Persico on the good
What does the Rabbi think about these things that Persico wrote?
Tomer Persico on the proof of the existence of a metaphysical good that governs the changes in creation and morality:
And here is my view of the existence of metaphysical goodness.
We will start with two starting assumptions, which I think will be accepted as facts by all of us. First, life evolved through natural selection, according to fixed principles over hundreds of millions of years. We will not go into details, the story is broadly understandable and I hope it is accepted. Second, another fact: people want to be good. This is a phenomenon (which is wonderful and impressive in my opinion) that the vast majority of people want to be good and do good. People will of course define good in different ways, but with the exception of rare cases of psychopaths of various kinds, people will strive for good and seek to do good.
These are the starting assumptions. Now the question: Why would the evolutionary process create the same aspiration for the good? Wouldn’t it have been simpler, and cheaper from an evolutionary perspective, to direct humans toward the efficient? In other words, isn’t there something strange in the fact that we all seek the good, and aren’t simply drawn to the efficient (or the effective, or the worthwhile, or the profitable)? Why exactly do we need the good? Isn’t there therefore something puzzling in the fact that we carry within us an aspiration for the good? Isn’t there something even stranger in the fact that the aspiration for the good sometimes comes at the expense of the efficient, when we cling to our principles even when it would be better for us, egotistically, to let go of them?
Why weren’t we programmed by natural selection to pursue efficiency? To do at every moment what is most efficient for ourselves and for others? Why weren’t we programmed for survival efficiency, for ourselves and for our tribe? Why don’t we feel a pull to maximize at every moment the greatest efficiency that reality offers us and our community? Why didn’t we evolve so that at every opportunity and every choice we would do what was most profitable for our survival and for society?
It seems to me that logic would dictate that such efficient-active creatures would be much easier to program, cheaper to operate, and generally much more, well, efficient. If the evolutionary process is based on natural selection with genetic replication of the fittest, doesn’t it make sense that creatures like us would evolve without a longing for goodness (abstract and concrete), but only equipped with an uncompromising determination for efficiency?
Wait, I know what you’re thinking. Look, you say, we probably need some kind of concept, “good,” to really motivate us to do effective things. Apparently, if we just call it “effectiveness,” it won’t motivate us in the best possible way, evolutionarily, to do what’s needed. It’s just too weak, not attractive enough, doesn’t motivate us effectively enough. That’s why during the evolutionary process this concept, “good,” took shape, which is nothing more than an effective illusion, and it’s what motivates us to action.
But ah, I say, your answer is flawed in the assumption of what is sought. Think about it: Why doesn’t what is merely efficient attract us enough? Why do we need something that is beyond, something that is sublime, a category that is not satisfied with the profitable and rises to the obligatory? Why doesn’t efficiency instill sufficient motivation in us? Doesn’t living only for the profitable arouse in us the same passion? Why is there no choice but to strive for the good?
My answer is that good exists. Good exists, and therefore, a long-term process of natural selection “identifies” it in reality, and acts accordingly, meaning that creatures are created that are intended to survive in the reality in which it exists. This happens just as natural selection “identifies” the force of gravity and sunlight and tends to develop creatures that will suit the reality in which they exist. Good exists as a fixed thing in reality. As if it were a physical force or a chemical element. Or like time. Good exists. And creatures that develop in a universe in which there is good develop accordingly. They develop senses that recognize good and they grow as creatures that strive for good.
The argument is old and not his. I partially agree with it. One could argue that the good is what is beneficial (for the survival of the gene and not the individual), as is said about the survival value of altruism. I argue this by virtue of the concept of good and its validity and not by virtue of the tendency to be good. See the fourth notebook, part three.
His formulation is also strange to me. He wants to prove the existence of metaphysical good. Is it an object or a phenomenon? As an object, this is what is called God (that is what I assumed in my fourth notebook). If we are talking about the phenomenon of metaphysical good, the proof is not clear to me, because it assumes what is wanted. He claims that good is not practical but metaphysical (because it is made without benefit) and from this proves that… there is metaphysical good. Well, these are the facts, of course. The question is what is the explanation for them.
One can, of course, talk about moral realism (the existence of the ideal of the good, whose recognition motivates action), but if it is a fact, a moral obligation (norm) cannot be derived from it, because of the naturalistic fallacy. And if it is a charged fact (which motivates action, not neutral), then for me it is synonymous with God. In my notebooks, I argued that each argument assumes a different definition of God whose existence is being proven. The evidence from morality assumes it as the basis for moral validity.
I have a few points that I would like the Rabbi to clarify:
1.-From the naturalistic fallacy, if recognizing the idea as a fact does not entail moral action, then why would the fact that God exists entail moral action?
2.-What is the difference between a phenomenon and an object on a metaphysical level? After all, an object belongs to the physical, and therefore the metaphysical is necessarily some kind of metaphysical phenomenon.
You wrote “This is a charged fact (which motivates action, not neutral) so for me it is synonymous with God”
I don't understand how God motivates action and why a metaphysical good is necessarily God.. From the point of view of the fact that He is the only one who provides evidence for His metaphysical existence, and in any case this indicates that He is the primary cause?
Thank you
Or
The fact that God exists is a fact like any other fact. No norm or obligation follows from it. But if God created a good idea, then its existence is sufficient to oblige, just as the divine command (which is also just a fact) obliges. If God exists, this in itself does not create obligations, but this opens up the possibility of the existence of such an idea that is a "charged fact."
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