Salting the sacrificial meat
In Rambam’s Shabbos 11:5, he ruled that there is no processing (and salting) of the food. In the Mishnah Lemelech, he cited a baraita in Menachot that brings a sermon to permit salting the meat of sacrifices, and if there is no processing of the meat, what is the need for the sermon? There he cited from the Shimak the excuse that this prepares the sacrifice and therefore involves processing, and it seems that his intention is that salting meat is not processing because nothing new is created by it (only a flavor is added), and salting the sacrifice renews the kosherness of the sacrifice for the altar.
The Mahrash (in Arzan) made this excuse difficult because Rambam ruled that the sacrifice is kosher retrospectively even without salting.
According to your important and well-known article on the diseases, as well as according to the example you often use of the diseases of the sukkah as part of its haftza (the opinion of the Qosh), I have come to the conclusion that even fulfilling the obligation of salting in itself corrects and renews the haftza, because there is a metaphysical difference between a salted sacrifice and an unsalted sacrifice.
Does the rabbi agree?
[Another point I would like to know: In your words about these halakhic entities, are you describing the Sages’ perception or also your own? Do you also assume that the halakhic entities are metaphysical entities?]
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[Treasure of Wisdom Search “Processing in Ochlin” in the books of Shvadron]
In the book Ein HaRoiim for Maharash and his son, page 151 letter 2, it is written as follows: “The comment on this is according to what the Rabbi wrote, chapter 3; Desukah e Lulav, there is no need for an egg, and it is not considered a corrective in its shagdo, since it does not delay. And indeed, Rambam, p. 1, from the laws of Issu, explains that a demlicha does not delay retrospectively, so let it be understood as a corrective”.
Ceramic Agbara?
[I have been told several times, I don't know how true and/or beautiful it is, that the Galician geniuses generally provide evidence, but their evidence is not always accurate. That is why I was surprised to myself how the Maharash insists that a correction from the beginning (in the Torah) is not considered a correction without providing evidence. And upon searching, it turns out that he does indeed provide evidence (Maharan) and on the face of it it is good evidence. However, perhaps it is possible to distinguish between an egged in the lulav, which is an additional matter, because of this, I am not a believer, and therefore there is no "correction" here of the lulav, and between a salting in the korban, which is a mitzvah in the korban itself and is considered a correction. ]
Indeed, I meant the words of the Maharshi quoted here (by Yass, and I did not understand what the Rabbi meant by the phrase “gabra agbra”).
My basic assumption (and the Maharshi’s, apparently) was that the halacha that salting does not inhibit indicates that salting is not a law in a sacrifice but a law in a sacrifice.
The Rabbi wrote to me: “And even if in retrospect it is kosher even without it, it qualifies it for a sacrifice.” In other words, the Rabbi understands that salting is a law in a sacrifice, only that it does not inhibit it. This is an excellent solution, but I would be happy to see another example of a law in a haftza that does not inhibit.
[What I tried to do was to resolve the problem without changing the assumption that salting is not a law in a sacrifice.]
You explain the Rambam, so what is there to make difficult for the rabbi?
There is no shortage of examples of the law of haftza that does not delay. There are laws of a sukkah that do not delay (thatch before the walls). Even an egged in the lulav mentioned here. In the holy books of the year it is written that it must delay, and it is unlikely that all of them are laws of Gebra.
You can of course state that everything that does not delay is not a law of haftza, but then by definition there would be no counterexample.
Thank you very much.
[The Rabbi insists on the Rif who wrote that since according to the law the lulav must be tied, then if it is not tied, it must be tied on a good day. And in general, one needs a good reason to try to argue between the Rif and the Rambam (especially since the initial difficulty about the melcha also has other excuses). But for the aforementioned reason, one should easily distinguish between this "Ali Vanahu" in the lulav, which is not a correction, and the mitzvah of melcha in the korban, which is a correction from the beginning.]
(I used the name Yes, which comes from a verse, etc., and I apologize for the mix-up)
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