The philosophical validity of Halacha

I want to ignore for the moment the question of utility, which seems to me less interesting from a philosophical perspective.

The value of morality lies in its universality, and if you will allow me, I will also add that genuine universality (such as is logically valid and not such as is anchored, for example, in ”humanism”) can only stem from a source outside the world, namely from God.

If I am right in the last sentence, then it follows that any “genuine”universal moral system surpasses the Torah in importance. Therefore, a Jew who wants to be honest with himself intellectually must create for himself the following norm: he must subordinate the Torah (and in my opinion this means first and foremost the Pentateuch) to morality.

On the surface, the Torah strongly rejects this norm that I have proposed, but in my opinion this creates a philosophical problem.

What do you think?

It follows from universal morality that anyone who does not think like me is condemned to death because he endangers the universal morality that only I know about.
So if you are a moral person you should commit suicide because it is quite clear from what you write that you are naive and do not think like me.

The last juror,
I didn't get to the bottom of your last thought.
Try juror again.

Doron, I didn't understand the argument. Why is morality superior to the Torah? So what if it is universal and the Torah is not? Why does that determine priority?

Before I answer you, I want to understand something. In your opinion, is there no clear priority for a universal system of values (or laws) over a particular system? A priority from a theoretical and practical perspective.

Not necessarily. For example, a mitzvah that is imposed only on priests is not necessarily less important than a mitzvah that is imposed on all Jews or on all humans. The same is true of the mitzvahs of the sons of Noah versus the mitzvahs that are imposed on Jews.

I want to focus the discussion.
The philosophical question we are dealing with here deals first and foremost with the side of the message being conveyed (laws, etc.) and perhaps also with the identity of the addressee (in this case an absolute and necessary addressee - God).
In other words: What is the logical structure of the message itself?
In my opinion, the question of who the intended audience of the message is or what its concrete contents are (the details of the commandments) is less important from a philosophical point of view.

Ultimately, the issue is the authenticity of the message, and deciding this question takes precedence over a formal discussion of principle.

Chinese. I didn't understand a word.

Have you traveled as far as China? I will try to bring distant things closer for you.

1. A rational philosophical discussion strives to clarify the validity of values/laws. As long as it does not pretend to achieve certainty, such a discussion is on relatively safe ground.
Agree/disagree?

2. A rational philosophical discussion strives to locate the most universal laws.
As a principle, the higher the level of generalization, the more “appropriate” and successful the philosophical discussion, that is, the more rational.
Agree/disagree?

3. Universality is indeed also measured in terms of the size of the population to which those laws are directed, that is, the public required to actually observe these laws (for example: the Jewish people, the priests, the Chinese people, all of humanity, etc.)
Agree/disagree?

4. However, the degree of universality (and therefore the degree of rationality) is measured first in the logical structure of the law, regardless of the audience for which it is intended (a broad or narrow audience).
For example: Law A can be formulated as ’Love your neighbor as yourself’ and offer it to one and only person in the world, while at the same time a competing law B can be formulated (’Do everything to preserve the emperor’) and offer it to the entire Chinese people.
Although Law A addresses a ’population’ whose size is one and only person, from a substantive (logical) point of view it can be expanded significantly more than Law B (which addresses about a billion and a half people). The first law can serve every person (even if they do not actually do so), while the second law is bound to the interests and values of a particular people.
Hence, Law A is more universal.
Agree/disagree?

5. The laws of Halacha cannot be expanded significantly, that is, they have difficulty universalizing. The less important reason is, as mentioned, that they address a relatively small population (Jews only). The more important reason is that they concern more a person's actions (and by extension, what happens to him "within" history) than his beliefs, thoughts, and intentions. In Claretian language: Halacha prefers addressing the actual and concrete rather than the potential and abstract.
Agree/disagree?

6. Hence, even if Halacha is valid, it is only as a second layer on top of more universal values.
Agree/disagree?

7. Halacha/Torah does not agree to accept the authority of a separate set of laws (even if it is more universal). Therefore, even if Halacha allows for systems of laws parallel to it, it still claims primacy for itself.
Agree/Disagree?

8. Halacha is wrong on this point, since it must give precedence to values that are more universal than it. Halacha is not rational (in this sense only).
Agree Disagree?

1-4. Despite inaccuracies and ambiguities, I will agree for the sake of discussion.
5. Just don't put us in Bachler again.
6. Agree.
7. Disagree.
8. Even if my answer to 7 was positive, I don't agree with it.

Regarding 5. You didn't answer me if you agree/disagree.
Why don't you agree with 7?
Why don't you agree with 8?

5. I disagree with the ”important” reason.
7. I didn't understand. You made a claim. You prove it. I claim that the law does not claim precedence for itself, as explained in the issue of a sin for its own sake, for example.
8. What do I need to justify? Again, you made a baseless statement, and I have the burden of proof?!

A. I will only refer to 5 for now.

B. I will be more precise in my use of terms. I have written several times “Halakhah/Torah”. Following our discussion, I made the mistake of referring to your article “Concerning a Transgression for Its Own Sake” and as a result, I will be more specific in my remarks. From now on, I will use the term “Torah” (=Pentateuch) only.

C. Below is Section 5. “The Amended”:
The laws of the Torah cannot be expanded significantly, that is, they have difficulty universalizing. The less important reason is, as stated, that they address a relatively limited population (Jews only).

D. In my opinion, it is enough that I have shown that the Torah designates itself in advance only for a limited public (the people of Israel) to show that it is not universal enough and that in any case there is no rational reason to accept it as the most fundamental religious truth (it is probably possible to accept it, but as a secondary religious truth).

E. Note: I am not saying that (any) divine Torah cannot be given to only a limited public. It is certainly (philosophically) conceivable that such a situation would exist. What I am saying is that if such an exclusive Torah is given to someone, it must clearly and explicitly qualify this exclusivity.

F. And so I will also demand what I called the “more important reason” for there to be a deep irrational basis in the perception of the Torah as that fundamental truth: the Torah establishes itself as the supreme authority from the perspective of man. From its perspective, it is the main (and perhaps even the only) channel for the connection between us and God. In other words: the central norm of the Torah does not allow a person to turn to more direct and higher sources of knowledge (the intellectual perspective) outside the text (=language). That is why I argued above that the Torah commits an “act of Esau” when it claims the birthright that is not its own.

G. By avoiding setting the correct norm (from a philosophical-rational point of view), the Torah creates an arbitrary “upper barrier” to the degree of its own universality. I formulated the same position in the past through the idea that the Torah, for its part, is necessary in all possible worlds and is therefore “forced” on God (God is contingent upon it).

H. You like to use the concept of “burden of proof”. In this context, it is up to you - if you think I am wrong, you must show me that in the Torah, that is, in the text, there is another central norm that places a direct cognitive channel above the text.
For example, if you manage to show me that there is a central norm in the Pentateuch according to which we must abandon the text if a contradiction arises between it and our intuitions, I may be convinced that this problem does not exist.

I. I have given you several times in the past a tangible example of a philosophical and theological dealing with this problem of the over-sanctification of the text. To the best of my memory, you did not bother to address this example even though it is relevant to the topic, at least in my opinion (I have explained why it is relevant and if you think it is not, you must explain it). The example I gave (the New Testament) is striking for two reasons: first, it reveals a “logical” solution to the problem that the Torah of Israel has encountered (the text that appears in the New Testament certainly does not make God contingent upon it); Secondly, this model was realized in a concrete historical reality, namely in the Christian Church (which also indicates its vitality and suitability for this world and for man).
In your own language, I would say that the model of the Torah of Israel is analytical while the model of the New Testament is synthetic.

J. I wanted to end with a tenth point as a symbolic gesture to the Ten Commandments. Unfortunately, I did not find one.

I hope you will forgive me for not compiling the Ten Commandments.
I do not agree with the entire first part, 1-5, and I have already explained this. The narrow can be more important than the broad and basic. There are many examples of this (some of which I have given). I see no point in repeating the discussion again.
The same goes for the rest:
6. The Torah does not deny any form of recognition and connection to God other than it. On the contrary, in the Talmud it is customary to say why did he call me Sabra?!
7-12. The rest is incomprehensible to me. A collection of assumptions, most of which I do not understand and some of which seem absurd to me and I do not know what to do with them.

1. I don't understand your comment at all that ”the limited can be more important than the broad”. Do you mean to say that in philosophy there are situations where it is possible to reduce universal principles to more limited and less abstract principles?
Philosophy seeks the most universal - this is a basic rule in its methodology and this is what I tried to do in this discussion. Therefore, even if there is no philosophical flaw in a religious or moral Torah that designates itself in advance for a limited audience (and therefore “compromises” on the degree of its universality), all this is conditioned by the self-categorization of that Torah. This specific classification is not found in the Torah of Israel, certainly not as a central norm.

2. I did not say that the Torah denies alternative forms of cognition and connection with God. This is what I wrote, this time and on many occasions in the past:

“The Torah positions itself as the supreme authority from the perspective of man. From its perspective, it is the main (and perhaps even the only) channel for the connection between us and God”

It is explicitly written here that on the Torah's side, there may be alternative forms of cognition to it.

3. I argued that this is not enough. The Torah - or for that matter any other body of “religious-divine” knowledge - must stand up to the criticism of reason. To do this, it must positively establish a central norm according to which our main forms of “encounter” with God are not in the text itself (i.e. in it).

4. The Torah does not do this, certainly not as a central norm.

4. Your claim that “on the contrary, in the Talmud it is customary to say….” Even more puzzling (with your forgiveness).
What does the Talmud, which was written hundreds of years after the Pentateuch and came to Baru (and not the other way around), have to do with our discussion? From the outset, I made it clear that I was dealing with the Pentateuch (or mainly with it).

5. I don't know why you refuse to address the model of the New Testament. This is a very simple logical and historical model that positions itself as a competitor to the model of the Torah of Israel. From the point of view of our discussion, there is a competing philosophical proposal here, in light of which the rational person is required to weigh the two, decide, and finally choose.
In any case, the point is that I was not satisfied with exposing the fallacy in the perception of the Torah (in the sense of criticism and negation only on my part), but rather that I positively pointed out an alternative test case.

6. I allow myself to take the liberty again within this excellent inn of yours and ask other readers of this debate (if there are any at all…) to clarify for me where I am wrong.
Y.D., how are you?