Questions about Rob

A. Indeed, this is the accepted definition, unlike the majority of stores, which is a random majority (coincidental. It could have been different). As far as I understand, the majority is mistaken in the Ivura Dirha, but it is not a majority in nature, because it can be different. This is a human error and people can learn. A majority in nature is something physiological that is universal (although I would not rule out the possibility that nature will change with the generations, like perhaps women giving birth to seven children, but for now, there is a majority in nature and this is not a random constellation). It is true that the majority in the Bible should be discussed, from which we supposedly learn the ruba daita kaman (on a mundane issue), and the Harash has already made it clear that it is actually a ruba dalit kaman (for as the teaching explained, we trust that the truth is with the majority of the dayanim, meaning that in most assemblies the majority is right. And this is a ruba dalit kaman, which is in the nature of the world and not accidental and coincidental. And the Anad does not say that most people are wrong in a well-founded and well-founded opinion). And in explanation of things, I once said a renewed foundation in a lesson, and I am attaching the relevant passage from it: The possibilities for understanding the nature of the majority in the Jewish Court of Justice The Mishnah 29:1, which we saw in the previous lesson, teaches that when there is a disagreement in the Bible, we follow the majority. Rashi there states that this is learned from the verse “after many to incline.” Thus the Rambam did a Qa’, and in Hala Sanhedrin 58:1, in Chinuch Mitzvah 88, and more. Although the Shas does not appear in the Hadith to teach this verse, but rather in the matter of a biased opinion (in Sugain, 3:2). And the question of whether the law of a biased opinion is related to the law of following the majority was discussed in the previous lesson. For example, in Chai’ Ha-Ranan 3:22, from the law of a biased opinion we learn the principle that one must follow the majority. Indeed, at the end of the Sugiya, we see that at least Rabbi Yosiah learns the law of following the majority in the Bible from “after many to incline,” and from souls to possessions we learn this in the Koch. If so, this is an explicit source in the Gamma for the law of following the majority in the Bible. It should be discussed whether Rabbi Yonatan agrees with this form of teaching. As mentioned, in Gemara Chulin 11a we learn from this verse the general law of majority: “After many, to deviate” – hence Dazlinan betar Ruba. The intention there is to follow the majority in clarifying the sufficiency, and not necessarily in deciding a law in the court of law. It is true that this is the same principle, and this itself is learned from the court of law. To understand this, we must examine the purpose of following the majority in the Torah. The meaning of the verse “after many to incline” is determined by the problem that this rule is supposed to solve (the problem that would exist if the Torah had not renewed this rule). On the surface, it seems like a mitzvah education , which he wrote: The commandments of following many To incline after many, and this is when a dispute arises among the sages in the law of the Torah’s policies as a whole, and likewise in a private law, that is, in the law that would be between Reuven and Shimon in the manner of a parable, when there is a dispute between the judges of their city, some of whom judge in favor of the law and some in favor of the law, to incline after the majority forever, as it is said [Exodus 23:2] to incline after many, and in the explanation they said, “Their memory is blessed” [Chulin, page 11, a] “a large part of the Torah.” And the choice of this majority according to the simile is in the two groups that disagree, knowing the wisdom of the Torah equally. It is not to say that a small group of wise men will not defeat a large group of ignorant men, even like the Exodus from Egypt. But in the wisdom of the simile or shortly, the Torah informed us that the majority of opinions will always agree on the truth more than the minority. And whether they agree on the truth or not, according to the opinion of the listener, the law dictates that we should not deviate from the path of the majority. And what I am saying is that the choice of the majority is always in the two groups that disagree, knowing the wisdom of the truth, because it is said everywhere except in the Sanhedrin, where we do not scrutinize whether they disagree or not, which group knows more, but always do according to the words of the majority. The reason is that they were considered to be bound by the Torah, and it is as if the Torah had commanded in an interpretation according to the majority of these, that you should do all your affairs, and moreover, they were all great sages. And the roots of this mitzvah, which we were commanded to strengthen the observance of our religion, are that if we were commanded to observe the Torah when we could attain the true intention of it, each and every one of Israel would say, “My opinion is that the truth of such and such a matter is so,” and even if the whole world were to say otherwise, he would not have permission to make the matter contrary to the truth according to his opinion, and the result would be destruction that the Torah would be made into several teachings, because each one would understand according to the limitations of his own understanding. But now that we have been commanded to accept the understanding of the majority of the sages, there is one Torah for all of us, and our existence is great in it, and we must not deviate from their understanding, no matter what. Thus, by doing their mitzvahs, we fulfill the commandments of God, and even if the sages do not sometimes direct us to the truth, God forbid, the sin will be on them and not on us. And this is the matter that their blessed memory said in the Horyot [page 2, a.] that a court of law that erred in a teaching and acted according to them, that they are not the only one at all, except in the aspects expressly stated there. The last paragraph explains why it is necessary to decide at all (and indeed this is only where uniformity is needed. It is not necessary to decide every dispute, especially if it goes against the value of each person’s autonomy). The previous paragraphs reflect a perception that the majority is usually right, and therefore the majority is followed. We explained in class that in a democratic majority the situation is completely different. There, the majority is followed not because it expresses the truth, but because it is the right of each person to determine their own fate. See my article in the attached file on this. According to the teaching , is the majority in the Bible a majority of Daita or a majority of Litha Kamen? It is quite clear that it is a majority of Dalita Kamen (as the Hararshash explains in Shachag Pasha), since we are basing our reasoning on the fact that in most cases the majority is right. This does not refer to the case found here.   Explanation of R.S. Shekap in the Bible, the cabbage is a common name. In Sha’i Sha’ga Pa’a, he goes into detail about the difference between the two types of majority, and brings up a dispute among the Rishonim about which one is stronger. In the lesson, we explained the Maimonides’ method that the majority of Dalit is stronger, according to the David Levi effect (where 100 percent of the results are determined by the majority of voters). Thus, the application of the majority of Dalit is applicable to all cases, and the minority is not taken into account. In the majority of Dait, there are Rishonim who say that in the end, there is no longer anything to eat, because in the Sus before us, there is a minority and it cannot be ignored. Rabbi Shekap claims that the majority of data does not clarify reality at all (this is a geziyyah from “after many to incline”). His reasoning for this is very puzzling. For he attributes this to the fact that in every shop there is a majority against it, which is of course a halakhic and unrealistic argument (an error in probability). He further claims that the teaching of the law is problematic, since in his opinion the majority in the Jewish Court is a majority of the Da’ita Kaman. Therefore, he explains the majority in the Jewish Court differently. He claims that one follows the majority of the parties. Just as each of the shops imposes a side on a piece of meat (whether it is kosher or not), and follows the majority of the parties, so each judge imposes a side on the case (that the law is this or that) and follows the majority of the parties. He explains that therefore these two are cases of a majority of the Da’ita Kaman.   An alternative proposal to explain ‘education’ We have seen that the majority of data is not based on a sample and a generalization, since it is not possible to test it in an experiment. This is in contrast to the majority of data, which is a scientific generalization based on a representative sample (like the majority of women giving birth to nine). Now let’s think about the majority in the law according to the explanation of education . Suppose that the majority is usually right, what is this assumption based on? Is it the result of a sample and a generalization? It seems not, if only because there is no way to perform tests on such a sample. Let’s take a collection of rulings that were received by the majority against a minority and ask how many of them were right? We have no way of knowing what is right in each case, since we have no more information than the judges themselves. Therefore, there is no way to create the generalization of education in the scientific form of a generalization of observations on a sample. So what is it based on? It seems to be on common sense. But if so, then it is similar to the majority of daita kaman and not the majority of dalitah kaman. It is true that it has the character of a majority of dalitah, but the attacks of this majority are based on common sense like the attacks of the majority of daita. Therefore, the Gemara in Holin states that the majority in the Beid is similar to the majority of shops and is the majority of daita kaman. There is no need to reach the explanations of R. Shekap, and as we have seen, they are not really correct either. There is a majority in favor of kashrut shops in reality as well. This is not only a halachic geziyyah, and even without the halachah, it is likely that we would do this. We note that the course of the issue of Chulin can remain as suggested by R. Shekap. The difference between the majority of daita and the majority of lita is that they are different, and not that one is strong and the other is weak. Therefore, the Gemara in Chulin assumes that one cannot learn from the other. Although the conclusion, at least according to one explanation in Rashi there, is that the majority of dalitah is also learned from “after many to incline,” since the S.S. here follows the majority. B. In Mordechai there are two responsa, and as far as I remember the difference between them is in the question of whether the place of determination is discussed according to the dayanim or according to explanations. I understand Maharat Hayut’s intention to say in the second opinion (that we discuss explanations and not the dayanim) that the fact that a reason is an abstract thing has no place, and therefore the place of determination of the explanation does not belong. And perhaps Mordechai’s intention is as I said in the lesson I gave above. [In parentheses, I didn’t understand your wording regarding “a true mixture” versus “seeing everything in itself.” A fixed thing is also a true mixture, the question is only whether it is mobile or fixed in its place. And would it occur to you that there is no fixed law in the dry in the dry that is evident? After all, the judges in the Jewish Law are such a mixture, as well as in throwing a stone at a Lego and in frogs. Usually, it is fixed in the dry and not in the wet.] All the best,