Questions about the first one
I’ll try to write something specific that bothers me.
At the end of the first book, you lead the reader from deism to theism.
To my disappointment, it was precisely in this part that bothered me the most that I disagreed with your arguments.
But right now I don’t have the book with me (I lent it to someone), so I will rely on the fifth notebook.
You start with an assumption that, in your opinion, is unlikely that the purpose of creation is morality, because if the purpose is to correct ourselves, then it would be better not to create in the first place. You assume that “the role of morality is to correct creation and the human society that lives and works in it. In other words, morality is a means to complete creation and human society, and therefore it cannot constitute a purposive explanation for its very existence.” It is much more likely in my opinion to assume that morality itself is the religious purpose for which the world was created. By the way, you wrote an article in which you elaborated at length on the importance of the process, so here too it could be said that the moral work itself is the cause, but that is not important.
You also claim that even if we say that morality is the purpose, it still lacks revelation, otherwise it is teleological instead of deontological. But reality has proven that people have arrived at a deontological conception of morality without a form in revelation. A person who makes a voluntary moral decision usually does so out of some purpose (I myself experienced a moral decision a few weeks ago, the decision required me to restrain my strong instinct for curiosity, and also to refuse my parents, I am almost certain that I did not aim for any result).
Even after you write that we were created for a religious purpose, you do not pretend to know or understand what the purpose is. You assume, at a later stage, that the commandments have some hidden religious purpose. The same thing, only with greater probability (in my opinion), can be said about morality. The purpose of creation was this hidden religious purpose, and morality was created in such a way that humans would know what the concept of “good” is, would recognize good deeds as desirable, and this alongside freedom of choice. The whole concept of an idea of good that is agreed upon by almost all humans, alongside a weakness of will that prevents us from choosing what is good, expresses to me a mystery of strong significance.
Then you assume that if there is a goal and purpose, one must expect some divine revelation that will reveal the purpose in question to humans, and therefore the historical accounts of the giving of the Torah gain new validity. Here too, the superiority of the thesis I presented earlier stands out. The purpose is morality, and God planted it in the heart of everyone in an astonishing way, so there is no need to assume that God is racist and chose one people for some reason. I do not mean now a moral judgment of God (is there such a thing? There is a precedent in Abraham) but to show that it is less likely than identifying morality, which is universal, as the religious purpose of creation, and thus it belongs to every person regardless of race and gender.
In the end, we will always reach a place where it is said that it is impossible to get to the bottom of God’s mind. His religious goals disappear from us, why he chose one people over all others and why specifically the people of Israel, this is also unclear. In my opinion, one should choose the option that raises the fewest questions, such as this one. Moreover, the entire discussion is based on a hidden assumption that his way of thinking is similar to ours and his way of operating is the same. This is of course a common scientific assumption (the laws of physics are the same everywhere) but it is much less well-founded (because in the first place we are talking about a being that precedes the world, precedes the known laws and perhaps also precedes the laws of logic). Some will say that this is a real intellectual failure.
So much for the first part of the fifth notebook.
I really don’t like to correspond, I like to talk face to face.
If you have any time we can chat, then it’s best if you save the correspondence and we can talk.
If there is no time, then we will continue like this (I have many more questions).
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You see it as arguments that fit together and create a strong argument as a whole. I see it as a doubt-doubt doubt. Each stage in itself is improbable to me (although not unfounded) and therefore the final picture is very doubtful.
Do you accept as a religious goal (of the Creator) only illogical commandments? That is, because morality also has an earthly and rational purpose of correcting society, it cannot be a goal?
There are actually two consistent ways here: You assume religious goals that are illogical to the flesh, and therefore revelation is required, and therefore you believe in the historical story of the giving of the Torah. I assume a religious goal that also has a human rationality, and precisely because of this the Creator planted them in the hearts of His creatures, and therefore there is no message that the Creator would try to convey through revelation, and therefore the historical account of the giving of the Torah is questionable to me.
I also have another argument in my favor that just occurred to me: If God was looking for a way to convey his message, that is, his religious goals, to the Jews, why did he choose a path that is so easy to doubt? Or the path of recommendation, how could he come to me with claims if the religious commitment is so unfounded?
Regarding deontological morality, you are the expert. Is Kant's morality distilled from revelation? I know that it derives its validity from God, but without any revelation. I am not too familiar with the personalities and methods, but the fact is (I write this from a perspective, I do not clearly know this “fact”) that primitive societies have morality (usually different in some values from ours). What I wrote, in my opinion, there really is room for investigating moral feeling. To the best of my memory, it was simply clear knowledge that I could not do such a thing.
You believe in tradition as a result of a priori considerations, I, for various a priori considerations, do not believe in tradition.
Regarding the use of language, you are absolutely right, that is the basis of the argument, but one should be careful not to personify God too strongly, although I do not think that one of your arguments can be said to be too crude.
What I am thinking right now is that if morality is indeed the religious goal, then the people who obey morality and choose goodness do not intend to fulfill the obligation of the commandment. We need to look into the matter, if such an act (assuming that morality is the religious goal of creation) has religious value. Apparently, here too, everyone will be divided according to their own method. I will argue that since God planted morality within us and choosing it is the goal, then it is clear that we are required to choose goodness, and not necessarily to choose religious value. You will argue that there is no value in an unconscious choice.
But apart from that, there are many ideas and methods for why God created the world. I remember right now: perfection and perfection, to benefit his creatures, to be recognized by his creatures, etc. Etc. It could be that the goal is one of these (or similar) and we, through our actions (faith, choosing goodness, or any of its forms), help to fulfill the destiny.
Doesn't make sense?
But we are not talking about several reasons, but rather a structure whose various layers reinforce each other. In order for there to be a sufika doubt here, it is logically required that the reasons must join together and only all of them together (the action of “also” between all of them) give the result. In such a case, if you have a doubt about each of them, a sufika doubt is created. But here the sufika of reason A is weakened in light of reason B. The reasons here are in the realm of “or” and not in the realm of “also”. From this you will understand that, contrary to what you say, I do not believe in tradition from a priori considerations. These considerations join historical considerations. Therefore, all the goals you proposed at the end of the email should not be discussed on the level of whether they are logical or not. Even if they make sense, another tradition has come down to us that reinforces the conclusion that the commandments are the goal.
I do not assume that the goal must be illogical. Absolutely not. My assumption is that morality is not the goal, and in fact everything that is intended to improve the condition of man or people in general is not the goal.
Regarding morality, I wrote my opinion. It can be understood without revelation, since it is inherent in me. But without faith in God, there is no morality. And if you perceive morality as an end in itself and not the improvement of the condition of people, then in my opinion it requires revelation because that is not its simple meaning.
The goal of self-education does not stand on its own. The question is what does it mean to be educated? That requires revelation (and commandments).
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