The Migo Paradox

Hello Ethan. Now I remembered the case of Gachin and Whisper in the Bible to the Hebrews, where the person creates the migo for himself with his own hands, and that is where this issue certainly belongs. But it can be raised almost anywhere. I will just note that there are some types of migo that are not subject to this difficulty. For example, migo that gives a substantial advantage in the better claim (meaning there is an interest in claiming it even though I know I will have migo in the second claim). For example, someone who can claim for two hundred and claim a portion. It should also be noted that in the law of money matters, the court of appeals (although less so nowadays, as the Chief Justice of the Rif and the Rambam are the Chief Justices and Chief Justices of the Sanhedrin) has the authority to act as it sees fit and is not subject to the laws of evidence. Therefore, specifically in money matters, it is not so difficult, because the court of appeals decides what is reasonable to do according to the matter and evaluates whether the person before it is a debtor or not. But there is also a prohibition in non-monetary contexts, of course (as in the Code of Letters regarding open and closed doors and more). It is customary to answer this in one of two ways: 1. Even if you eliminate the migo, it will return and be created. This is a loop like the “ran” in Exodus 31:1 about a red cow that was yoked to the will of the owner, in the name of the Lord. Although here it is still not clear why to stop specifically at the fact that there is a migo. And perhaps the fact that the BIDD may not accept the Migo (see my comments above) creates a situation in which the person cannot be sure, and therefore it is better for him to make the really good claim. 2. Migo has an aspect of argumentative power and not just a reason why I should lie. And that is present here too, as in Migo Da’ezah. Although the aspect of why I should lie is indeed problematic. See more about this in my brochure here . —————————————————————————————— Asker (another): I thought of a parable from the world of electronics that is similar to the Migo paradox. Two NOT gates are connected to each other in a circuit (output 1 to input 2). At first there will be an oscillation between a logical “0” voltage level and a logical “1” voltage level. It seems to me that after a while the circuit should converge to some final intermediate voltage level that is neither a logical 0 nor a logical 1. This perhaps shows that in any paradox of this style, the final solution is an intermediate solution between the two states. In our case, we could say that the Migo is half-useful, and therefore it still needs to be taken into account. Pine —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: First, I think you might mean a single gate that closes on itself (connecting the exit back to the entrance). There is no paradox in two gates in a row, because it is a structure like this: – 1 – 0 – 1 – In any case, in your example you moved from the logic of the circuit to its electronics. In logic this is a paradox and there is no way out, but in terms of electronics I think the result depends on the electronic implementation of the gates. There are implementations in which what you get is a short (connecting two different voltages shorted to each other will burn the wire. Only if there is any resistance in the connection can we talk about averaging. Therefore I think it is better to talk about logic without going into electronics. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Yes, I got confused between two gates and one. Regarding the parable, perhaps the Migo paradox in the logical world also remains unsolvable or oscillates globally between “0” and “1” and only when it is brought down to the practical-legal world does it receive a kind of averaging (or a kind of “super position”) between its two possible values, so that its final result remains the same as it was before we raised the paradox. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Indeed, this is the situation. As I wrote, the BID decides whether to use the Migo or not (to collapse the wave function one way or the other). —————————————————————————————— Shua: Regarding the question of why stop precisely at the fact that he has a migo. I think the answer here is simple. The Bible should be conducted according to a single general principle. Establishing a principle that there is no migo leads to false judgments whose falsehood is obvious (because the migo will immediately stand up and wave Mount Bat Zion in his hand). Establishing a principle that there is a migo leaves us with a balance on a balance (at most against the assumption that the migo is excluded). In a cow, both sides are equal, and therefore in order to stop precisely on a particular side, an additional principle is needed (for example, that they go to the grave as if they were ‘to the grave they are making a mistake’ and not to rule out doubt). —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I didn’t understand the argument. Even if there is no Migo, why would the verdict necessarily be false? The person makes his claim and the Court of Appeals will decide whether he is right or not. And certainly if we take into account the Maimonides and the Rif, which are not subject to the laws of evidence and can rule differently. I also didn’t understand why when there is Migo, we are left with half and half. On the contrary, if there is no Migo, then the person will simply lie with the better claim and that’s it. —————————————————————————————— Shua: If we establish as a rule that we do not believe in falsehood (but do believe in falsehood), and someone comes and claims falsehood and we do not believe him, then we are directly in conflict with “why should I lie” and the ruling is certainly wrong (high probability at the very least. The BD needs penetrating hawk eyes to overcome such a strong consideration in its imprints).
If we establish as a rule that we do believe in a liar (just as we believe in a fake), then indeed we have no special reason to think that the ruling is correct (that the person is telling the truth), but there is also no special reason to think that he is wrong (that he is telling lies), and for that matter there is a split on whether he is lying or being truthful.
Therefore, it is not possible to establish a general principle that a Pharoah is not loyal, but it is certainly possible to establish that a Pharoah is loyal. I missed the contradiction to this claim. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: We don’t believe in a fake Mego, but we can believe him in himself (according to the eyes of the judges). Therefore, it is not right that we should not believe him, and I don’t understand why such penetrating eyes are needed. This is no different from any other situation where the judges are impressed by the person standing before them.
And on the other hand, since you believe in the payment, according to your words it turns out that you simply believe in him and not by virtue of Migo. But that doesn’t explain Migo’s loyalty. You believe him enough since the plaintiff is the one who issues it and he has the evidence. That’s all.

I think another explanation can also be put forward. Let’s assume that there was no Migo in the world. In such a situation, the liars cannot claim a wild one, but they would choose the best claim they have (fake), and would still be convicted. Therefore, denying the Migo will not help convict any liar. On the other hand, if there is loyalty from Migo, then the judge will claim the truth because he is acquitted whether he is wild or fake, therefore he will choose the correct claim and be faithful to the core.

This is probably a continuation of the words of the Rambam in the Talmud, 15:1:
The litigants who came to court, one of the claimants said, “I have some money with this person that I borrowed or deposited with him or he stole from me, or I have something with him as a reward, and everything like that.” And the defendant replied, “I owe nothing,” or “I have nothing in my possession,” or “You are lying.” This is not a correct answer. Rather, the court tells the defendant to respond to his claim and interpret the answer as the other party interpreted his claim, and say, “Did you borrow from him or not? Did he deposit it with you or not? Did he steal it or not? Did he rent it or not?” And so on. And why is this answer not accepted from him? Perhaps he is mistaken in his mind and has come to swear falsely. After all, it is possible that he has borrowed it, as he claimed, and the other party returned the debt to his son or wife or gave it to him as a gift in exchange for the debt, and he imagined in his mind that he had been released from the debt. Therefore, they tell him, “You should say, ‘I owe nothing.’ Perhaps you are obligated by law to pay and you do not know. But inform the judge of the interpretation of the matter, and they will inform you whether you are indebted or not. And even if it were A great sage tells him that he has nothing to lose by responding to his claim and informing us how you are not obligated to him because things never existed or because they did exist and you returned it to him, for we are judging from the source that he can speak anywhere. —————————————————————————————— Shua: [I’m coming back because I’m interested, but I don’t have anything particularly new to add. You probably understood exactly what I was saying, and I’m the one who didn’t understand the rejection, but the bribe doesn’t just sit there].
I suggest that accepting the migo is not because it is real, but because the alternative is worse. If you don’t accept the migo, whether you don’t accept it as a rule or you leave the decision to the judges in such a way that there is some priority for a certain claim (for example, a fake one), then you end up in an awkward situation. Perhaps in exceptional cases, the judges will be able to ignore the migo as they see fit, but does the fundamental freedom of the judges make the rules of the law redundant? This rule does not detract from the other rules that the judges can ignore according to the methods you presented. I do not believe Pera’s claim of ‘doubt’, but rather accept Pera’s claim that it is impossible to establish another general principle. And in my opinion, by the way, regardless, not believing the migo is more strange than believing a hundred witnesses.
The other explanation you offered [I understand that the benefit is that one avoids misleading the majority by telling lies in the Bible] I did not understand how it escaped the difficulty that is difficult for ‘my’ explanation (although in my opinion, both explanations should be reconciled in a similar way). Now that the liars were wrong to believe that they would be faithful even to a peruvian, let us be wise to them and, according to the eyes of the judges, we will not believe what the peruvian says. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: And what I argued is that if this is the migo then you don’t believe a person by virtue of the migo. I mention that the migo is seen as evidence. Secondly, I said, accepting a questionable claim sounds very strange.
Third, in my opinion, there is no difference between rejecting a hundred witnesses and rejecting a few. If the judges see that there is a problem, they will reject it. It is true that in practice this will happen less often, because with a hundred witnesses there is really less chance of problems in their testimony. In other words, the strength of the evidence does not determine the difficulty for the judges to discern whether it is false or not. It does determine the very fact of the falsehood, but that is not what you wrote when you talked about the judges’ penetrating eyes.

As far as I understand, my explanation does not suffer from all the problems of the explanation you proposed (see above, there are several of them). In my opinion, the Ba’ad is truly faithful to the Migo. He tells the truth that Par’a, and we know that it is true because if it were a lie he would be making a false claim (after all, Par’a’s Migo can be rejected by virtue of the eyes of the dayanim, so why would he take the risk? Admittedly, the claim of a false claim can also be rejected in the same way – but it is an argument and not evidence. Arguments are not rejected so easily, since the arguments are not evidence that the dayanim are supposed to determine whether it is true or false. Arguments primarily determine the status of the Ba’ad – on whom the burden of proof lies, etc.). I also added that the alternative of denying the Migo completely is of no use at all, since no liar will lose in court because of it, as Maimonides explains in Ref. 6 of the Talmud, which I cited. —————————————————————————————— Shua: Now I understand. thanks —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: happily.