So what about someone who has children but only boys or only girls and has not fulfilled the obligation of the mitzvah from the Torah?

Rabbi :

How did you understand this from my words? The Rav at the beginning of the Sifra says that even a za’ga for women (which in my opinion is less than an existential mitzvah) rejects the lat.
And for those who fulfill the mitzvah of the Mitzvah, even after having two children, there are Shabbat mitzvahs from Kabbalah.

Eric :

I understood this from the statement that the custom of 7 clean days should not be abolished to allow those who already have children to have more children.
If it is still considered a positive commandment and she rejects a negative commandment and is a custom, then why shouldn’t the custom be abolished for her?

 

If even someone who has several children still has the habit of having additional children, it is not permissible to do so, and why did the Rabbi write
“I disagree with what you wrote that “infertility” after already having children is indeed a problem that justifies such an annulment. Let them settle for three children and raise them in peace.”

Rabbi :

Hello Eric.
Apparently because I’m playing simultaneously here (replying to several threads at the same time at intervals) I’ve completely lost the thread of the discussion. Unfortunately, I don’t have time right now to go through the entire thread and see where we stand. I apologize. I’m just saying that as a rule, in my words I didn’t express a position, but only presented sides here and there to say that the problem is not as simple as described in his words.

Pine :

I understand that the ruling of Ethiopian Jews (in Rabbi Shalom Sharon’s book From Sinai to Ethiopia) leniently addresses the issue of Zira’s rabbis. Could this ruling constitute a halakhic precedent that would contribute to the voices of non-Ethiopian Jews on the subject?

Rabbi :

The halachic status of Ethiopian Jews and their halakha is a fascinating issue that challenges our halachic perceptions. Even if we accept their full historical claims, they rely on a tradition that predates the Talmud, and therefore their halakha does not contain a significant portion of the Oral Torah. In principle, one could expand the question and wonder whether it is possible to dispense with the Toshabap altogether in light of the halachic tradition of Ethiopian Jews.
For them, the Talmud is truly not binding because they were not part of its acceptance as a binding codex. On the other hand, if they want to join the halakhic-Talmudic community, I think they will have to accept its authority by joining it. They need to “convert” to Humra, at least in this sense. Of course, they can choose not to join, and then they can, of course, continue their tradition in a completely legitimate way. I think that the Ma’ale Rabbinate will not be able to come to them with any argument.
But I think that is precisely why their approach to Rabbi Zira’s severity is irrelevant. We have accepted the Talmud as the binding halachic code, and therefore a group that is not committed to the Talmud cannot constitute a halachic option for us (although in their opinion they can certainly do so). After all, it is possible to go even further and accept Christian morality, which also split from us at some point.
The commitment to the Talmud means that we do operate within the Talmudic framework. Within this framework, we can of course discuss whether Rabbi Zira’s severity is binding or not, and that is Dr. Rosenk’s topic. But in my opinion, the Ethiopian tradition, which does not operate within this framework, is irrelevant to the discussion.

Pine :

I understood that Rabbi Sharon tried to unite Talmudic law with Ethiopian tradition as much as possible (for example, he ruled that Pikuach Nefesh rejects Shabbat, even though Ethiopian tradition says the opposite). It seems to me that in places where he saw that it was a matter of decrees or regulations (and especially that they were null and void) he felt freer to rule in accordance with Ethiopian tradition. Perhaps we can see in the fact that even after the Ethiopians were exposed to Talmudic tradition, they still did not accept (at least according to Rabbi Sharon’s ruling) the severity of the Zira rabbis upon themselves, we can see this as an opening for annulling the decree, for the Rambam said: “A court that has issued a decree or established a regulation and introduced a custom and spread it throughout Israel, and another court has followed them and sought to annul the first things and to uproot that regulation and that decree and that custom cannot do so until it is greater than the first in wisdom and in number.” And the decree did not apply to all of Israel (after all, the Ethiopians did not accept this decree – even after they became aware of it). Rambam also said: “They issued a decree and imagined that it applied to all of Israel, and the matter remained that way for many years. After a long time, another court stood and examined all of Israel and saw that the same decree did not apply to all of Israel. It has the authority to annul it, even if it was less wise and just than the first court.” What do you think about this idea?

Incidentally, it is interesting to note in this context that, similar to the tradition of the Sages, in the Beta Israel tradition, the counting of the Omer begins on the eve of Passover, but not on the eve of the first holiday but on the seventh eve of Passover (it is likely that Rabbi Sharon adhered to Talmudic law in this context, but I have not checked).

Rabbi :

With all due respect to Rabbi Sharon (we know him well), the fact that he is trying to coordinate the traditions has no meaning. At this initial stage, anyone can do whatever they want. Even if they take their halakhic tradition seriously and treat it like our tradition, then I doubt to what extent he can even permit the desecration of Shabbat for the sake of the Pikoun. After all, if their tradition prohibits it, there is desecration of Shabbat here, and who is there to permit or prohibit it? What do you care? Or is their tradition as valid as ours or can be played with as we wish, and then I can do it too, even though I am not Ethiopian. He has no different status than I do in this matter.

Regarding the repeal of regulations and decrees, firstly, it is a custom and not a decree. Secondly, the “decree” was issued a long time ago and has completely become obsolete. It makes no sense that there is a small community that has not heard of it and therefore has not accepted it upon itself.
Even my saying that they can continue as they have is an innovation, as there was room to say that the people of Israel accepted the Talmud and they should join it (like an individual who has not heard of any regulation that we clearly will not treat as a separate tradition and will be obligated to join what the public has accepted). So taking them as a basis for saying that the regulation has not been simplified by the public at large is much less likely. Beyond that, there are lengthy discussions of regulations that have been simplified and then repealed or vice versa. But I don’t think there’s any need to get to that point.