Judicial legislation
I heard your lesson on intuition and the synthetic-a priori problem and how this problem manifests itself on many levels (a fascinating lesson). Regarding judicial legislation, which you tried to solve with the help of intuition, I still don’t understand how this can explain the fact that judges legislate (interpret) the laws so that they work out exactly according to their worldview (as you showed in several examples)? Isn’t this conclusive proof that they use the dry law (intuition) to interpret them according to their worldview?
I hope I phrased myself correctly and the question was understood.
Thanks in advance.
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So the interpretation of the law is a kind of mix between his worldview (subjective) and an objective interpretation of the law?
Isn't it correct to say that a judge has a certain worldview and when he encounters the law, he will automatically interpret it according to his worldview and because he is a judge who only interprets and does not legislate, he finds a reference for this in the law? My question is whether the judge really believes that his interpretation of the law is more necessary/reasonable than the interpretation of his colleague with a different worldview or not?
Indeed.
You present it too crudely. He interprets as he understands, and that includes elements that depend on his views, but he is not necessarily aware of it. Sometimes yes. But to the outside observer it is clear that he is influenced by his views. Incidentally, this is also the case in halacha.
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