Question about the Balama debate
In the SD.
Greetings to Rabbi Michi, the favorite of Ruba Da’alma. When I watched the polemic you had with Prof. Enoch, a few points came to mind and I wanted to ask you a question.
First, I felt that you did not maximize yourself. In the sense that you did not conduct the discussion, but rather you leaned in as a neutral player. And if you had conducted it, you would certainly have directed the discussion more sharply to the places where the basis of the dispute was, and effectively in the philosophical method to the points needed for the discussion and nothing more. (Unlike your impressive company bar, who at every opportunity deviated and spoke in a more general way).
Secondly, and this is my question: Could it be that you had such a hard time resolving the dispute (because everyone made their arguments and Ida didn’t even blink) because you didn’t define morality as a necessity before the debate? After all, you are a moral Kantian. And you only accept as moral an act that comes from an informed place that respects the “law.”
And Prof. Enoch, on the other hand, disagrees with you and accepts morality not necessarily in its “law” form. It’s like a scientific fact in his eyes. It comes from within the person and not outside of him. Morality is not some external law that needs to be attacked. And the justification for that? Intuition. Just as I accept the principle of causality by virtue of intuition, the same is true for accepting morality. There is no need to reduce it.
He suspected you of trying to make a metaphysical reduction to morality, and therefore, in my opinion, he became demagogic. But no [!], you did not try to make a reduction, but rather to give validity to the moral axioms. The debate took place on two different levels altogether.
In short, I felt that it took you a long time until this point became clear – which is the source of the controversy – and then the wave of questions began; so it was difficult to focus on this fundamental point. What is “morality” ?
I would love to hear if you agree with your student; was it the aforementioned lack of synchronization that accounted for the lack of doubt?
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Thank you very much for your generous response. Sounds like an interesting column, I'm eagerly awaiting it.
In my opinion, if the rabbi had spoken of morality as a (Leibovitzian) value, the professor would have been confused. Because he was trying to say that morality does not need a reason and that God is just filling the hole of why to uphold morality. In my understanding, he thought that Rabbi Michi's God came to remove the thought that morality is a Leibovitzian value (a value without a purpose). But Rabbi Michi's argument is that it is true that there is no purpose, but there is a source, a reason. Did I understand correctly?
Can we watch this controversy online?
What does a Leibowitzian value mean? That the commitment to morality has no purpose outside of it? That is certainly true, as it is true of every value. I was not impressed that you misunderstood me on this matter.
Rebecca Ray here in video lessons. I think this is the last one.
Yes, that's what I meant when I wrote a Leibowitzian entry.
Prof. Ankh always came back to the point that God is not needed, if I understood his words correctly, because there is no need to ask "why am I obligated to be moral?". And I think he doesn't make the distinction between why = what is the source and why = for what purpose. And in his opinion, because there is no need to ask "why be moral" (in the sense of purpose), then he dismisses the question altogether, or as he put it: "it's a false question."
This is my attempt to analyze what he said, because otherwise it's hard for me to understand what in what he said contradicts the need for an objective source to legislate morality (although in the end he said that if God is only the source of the moral command, then it's not to call it God but the objectivity of morality, and he also believes in this, just God forbid he call it God).
There is another difference beyond the question of whether to call it God or not. Is it an intentional being (with intentions and desires) or just an indifferent and silent fact? I will clarify everything in the next column.
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