Is there a concept of conscious despair over theft?

Perhaps we can link what is happening there to the looting during the war, after all, one of the signs of a lack of government is when looting is done in front of everyone and no one upholds the law.

A. Regarding the issue of the smallness of the sea in people's choices (at least when they have to choose to fail, and not just choose between two options), the doubt is actually whether to hold to a categorical halakhic command?
Perhaps this is similar to the innovation of the Mishnah (according to the Tosafot) that if a Jew is willing to teach (with a prohibition) the Gentile Torah, this is not considered a single hebra danhara. And perhaps when there are few people, then one should come to a choice with a prohibition (as in the case of the Mishnah), but when there are many people, then the scales almost certainly tilt the result and therefore the choice does not increase or decrease (the Iluliye of the command).

B. Why does the fact that the police will try to seize mean that the objects are not the property of the person? The object is going to be stolen anyway, and the one who takes it will accept the risk and payment.

A. Indeed, this is one of the sides to my doubt. The number of people makes it almost certain.
B. The fact that the police will try to seize it is only a sign and not a reason. My point is that when the store is broken into and the object is about to be stolen, it is no worse than a situation where the object is already in the thief's possession. And it is also forbidden to steal from the thief because the object belongs to the buyer (but not in his possession). So why is it that when the object is not in his possession but it is clear that it will end up in the hands of some thief, the situation is even more permissible? Unlikely, as stated, the police are only an indication that the object is still considered to belong to its original owner.
Incidentally, even if the object is actually stolen, this does not mean that the thief will only pay money for it. If the object is still in the possession of the thief, they will return it themselves.

What about the exact definition? Is it theft or robbery? For theft, there is no place in the underground. For robbery, there is no place by force.

Why isn't there power here? Of course there is. Theft doesn't have to be underground. Going underground is one type of thief.

Rambam:

What kind of thief is he who takes a man's property secretly, and none of the owners know it? Like one who puts his hand into his friend's pocket and takes his money, and none of the owners sees it. And so everything comes out in disgrace. But if he takes it openly and publicly, with a strong hand, this is not a thief but a robber. According to the law of the wicked, a thief who steals is not a robber, but a thief, even though the owners know at the time that he stole:

What is this thief who takes a man's property by force, like one who snatches a movable thing from his hand or who has been seized without the permission of the owners and takes away all his belongings? Or if he attacks his servant and his cattle and eats them. Or if he goes into his field and eats its fruit, and all that comes out of it, he is a thief. As it is said (2 Samuel 23-21) ‘And he snatched the spear out of the hand of the Egyptian’:

B. I see (H”M Siman Sh”W) that the reason why it is forbidden to buy from a thief is “because he holds the hands of a criminal and causes him to steal other thefts, which if he does not find a taker, he is not a thief”. This means that this is not ordinary theft that is forbidden on the part of the owner of the house. And according to this, stealing what is about to be stolen would be permissible?
But perhaps this consideration (not a mouse steals but a thief steals) is actually a categorical command. It is reasonable to assume that the thief will find someone to sell to even without me, but still everyone is forbidden to buy, and everyone together tries to plug the hole. And so it is here that it is forbidden to steal.

Ruling,
This is not a secret. A thief is someone who takes without the owner seeing. A robber is someone who takes by force. In any case, none of this is a sin. Any taking of money in any way is robbery.

Yehoshua,
You are talking about the prohibition of buying from a thief. I am talking about the prohibition of stealing from him. The one who steals from a thief is exempt from double payment but is subject to a prohibition.
Stealing what is about to be stolen is certainly forbidden. Either you are a thief or you are stealing from a thief.
The categorical imperative certainly belongs here.

I understand the relevance of a categorical injunction (and perhaps if holding the hands of offenders is a categorical injunction then it is completely similar to looting a store, and this would not be considered a mere trifle in terms of the prohibition of theft). I have not yet understood whether there is anything additional to the categorical injunction (i.e. a regular formal prohibition of theft).
And regarding the regular prohibition, I thought that on the side of taking from the owner of the house (which is his but not in his possession) there is no difference between buying from a thief and stealing or taking from a thief. And in stealing from a thief there is no holding the hands of offenders, and hence stealing from a thief is prohibited because he steals from the thief, and not because he steals from the owner of the house.
Therefore stealing from what is about to be stolen will be permitted (Illul Tzo):
He did not steal from the owner of the house – like taking from a thief, it is about to be stolen and not in his possession.
He did not steal from the thief – because it has not yet been stolen.
He does not hold the hands of offenders – On the contrary, it may weaken their hands.

My questions (one last time, with thanks)
A. Is there also a regular prohibition here besides the categorical imperative?
B. Is it possible to show from the prohibition against buying from a thief that there is a categorical imperative even where the number of people (who could fail and buy from the thief) makes the result almost certain.

There is a prohibition against stealing from a thief, but it seems to me that this theft is theft from a thief. See Rambam Theft 1:17.
He, as a guide, does not weaken the hands of those who commit a crime because the perpetrator of the crime here is the one himself. In your opinion, none of the burglars commits a crime because all of them together exempt themselves. This is clearly not reasonable.
Regarding the prohibition of buying, this is a special ruling of the Sages, and therefore I doubt whether a general principle can be learned from this.

In raids, stealing an object from its owner is precisely when it is under his control.
Stealing from a thief is under the control of the thief, (owners of robbery).
Wandering is like wandering because of a speck of sea, because the robbery is done by Gentiles. The categorical imperative apparently only applies if everyone is Israeli and everyone must refrain from robbery.

Tam, regarding your raids, I saw in the Khutbah of the Law of Moses (Sek. 3) that there is no thief after another thief (and if he eats, he harms the owner, and is not disqualified from testifying). And in Netivot (Sek. 5) that there is theft against the owner's "property". In any case, according to all of them, it is forbidden to use an object (at least use that harms its value).
Regarding a categorical commandment that encompasses gentiles, even a son of Noah is forbidden to steal, and simply put, this is the same prohibition of stealing as for a Jew.

Yehoshua, here I wanted to argue that he is not harmful, except that he is not a thief.
Regarding the decree,
Gentiles are obligated by the Seven Commandments of the Children of Noah. It is only regarding the main prohibition and not on associated prohibitions. And in any case, there is no prohibition on the sea's goods as a means of raiding, and it was found that the object was the sea's goods as it were.
I doubt whether the insurance companies and the police will try to reach the looters, it is more likely that they will look for the rioters who broke and broke into the stores, so that even from the authorities' perspective, the contents of the stores are as if they were abandoned.

That is, you agree that a regular thief is a thief or at least harmful when he causes harm, but you claim that here it is not a thief and also not harmful when he causes harm because here it is even more ”not with the permission” of the owner than when the object has already been stolen? Look at the first answer that the Rabbi answered me above, section B. Or is this theft after desperation?

I would say that there are also no accompanying permits and they would not be permitted at all in the case of a sea of thieves. A accompanying permit that comes with its caveats is sufficient (and the proposed caveat is that in the case of a sea of thieves it is permitted, because a decision that is forbidden to be made is not a useful decision in general. But in a broken-down store it is forbidden to be made, because a decision that is forbidden to be made is a useful decision in general).

Regarding insurance companies and the police, it was explained above that the police are a sign (probably a sign of the concept of public ownership, and then legal theory), and therefore even if the authorities do not have the resources or sufficient motivation to catch the looters themselves, the sign is still useful.

Here it is definitely not under anyone's control. Unlike a thief, a thief is a thief.
Regarding the accompanying permits, they depend on the accepted worldview, and it seems that in anarchy there are no laws anyway.
The police and insurance companies are a sign that this is not under anyone's control.

To Rabbi Michai Shalom.
With the forgiveness of the Torah for wanting to liken the above matter to the Flogathah of the Torah and the question of whether there is a difference between a stone thrower and a tool thrower, but there is no discussion at all about matters of despair and there is a discussion about the intrinsic value of the object itself, as discussed there in the Gemara Gabi Batar Meikra or Batar Tebar Mena, and that is, the question is whether the object is still defined as "worth" in these situations.
In contrast, in the matter of Didan, it is certain that the object will be worth the same after the person steals it as before he stole it, and when discussing matters of despair, it is a question solely of whether a person has despaired of the object or not, and there is no room for likening a case to a discussion about the value of the object itself.
Isn't that right?

It seems to me that the analogy to the type there is in the case where one threw an arrow and the other took the object for himself, in which case the other would be obliged to return it to its owner under the law of one who recovers a loss, even though it does not mean that the object no longer has value from the moment the arrow was shot, and likewise in the case where one threw the tool from the top of a roof and the other saved it, even if it is faded, the object belongs to its owner.

Avraham Aharon,
This is the division that comes to mind at the beginning of the thought, but in my opinion it is not a division. In the case of the sea, the object does not necessarily lose its value. It will eventually reach the port of Padua in Italy and someone will take it and use it. The basis of the despair (not everyone agrees that it is despair there. It may be normative-halakhic-legal despair and not factual) is that the object lost its value for the owner! That is the law here. And now you must ask at what moment its value for the owner was lost? At the time it was taken or at the time the store was broken into. And here there is room for division into the two, that as long as the object is in place and there is only an external threat to it, it is not considered to have lost value. Note that this is why I wrote that there may be room for this to be linked to the first dispute. It is clear to me that this is not exactly the same thing, but in my opinion there is definitely room for it.

In Manna Tabira, if the second person took the object for himself, will the first person be liable for a harmful judgment and the second person be exempt from the forfeiture?

Indeed, just like in the sea of Zut. After all, since people go from Aikra to Mana, if someone else comes and receives it with a sword (in a baby) or breaks it (in a vessel), he is exempt. What is the difference between breaking it and taking it?

What is the explanation that the one who kills a prey is exempt, but if it was stolen and sold or incited to commit a crime, he is supposedly liable?

First, how do you know that he is obligated in all of these?
Secondly, there is an intermediate situation in which the act of killing is committed but he himself is not yet dead. This is enough to absolve the murderer but he himself is still considered alive (I think he is obligated in the mitzvot until he dies, and there is no need to go to your examples). By the way, I remember that something similar was also written regarding Manna Tibera.

I didn't understand what was meant by "something like this was also written in relation to mana tabira". In tarifa, the killer is exempt and the thief is liable (I don't have a source, but we haven't heard), and in mana tabira in the above answer, the harmer is exempt and the thief is also exempt (from transfer and restitution)?

It is what I wrote.
Regarding the Mena Tabira, I remember that they wrote that an act of breaking was committed against it, but the vessel is not considered actually broken (for example, does it become impure?)