Postmortem autopsy and prohibition of burial of the dead

Now I thought that even without resorting to a persecutory law or public laws, there is an interest here for the deceased to have justice done to the one who caused his death. And a person's desire is his honor. And if for the purpose of shrouding he can be buried, even more so for the purpose of doing justice to his murder. Another reason is that perhaps the very act of doing justice to his murder has some protection for the honor of the deceased, because if they had not done justice to him, it would seem as if the blood of the murdered person was permissible.

There is no best.

Following on from this question, I heard today about a case of a 14-year-old boy who collapsed and died during a soccer game. The family refused an autopsy to determine the cause of death. Do you think the family is allowed to perform an autopsy to understand what happened to the boy?

[It probably won't add anything to anyone, but I once saw on the Otzar Hochma forum that they brought a figure of evidence from a halachic perspective that a vice that comes from/for benefit is not considered a vice (meaning it's not just a rejection instead of a necessity) from the Gemara Pesachim, which says praise to the priests who go up to their stirrups in blood]

[*Pesach's Cell, page 2]

If it is only an intellectual understanding without practical results - I don't think it should be permitted.
Although if in our opinion the deceased himself would have agreed to it, perhaps there is room for permission.

Well, I didn't fully understand the evidence from Pesachim.

I will try to put it up to hear the rejection (I was not able to find it in the forum there now to see more and give focused credit). The question is whether a state of honor is measured by the image alone or also by the interpretation. In the analysis of the dead from the point of view of the act, this is considered disrespectful, but if there is a purpose, then perhaps it is considered rather honorable. Do you think it is obvious that honor is judged by the interpretation, or that regardless of the opinion on the merits of the matter, there is no connection to the evidence from Pesach?

This is the language in Pesach. Tanya said to them, R’ Yehuda told the sages, "Why did you say, 'Why did you poke the shard' (Rashi - the hole in the wall of the shard through which the blood that mixes in the shard comes out and they used to poke it on every evening of Pesach. Shlomo, to my friend, so that all the blood that spills does not come out, and when the cup of the mixtures is filled, it is found in it from all of them, and if one of them spills without throwing it, it is found that he threw it). They said to him, 'Praise be to the sons of Aaron, who will go up to their anklets in blood.'
That is, the Sages deliberately wanted the priests to be baptized in blood even though there is no halachic benefit to it – and according to our path we have learned that even though it is filth and if it were just a slaughterhouse, it would be considered a disgrace and the priests would reject the offering even on Shabbat, which is not the will of the Sages, as it is written there in the Mishnah – because it is actually praise because it comes from the commandment, and so they dealt with it. In other words, honor is judged according to the interpretation. If so, then the law is ignominy and the purpose is what makes the deed honorable. And now I would be grateful if you could explain why the evidence is not there.

[And for the joy of the chatterbox, I will suggest an anecdote that in this there is an explanation for the dispute between Michal and David. And she saw King David dancing and dancing before the Lord and despised him in her heart. And Michal, the daughter of Saul, went out to meet David and said, How is the king of Israel honored today, that he has revealed himself today in the sight of the mothers of his servants, as one of the empty ones is revealed. And David said to Michal before the Lord: Etc. And I played before God.

And more evidence (I am not lying and I hope that I did not make a mistake in seeing that I committed a crime) from the Tosafot Kiddushin 3:45 And Tima. And Tima has made a vow of shame and blemish – a vow that is by herself that is her father’s, shame and blemish, because certainly from her father’s vows, they are completely by her, but initially (meaning in the Gemara in the Ketubot there we learn that the manes pays a vow of shame to the father) that is not by her from her father’s vows, and later (meaning in the Gemara here in the vows that try to teach that the vows are to the father even if she sanctifies herself in her youth) that is by her from what is not by her father. So. Then the Gemara rejects that I am a disgrace and a defect of a father who belongs in the body (it is not right for a woman to give herself to a prostitute and a woman with a boil to give herself to her shame and a defect). And it is apparently difficult why only a father belongs in the body and not she also belongs just as much as he does, since she can give herself to a woman with a boil in her youth. And it is said that if she gives herself up of her own free will, then it is not a disgrace and her will is her honor. ]

I suspected that this was the intention, and I don't see a shred of evidence here. After all, it's not about the honor of the dead, but simply about the concept of honor. The general explanation that honor depends on circumstances is simple and does not require evidence. After all, the honor of a T.H. is not the same as the honor of an ordinary person, etc. Even prostitution payments are not the same for every person.
By the way, what you wrote is really not for the joy of gossip. This is evidence no less good than the evidence you provided (i.e. evidence for the general explanation that honor depends on circumstances, which in itself does not require evidence). And the same is true for the issue of kiddushin.

[To me, the general explanation doesn't seem simple and I don't think that honoring the dead and shame are similar enough, but I won't insist.] Why would there be a difference between honoring the dead and just honoring them?
In the Tosafot on Kiddushin, I thought it was very loose because the fact that she is willing to give herself to a woman who is suffering does not mean that there is no shame, but that she is absorbing the shame in exchange for what she wants to get from the woman who is suffering.

The explanation that honor depends on circumstances is as simple as a statement. The question is within the boundaries of honoring the deceased and his conduct, whether what they forbade depends on his will and circumstances or whether the prohibition was established as a permanent boundary (both because of the boundaries of the sages' regulations and their halachic determinations and also because honoring the deceased may not depend on circumstances but is a matter of sacred values for the sages, which is his honor and nothing else). All of this evidence is of no use to this. The question is also whether the obligation to honor the deceased is towards the deceased (and then depends on his will) or is it an obligation towards Heaven (who want the dead to be honored).

I thought the evidence was also if the obligation towards Shemya, because the act itself is simply not considered obscene but praise. And that the honor of the priests and the temple depends on their will? Why shouldn't there be a permanent fence there according to what is considered disrespectful in other slaughterhouses?
[What shall I do and the expression frightens me and do not abhor me, etc.; and so in the end I hear and think. The dignity of a feeling like תאחה and the degree of shame according to the one who shames and the one who is ashamed certainly depends on the feeling that is derived from the circumstances, but when there are no feelings on the subject (like the priests and the dead) but rather we discuss according to definitions of situations, then at least it is not clear to me that the picture as it is has no meaning. The fact that David himself did not feel shame does not need evidence and is also irrelevant. The evidence is that a king who forgives the honor of the monarchy does not have his honor forgiven, and yet here in his opinion it was not at all disrespectful, but rather the opposite. As in shame, she probably feels similar feelings to the situation where her father gives her up, but as a matter of definition, if there is a desire, then it is not "considered" shame.

I agree with the explanation, as I wrote. The question is for Dina, as I detailed in the last message.

[There is no publication, but I found who said it. It is a picture of text and therefore elusive. The speaker is Rabbi Avraham Aharon Yodelevich (and there is a forum about him and the troubles that hang over his storms). After a long answer in which a necropsy permits studying medicine when there is another patient in front of us, from a certain Picun who rejects defilement and the prohibition of enjoying a dead body,
comes this section in which he responds to his friend's claim that the soul regrets seeing the body dissected.
http://forum.otzar.org/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=40530&hilit=%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%90+%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D#p55810
I hope the message was sent only once.]