Tema D’Akra
In the third part of your wonderful trilogy, you rejected the explanation for not requiring a reason for the reading because it is not certain that this is the reason, since on the side where the reason is correct, we will lose if we do not require it (for example, the one who accompanies a rich widow could be poor, etc.).
I didn’t quite understand the rejection. The fear is that we won’t fulfill the Creator’s will. If we demand a reason for the reading and don’t generalize the halakhic requirement as it emerges from the plain meaning of the reading, we may be violating His will. But if we don’t demand, perhaps some kind of moral injustice will arise, but there is no fear that we will be violating His will. (For example, in the case of the widow, if the demand is truly also for a wealthy widow, then by demanding the reason we will be violating God’s will for a wealthy widow, but if the halakhic law is truly that it is permissible to take a mortgage that enriches, and if we don’t demand the reason, we will not be violating any halakhic law.)
I personally lean more towards Maimonides, mainly because it doesn’t say anywhere that we don’t demand, because that’s not the reason. It says that we don’t demand, so it seems like a clear rule, the sermon itself is not done. (I’m aware that the G.M. always simply points to the rule and doesn’t deal with its meta, and it may indeed be the meta. It’s hard for me to point out the point, but it doesn’t seem that way from the G.M.) But also because I have trouble accepting this distant concern, when the reason is clear to us why we shouldn’t demand. But that’s not my question, my question is that I didn’t understand your rejection.
I didn’t understand what was not understood: Let’s assume that the real reason for the prohibition of mortgage to a widow is as suggested by R.S. So it follows that there is no prohibition regarding a wealthy widow. Now, if you don’t require a reason for a claim because you might be wrong, then to the same extent if you don’t require it, you might be wrong and in fact it is possible to mortgage to a wealthy widow. My argument is that there are no less advantages to an approach that does not require a reason for a claim but rather adheres to the language of the verse. And if you have a compelling reason for the mitzvah, then there is even a preference for the alternative, which is indeed the correct reason. Why assume that a reasonable reason is not the correct reason, but that there is another reason that we are not aware of?
This is clear to me.
My argument is that the requirement of reason can lead to me transgressing the will of God, while the failure to require reason can lead to serious consequences, but not to the gravest consequence of "transgressing the will of God."
I see only two directions for the answer here:
1. Transgressing the will of God is no more serious than other consequences.
2. The failure to require reason can also lead to transgressing the will of God, when the sermon includes more cases than what is written in the verse.
I do not accept both directions. Regarding 1, it is certainly understandable that the fear of transgressing the will of God is the most serious.
Regarding 2, the claim of the M.D. that they do not require a reason for reading is only where the sermon diminishes from the command in the verse, it can also be required when the sermon increases. (If you prove that the same M.D. does not require it even when the sermon increases, then I accept this excuse.
I really don't understand what the discussion is about. When you don't require a ta'ma'dqra, you are violating the will of God. He meant that you would rip up a rich widow's garment and you are not obligated. In this case, although it is ostensibly a grave matter, it is not true: when you do not allow the rip up of a rich widow's garment, you are harming a lender who has no collateral for his loan and you are harming a widow who will not be lent to. And so with every ta'ma'dqra requirement, there is a possibility of violating the will of God.
For example, disqualifying women from testifying. When you disqualify women, you are reducing them. Now I am demanding a ta'ma'dqra and increasing educated women. Should I implement this or not? If I do not qualify educated women, I am violating the will of God both by harming women and by not issuing a true judgment (because women's testimony is not accepted).
(According to the law of Emet, it can be said that this is simply a human violation of property. But the multiplicity of educated women according to the Te'ma D'Kra also affects prohibitions between a person and a place. Two women were witnesses at the Kiddushin. According to the law, witnesses are required and the Kiddushin does not apply. The woman is free and the groom is permitted among her relatives. If the Te'ma D'Kra is required and educated women are eligible to testify, then the Kiddushin does apply and the woman is not free and the groom is prohibited among her relatives.)
You are actually going the other way.
Oh, you claim that instead of there being a harshness in demanding the reason for a call, then the reason is incorrect.
I claim that according to the accepted explanation (which you rejected), oh, in these cases a reason for a call is required.
The case of a widow is simply incorrect, since the party who had to demand the reason for a call is not commanded to tear a widow's garment (that is, there is no such mitzvah). In short, there is no prohibition against tearing a garment and I will not violate any prohibition, therefore it is harshness.
There is no doubt: on the side that it is true, it is true. But we are discussing here whether it is true. You assume that if we do not demand a reason to read, then the will of God is expressed in the language of the Scripture and not in its meaning, and in any case we do not transgress His will. But that is the discussion itself, is there not a transgression of the will of God here. So what is the point of assuming what is requested?!
I think we have exhausted it.
I would be happy to do the mitzvah, but I feel that I was misunderstood (apparently I did not write clearly) and this is also a fundamental issue in my opinion, so it is important for me to close the corners.
After all, there is your foundation of the halacha (the command of God) and on the other hand, the will of God.
The argument of the meditators who do not demand is that on the side that this is really not the right reason, you are violating the halacha.
Because the halacha was not to harm any widow.
But if this is indeed the right reason, then by the lender not taking the pledge, there would be a violation here of the will of God, but not of the command of God. (After all, the meditators insisted that there is no actual command to harm a widow's garment).
And worse than violating the will of God is to violate the command of God.
I will give a clearer example, he will not remove his heart, how would you interpret it there that if the reason must be demanded and is not demanded, it is possible to violate the halakha?
Completely understood and also completely answered.
I will try one last time. The discussion is about whether or not to demand a reason for reading. Therefore, at the moment we do not have data that does not demand a reason for reading. Hence, your assumption that if I obey the commandment literally without demanding it, I am in any case fulfilling the commandment is incorrect. This is true only on the side that does not demand a reason for reading (then what God commanded is for all widows). But if a reason for reading is demanded (meaning the commandment is only for poor widows) then obeying the commandment also for rich widows is a violation of God's will (which, as mentioned, has costs for both the voice and not just the voice).
That's it.
There is some kind of deaf discourse here, and in any case, for me the discussion is not exhausted.
As far as I understand, Reuven does not at all intend to claim that if I do not demand a taema dekra then I will in any case fulfill the commandment, which is of course the desired assumption as the Rabbi says.
He means what the Rabbi wrote in the last paragraph in parentheses, that the Rabbi assumes that not demanding a taema dekra also has a “price”, but Reuven claims that the prices are not equal, because if we actually demand a taema dekra, a situation will be created in which they will actively violate the will of God (in the sense of getting up and doing, not exactly), whereas if we do not demand a taema dekra, it is possible that a non-optimal situation will be created in which the lender will pay a certain price, but no one will actually violate the will of God.
(The example of not multiplying wives illustrates this better. If we require a reason for the command, a situation will be created in which he will actually marry many wives and actively violate the will of God. However, if we do not require a reason for the command, then at most he will not exercise his right to multiply wives. However, on the other hand, we are wrong and it is possible to demand that there is no obligation to multiply wives, and therefore he does not actually violate the will of God, meaning that the “price” of this side is lower.)
Yishai, read again (so that there is no dialogue between the deaf). This is only a small part of what he claims and even that has already been well answered.
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