The duty of obedience – to God or to morality?

It is clear that if the obligation to obey morality stems from the obligation to obey God, then it is impossible for the obligation to obey God to stem from morality. My argument is that the obligation to obey morality does not stem from the obligation to obey God, but rather is the primary obligation that constitutes the basic axiom of the obligation to obey, and from which the obligation to obey God stems (not because of “goodwill,” but because of the assumption that God is moral and good and therefore his commands must be moral and good). Just as, according to you, the obligation to obey God is the basic axiom that gives rise to the obligation to obey the morality he has enacted.

That is, our system has a basic axiom of authority, and the question is which: morality or the divine will. My argument is that while I certainly find logic in a commitment to morality in a way that does not require a more primary source to cause this commitment, I have difficulty accepting this regarding the second possibility - a commitment to the divine will, which I see no logic in being committed to if there is no moral consideration in doing so.

I brought up the example of an evil god to illustrate the difference between the two proposals for the initial commitment, that if the commitment is to morality then there is no obligation (and even a prohibition) to obey God's evil commands, but if the commitment is to the divine will - there is an obligation to obey even an evil god whose commands are evil and immoral. In my opinion, basic intuition supports the position that evil commands should not be obeyed, even if their source is divine, and not that every divine command should be obeyed even if it is evil.

I would love to hear and better understand your position, and again, thank you and much appreciation for your great investment in answering the questions.

It is not possible to give validity to morality without something or someone behind it that gives it validity. Morality is not an object and therefore has no validity on its own. And even if you assume that there are moral facts as entities (moral realism), such facts have no validity without someone who gives them it and stands behind them.
And on the other side of the equation, the obligation to worship God cannot stem from the fact that he is good. Even if he is good, so what? The fact that he is good does not create validity for the principles he believes in. And even if he is good, why does that mean that I have to follow all kinds of his instructions that are not related to morality?

But one can equally ask what gives the binding validity to the commands of God Almighty, God Almighty Himself? So who gave Him the authority to do so and why should I obey Him?

In order to reach a source of authority (assuming there is one) one must reach a primary source that did not receive authority from another entity but whose authority is axiomatically self-evident according to common sense that requires it without the need for further explanation as to why and from where.

You claim, if I understand correctly, that such a source can only stem from an entity (or personality) and not from a fact or value, but I do not understand why. The authority of this personality must also ultimately stem from a certain reason - a value that common sense requires us to follow and not violate.

As I see it, the value of doing good things and not doing bad things is self-evident according to common sense, and this is the source of its binding validity. On the other hand, I see no value in doing God's command if there is no good and moral benefit in doing so.

Again, I will ask, does the Rabbi see an obligation to obey even an evil God whose commandments are evil only because they were spoken by God? Also, does the Rabbi believe that without the existence of God there would be no reason to be moral so that there would be no flaw in robbery and murder, for example?

[Also, I would be happy if you could explain in your opinion what is the characteristic of God that has the binding authority, is it the fact that he is omnipotent or that he is the creator of the world, etc.]

An entity can have an authority that must be obeyed. But there is no obedience except to an entity. Obedience to facts is a meaningless expression. In other words: every law requires a legislator.
The fact that you feel a value or obligation is a vague feeling. For it to reflect truth, there needs to be someone in the background. How can you make demands on someone who doesn't feel it within themselves?
Commitment to God stems from the fact that he created the world and us.
If he commands bad commands, there will also be an obligation to obey, but I might refuse them. But the obligation remains. But I think this is a meaningless question, since God, by definition, is good. Beyond that, it is a completely different reality that is not like our world and it is difficult to answer such hypothetical questions. You have to live there to answer.

Jacob,

It seems to me that there is a logical fallacy in your question. In my understanding, God is not a being or a figure who has established various laws, but rather the root of the reality and being of these laws. So if God is an expression of the source of goodness in the world, then this includes what you call "morality."

In other words, "commitment to doing good" and "commitment to God" are exactly the same thing, just in different words.

Even without God, I think it is certainly possible to define the laws of morality. For example, as an extreme case, killing innocent people without any benefit is certainly an immoral act without any disagreement. Of course, the exact limits can be argued, but this is true even when there is a God. So, I don't understand why you say that there is no meaning to obeying morality without God, why I cannot be said to obey these laws of morality, which are revealed to me by common sense and conscience.

This is not just a feeling but a necessary recognition, like the recognition that gives validity to all axioms in all fields, such as the recognition that everything has a reason (except axioms…), the assumption that it is true is not a mere feeling but a necessary and almost ‘immediate’ recognition that stems from common sense and does not require further explanation.

And in any case, according to your method, we must also reach such an axiom, except that according to your method, the axiom is not that one should do what is good and moral, but that one should do the divine will. And that can also be made difficult, just as you made it difficult for me, that ”this is a vague feeling and how can you make demands on someone who does not feel it within himself” (like me…).

Regarding an evil god, you said that he still has authority but that you may refuse it. Doesn't the meaning of your words mean that in fact the commitment is not to the divine will but to morality, and therefore in a conflict between them you will obey morality and not the divine will? [Or do you mean that you will not obey it only because of your ‘weakness’ and the ’evil inclination’ in you (although the inclination to do good can be called an ‘evil inclination’…), but a truly ‘righteous’ Will he obey the evil divine will and not morality?]

Regarding the fact that an evil God is a hypothetical possibility that is not possible in reality, I do agree with the claim (at least assuming that God is indeed composed of all the attributes we attribute to Him, regarding an entity that would create a specific person and is not omnipotent, I certainly believe that there is a theoretical possibility that it would not be good) but in my opinion this does not harm the ’investigation’ of what component of God we obey Him for. If we obey Him only because He is good and moral, we find that the commitment is to morality and not to the divine will, but in this case the divine will is good and therefore we obey Him. On the other hand, if the commitment is due to His being the Creator of the world or due to other attributes of His, then the commitment is not to morality but to God (but I do not understand the logic of this commitment, why would I obey God's laws just because the one who legislated them is the Creator of the world regardless of whether they are good or bad?!).

In my opinion, these words also provide an answer to Moses' response, which is that although morality and the divine will are in fact united because God is good and moral, this does not resolve the issue of whether the commitment is to the divine will for its own sake or to the good and moral and therefore also to the divine will which is good and moral.

The question is not defining the laws but giving validity to the laws. See column 457.
There is a common approach according to which any matter that you cannot explain you can claim is an axiom and that is it. And certainly if you have an intuition that it is so. But this is a mistake. Even if I have some feeling that something is true, it does not mean that it is true or that it is an axiom. If this feeling is not logical or is based on something else, then I will choose to say that it is not true or is not an axiom.
Of course there is a feeling of obligation to morality. But in the absence of a factor that gives it validity, this cannot be an axiom (because no law is valid without a legislator to whom I am obligated). This is exactly my argument in the argument from morality in the fourth conversation in the first precept. This feeling proves to me that I believe in God, because otherwise it would not make sense. Therefore, the feeling in itself is not enough to establish an argument.
On the other hand, the intuitive feeling that there is an obligation to the Creator of the world has no logical problem. It sounds completely reasonable, and therefore, from his point of view, it is both true and an axiom. Therefore, it can also establish a commitment to morality.

The discussion about an evil god is, as stated, hypothetical and there is no point in conducting it. In the series of columns that will begin today, I will talk about the limitations of thinking about a reality that is unfamiliar to us and far from us.

If I understand correctly, the gist of your argument is that there can be no valid law without a legislator to whom I am obligated, and therefore the primary obligation can only be to God – as the legislator – and not to morality, which is the law itself. This is the logic on which you base the claim that only an obligation to God can constitute an axiom, in contrast to an obligation to morality, which cannot be such because it contradicts the logic of ‘there is no law without a legislator’.

But in my opinion the logic is exactly the opposite. To be obligated to something requires a reason. The entity itself cannot constitute a reason for being obligated to it, but only if there is another reason, namely some value, that requires it. On the other hand, an obligation to a certain value can be due to the very fact that the value is true and good in a way that cannot be doubted. Only after I am obligated to a value, am I obligated to an entity whose laws correspond to this value.

This can be illustrated by comparing it to the laws of the Knesset. Commitment to the Knesset does not stem from the entity called the ‘Knesset’ itself, but from a certain set of circumstances (or several) that give it authority, such as the value of ‘rule by the people’, the value of ’democracy’ or the social consensus of the citizens of the state. Only because of the fact that obedience to the Knesset fulfills these values – I obey it. Without them, the entity ‘Knesset’ would not have any binding authority.

I would love to hear your response, thank you very much.

Commitment to an authority figure is not based on a principle in the same sense as moral principles. It is based on the inherent content of that entity. It is not distilled from reasoning. Just as commitment to morality is not based on a prior principle that explains why one should commit to morality. I am committed to it because it is binding. Someone who understands what morality is cannot ask: I understand that it is morality, but why is it binding? But I argue that something binding must be the product of a legislator. Otherwise, it is not something binding. This is not reasoning but validation. Therefore, when someone tells me that I understand that this is a moral command, he does not need any more reasoning to commit to it, but for something to be considered a command, it must be the product of a mitzvah. By saying that it is a moral command, he is saying that there is a mitzvah in the background.
I think we are already repeating ourselves.

Jacob,
I didn't understand your answer.
My argument is that commitment to an absolute value and commitment to God are the same, because God is a name for absolute truth and goodness.

When you say that you are committed to morality and your friend says that he is committed to the divine will, as I understand it, you are both saying the same thing in different words. The difference would only begin in the case that morality is not absolute but only utilitarian (which is the main reason why modern morality is limited to preventing suffering).

I will try to explain my position in a different way.

As is known, in the world of law there is a dispute between two approaches: natural law and positive law. The natural law approach claims that legal rules are determined according to moral values that are clear to everyone, and by virtue of them and according to which they should be judged. In contrast, the positive law approach claims that legal rules are determined according to the formal bodies that are given the authority to enact and determine legal rules, regardless of the question of whether the rules that are determined comply with natural moral values.

In my opinion, there is no room for this dispute regarding the primary source of legal authority, but only regarding its derivatives. In other words, it is clear that the primary – basic – source of legal rules stems from a natural value and is what gives the validity and authority to judge and impose a certain law on citizens and other people. However, in practice, in order to exercise this authority in a practical way, there is room for discussion as to whether the best, most stable, and most effective way to maintain a legal system is in a way in which judges can decide directly according to moral-natural values in accordance with their discretion and are not bound and absolutely subject to the formal laws when, in their opinion, they do not comply with these values, or whether the better way to maintain a legal system is in a way that limits the judges' discretion so that the decision as to whether the formal laws comply with moral-natural values is not subject to their discretion and they are absolutely subject to the formal laws even when, in their opinion, they contradict these values. But the decision on this question must also ultimately be determined according to moral consideration, what is the moral and best way to run a legal system, and this is the source of its validity, so that in any case, even according to the positive law system, the initial basis of the source of obligation is determined according to a moral value.

If we do not say so, but rather say that the primary source of legal authority is the formal body with legislative authority, we will immediately be forced to ask who gave this body the authority. As the example I gave in my previous response regarding the Knesset, we must ask who gave it the authority to legislate. Of course, it would not be enough for us to point to another entity with formal authority that gave this body the authority (such as the ‘People's Council’ or the ‘Declaration of Independence’) since we would still be left with the question of who gave this entity the authority. The primary source of authority cannot be an entity but must be a value that does not need reasoning to be binding, but rather the very human recognition of its truth and value is binding. In the context of the Knesset, as I noted in my previous response, this value could be, for example: the value of popular rule, the value of democracy, or the value of maintaining social consensus. Without these values, why would I be obligated to obey the laws of the Knesset?!

I believe that this principle also applies to the authority of the Torah given by God Almighty. God Almighty himself, as an entity, cannot constitute the primary source of authority, since one must ask where he gets this authority from and why I should obey him. If there is a value reason for this, then obedience does not stem from the entity itself but from the value that obliges us to obey him. In other words, I obey the value. In my opinion, obedience to God Almighty does indeed stem from the value of doing what is good and moral, which is a value that stands on its own – even without God Almighty – and must be obeyed because of the human recognition that what is good and moral must be done without the need for reasoning from an external source (axiom). However, from the assumption that God is good and moral, so that His commands are also good and moral, the obligation to obey God also derives from the obligation to obey moral values, since in doing so one is in fact obeying morality.

[To Moses -
If when we say that there is an obligation to obey God, we mean that the obligation stems from the fact that we assume that there is an obligation to obey morality and do only what is good and moral, and from this we deduce that there is also an obligation to obey God because of the fact that He is good and moral (and only because of this fact) - this is indeed my position, according to which morality stands at the top of the pyramid of obligations, and as a consequence of it - on the second level - stands the obligation to obey God. However, Rabbi Michael's position is not like this, but in his opinion there is an obligation to obey God because of the very fact that He is the entity who created the world and me, and not because in doing so we do what is good and moral. Conversely, in his view the obligation to do what is good and moral derives from the personal obligation to obey God because He wants and expects me to behave morally as revealed by His having implanted a conscience in me, so that the reason I am obligated to morality is because it is the divine will and not because of the moral value in itself.

I will clarify and refine my position more in relation to the core of our dispute, as I see it (I apologize in advance for the length).

We both agree that moral laws exist as a matter of fact, that is, there are good deeds and there are bad deeds. For this, there is no need for a legislator, just as the laws of logic exist as a matter of fact even without a legislator (not even God, as I know you agree). The question is whether without God moral laws exist as normative laws, that is, whether there is an obligation to behave according to morality – to do good and avoid evil.

In your view, normative validity is not a matter of fact per se but requires an authority to command it, and only according to his command – his legislation – is there a normative obligation to behave according to it.

I have seen several times that you distinguish between two types of authority: ‘formal authority’, whose commands must be obeyed and acted upon regardless of whether the commands are based on correct and factually justified facts, and ‘substantive authority’ whose commands have no binding normative validity but must be obeyed only because they are judged to be factually correct, but if they are not correct – there is no obligation to obey them (like a doctor ordering you to take a certain medication).

From what I understand, your argument is that a fact or value in itself does not have binding normative validity, since such validity can only be granted by an entity with formal authority to grant such validity. Therefore, the moral value in itself is not binding as long as it is not validated by God, who has formal authority to enact normative laws (I admit that I have not yet been able to understand why and from whence the entity that created the world and me has such formal authority).

But I disagree with this and in my opinion there is never any original ‘formal authority’, but rather all ‘formal authority’ is based on ‘substantial authority’, that is, on a reason or value for which it is determined that this entity has authority. However, the difference between an entity with formal authority and an entity with substantive authority is that an entity with formal authority is determined by a reason or substantive value that must be obeyed formally, meaning that the entity's laws should not be examined for their substance and obeyed only if they are justified and based on correct facts, but they must be obeyed even if they are based on error; But this determination is also based on an ‘essential’ value and only because of it do we obey formal authority, so that the basic obligation is not to the formal entity but to the essential value, as I will demonstrate.

I intentionally compare this to the legal system because there is also an entity with formal authority to enact normative laws, and since it is an entity that is not ‘divine’ it seems to me easier to understand through it that there is no formal authority that stands on its own, but that it too ultimately derives from ’essential’.

To this end, I will quote the words of Moshe Sternberg on behalf of Hans Kelsen. I will first state that every legal system is based on a ‘basic norm’ from which the validity of all additional norms, lower in the normative hierarchy, is derived. But one must ask where the validity of the basic norm itself comes from, as Sternberg writes (quoted from the High Court in the matter of reducing the reason for reasonableness, paragraph 140 of Justice Solberg's judgment):

“Where do these basic norms have legal validity? Kelsen answers this question as Austin answered with regard to the sovereign, that we have reached the end of our domain and there is no need to add anything. The domain of law ends with the basic norm. In this respect, law is similar to religion. Both are dynamic normative systems. In both, we reach a line beyond which we cannot go without trespassing. Just as the final answer to the religious commandment is ‘Thus God willed’ or ‘Thus did His wisdom decree’, so the final answer to the validity of the legal rule is: Thus determined by the basic norm. If you ask where the validity of the commandments of God comes from – you have left the realm of religion; if you ask where the validity of the basic norm comes from – you have left the realm of law.

In other words, he answers that this question is outside the realm of law, since the legal system operates within the basic norm and not outside it. He adds and compares this to religion, which also has commandments (‘norms’) whose validity is given by God, but the question of where God's authority comes from is outside the realm of religion.

However, it is clear that in the realm of law, the question of why one must obey the basic norm cannot be left unanswered, so its answer is that it is an axiom that cannot be doubted, since this norm has not existed since time immemorial but was created and determined by human beings, and one must ask why there is an obligation to obey it specifically and not other things. For example, according to Sternberg, the parliament constitutes the basic norm of a democratic state, but it is clear that the obligation to obey its laws did not arise out of nowhere, but rather stems from some system that requires it.

In my understanding, the intention in Sternberg's words (and even if this is not his intention, in my opinion this is the truth) is that this question must indeed be answered, where the validity of the basic norm comes from, but this is not a legal question but a meta-legal one. Law is a formal field, so its laws are binding regardless of whether they were determined according to good values and correct facts, but this question has no formal answer, but rather it is what gives validity to the formal authority of the entire legal system. The answer to this question lies in the values themselves, such as popular rule and democracy, and not in formal legal norms. From these systems the basic norm draws its validity and from which all other norms draw their validity.

[Incidentally, this is what Judge Solberg based his claim that the question of what the basic norm of the Israeli legal system is is not subject to the court's decision, because if such a determination by the court has formal validity, it is found that in fact the basic norm is the word of the court. In other words, the question of what the basic norm is is a factual and not a legal question, and therefore the court's decision in this matter has no meaning, because if it is wrong, its decision has no formal validity (because formal validity does not change facts but norms), since the formal authority of the court itself derives from the basic norm].

As mentioned, Sternberg compares this to the religious system, in which the basic authority is the will of God, and the question of where the binding validity of God's will comes from lies outside the religious sphere. As I understand it, the explanation is similar in his words as well. Although this is not a religious-halakhic question, since halakhic is also a formal system, this does not mean that there is no answer to this question. Its answer lies outside of religion, on the meta-religious level, and therefore religion itself cannot decide on it in a way that requires obedience to its decision, but rather this answer is what gives validity to religion. In other words, the formal authority of God's will stems from a certain value that reason requires that it must be upheld. Only because of the basic commitment to this value are we also obligated to obey God, because in doing so this value is realized. In my understanding, the value in question is morality, which is clear to man that he must uphold, and since in obeying God's will one realizes moral behavior, since God is good and moral, one must obey Him. But the basic commitment is to morality, and obedience to the laws of the divine entity, who has formal authority, is derived from it.