On the return of a loss

An excellent question, and so is the answer or division you proposed. Although there may be room for another formulation that provides a more substantial explanation. I will also state that you shall not stand for your neighbor’s blood, which appears in the Torah (see 10:1). It seems to me that similarly, the restoration of loss can be formulated as an obligation based on the right of the other. The basis is a person’s right to his property and body. Therefore, it is clear to you that it is forbidden to harm this, and this is a simple obligation by virtue of his right. But in the restoration of loss or the duty of salvation (you shall not stand for your neighbor’s blood), the Torah expands a person’s right to his property and states that each of us has an obligation to ensure that the property and body of our friend remain in our possession. According to this definition, there is room for the definition that this obligation is by virtue of the right of the other. And the question is, would a person have the right to sue me for not returning his property to him or for not saving him? As evidence for this view, there is a response in the Rashba’s response, Ch. 4, 37: Answer: What I wrote seems to me to be simple and close. I would say that I did not need to write it because of his many raids, since you have nothing standing in your way except for those three things mentioned. Reach yourself, whoever was in the desert and died of thirst and found a water jar belonging to his friend, he shall die and not drink, and even in order to pay, and he will be called a robber, and the owners are obliged to give him free of charge and to revive him until he was a free man. He demands in tractate Metzia that in the years when they were walking on the road with a water jar in one of them, if they drink, both die, and if one of them swims, it is better that both drink and die, and that neither of them see the death of his friend. And up to this point, Rabbi Akiva did not go beyond the fact that it is written: “If your brother lives with you, your life is preferred to the life of your friend.” Is it not in place of his life that he is liable? And if so, what kind of robbery is there here, until it is said in it, even though it is robbery, the payer is wicked, but certainly to save himself in order to pay a fine… Although he disagrees with Rashi, he makes the permission to rob conditional on the other person’s servitude to save the persecuted. This means that in principle the prohibition of robbery is not rejected, but there is no prohibition of robbery here. This is also stated in the Toshchus in the name of the Rosh and the Tosh that he cited in Benin Zion 3:167 , which only permitted robbing in order to pay. He explains that a person does not save himself with his friend’s money (BKS) means that the victim does not have to pay. why? Because the obligation to save him lies with the owner of the wealth, and therefore when I took his wealth from him in order to be saved, I did what he himself was obligated to do to me, and therefore I am exempt. We also see from these words of the Rashba that a person’s duty to save me is my right. If it were only his duty towards me, then such a duty does not justify my violation of his rights. I cannot take his wealth from him because he has a duty to give it to me. A person can say that he does not want to save me and will stand trial in a higher court, but I cannot force him to save me. Thus, a poor person cannot sue me to give him charity. If so, the Rashba, who permits me to take his wealth because of his duty to give it to me, apparently understands that the duty to save is based on my right over myself, as I explained above. And yet he still succeeds in this.