The new study on free choice

By the way, this is Liad Modrik, not Idit Modrik. I've heard half of the lecture so far and the girl has no idea what she's talking about. She has a mix of concepts like the last of the laymen. Which proves once again that even professionals make serious mistakes in this field. What's surprising is that she also did a doctorate in philosophy, not just in neuroscience.
By the way, so far she's been presenting a completely deterministic picture and position, and I'm very surprised by the summary given to her words on the Ratio website. But I keep listening.

In the end, the experiment is actually very interesting and I didn't know it was conducted. I would recommend skipping its conceptual-philosophical introduction.

What did the Rabbi say about the first part of her words, (I hope I understood him correctly),
that over time she realized that she was not interested in having free will and the ability to act this way and not otherwise. But even more than that, it sounds like she might prefer to be a creature that in the same situation would make exactly the same decision.
Because if you are now standing at a crossroads and you have two options to do A or B, and you are given the same considerations. Then she would want to choose the same thing every time. In other words, the possibility to act according to her set of beliefs and values and the ability to distinguish between good and evil and between truth and falsehood what she wants to do *is* what makes her a rational creature.
(As I understand it, as opposed to a choice that to some extent adds nothing to the equation in relation to a systematic deterministic path).
After all, what do I care if I behave in a deterministic manner or not, as long as I act according to my values and try to be a good person under the belief that this behavior is inherent in our nature. That's enough.

The question of what interests her is irrelevant. It's a matter of personal taste, and in particular, in a deterministic picture, she is structured so that this is what interests her. So what?
Libertarianism does not mean that you will not decide the same thing, but that you will not necessarily decide the same thing. Therefore, the question is not whether I will do the same thing but whether the action will be mine or not. According to her, she also prefers to be hypnotized so that she always behaves in the same appropriate way. I doubt whether she would agree to that either.
Her mistake is that she thinks that the choice is intended to ensure that you do the right thing, that is, our judgment is only consequential. And it is not. The right thing is worthless if it is not done out of choice. Judgment is deontological and not only consequential. According to Kant – it is only deontological.
Incidentally, in a deterministic picture, you do not act and do not try. You do nothing. Everything is done through you.

Man is forced to feel good while he perceives himself as free from limitations. Therefore, he is forced to feel better if he believes he has free choice. Therefore, everyone believes they have free choice (even those who claim not to believe they do). All this stems from the necessity of man's psychological reality.

Is there a volunteer to summarize what the experiment was and what the results were?

In one sentence, the findings are that in Picking's experiments there is the Libet effect, that is, the RP signal precedes the decision. In Chosing's experiments there is no such time gap. [By the way, this is exactly what I wrote in a chapter in my book, where I said that I had a friend at the Hebrew University who told me that they were planning to do such an experiment].
Chosing's experiment is the following: They presented the person with options to donate money to various charities, some of which are controversial. He is supposed to pressure the charity for which the money will be donated, and this is Chosing's hesitation.
There is room for discussion about the interpretations she offered for the results, for RP, and for the Libet experiment itself. (Her view is deterministic)

Interesting.
Anyway, every experiment has a deterministic explanation. Methodologically, everything is assumed to be deterministic anyway, and then it turns out that the mechanism of choosing is different from that of picking.

Why hasn't this study caused a stir? It's a real bombshell.

(What Modric claims is probably somewhere else, etc., is just a gut feeling)

Does this mean that the scientific world is so convinced of the truth of determinism that no amount of research will move it?
Or does it misunderstand the a priori division between Picking and Chasing and therefore the research is not that significant?