The Rabbi’s Response to Rivka Lubitz’s Article

What people perceive as the will of God is the will of God?
So what if the sages concluded, perhaps they were wrong? There is a difference between saying that this is their halakhic authority (according to the response above), and saying that it is the will of God (according to the article). After all, the entire interpretive approach was based on the fact that it is the will of God and therefore one must try to interpret in a moral way. What requires that the sages thought in a moral way?

Absolutely. Do you have direct access to His will other than through parashot? Or Rivka Lubitz? Of course, it is not necessary that any person, including the sages, correctly interpreted His will, but that is what is there. And specifically regarding the sages, even if they were wrong, they have authority. The meaning of authority is that even if it is not His will, it is binding.
And there is no difference between saying that it is the will of the Lord and saying that they have authority. His will is that we also maintain authority.
And as mentioned, I personally see no reason to assume that it is not His will and that they were wrong.

Rabbi,

I wonder if the opinions differ on what follows from the content of the quote below

Yad Lemelech, Halachot Memariam, Chapter 1, Halachat B:

And I have to bring evidence, such as the opinion of the Gemara Didan, that in a teaching that one knows in their hearts that it is against what is stated in the Torah commentary, they are not permitted to listen to them, what is the meaning of Dehoriyot [2, 2], as the Gemara says: If the faithful ones go to the court of justice and one of them knows that he is in error or a disciple and is worthy of instruction and goes and acts according to them, then he is liable because he did not go to the court of justice. And the Gemara said, such as Mann, Rava said, such as Shimon ben Azzai and Shimon ben Zuma. Abaye said to him that he is a wilful sinner, and the Gemara concludes that he erred in the mitzvah of listening to the words of the sages. And Rashi interpreted it as meaning that even a person who has committed an offense is obligated to hear the teaching of the Sanhedrin. And similarly, our Rabbi brought in the third chapter of the Laws of Mistakes of Halacha and the conclusion of the Gemara to the Halacha, that in error, even if he knew the body of the prohibition, he only knew the teaching of the Beit Din according to himself, and he believed that he was obligated to hear the Beit Din, thereby he was obligated to offer a sacrifice of error. Thus, in the interpretation of the Gemara, we have the opinion that if the student came to the teaching and could confidently believe that the teaching of the Sanhedrin was in error against the laws of the Torah, and yet he listened to them and transgressed the words of the Torah according to their teaching, he would be guilty of willful disobedience, just like everyone else who transgresses the words of the Torah out of disgust. And also in the conclusion of the Gemara, the Shass accuses the one who erred and believed that he was obligated to listen to the words of the Sages against the law of the Torah, which he erred in doing, but nevertheless it is explained in the commentary that the law is not permitted to listen to them, only the conclusion is not called deliberate, only he erred and erred in doing so against the law, and this Gemara is the exact opposite of this book that I cited. If we do not disagree with this division that I disagreed with, the book of Meiri Beguna states that according to his judgment, the Sanhedrin's teaching is against the law of the Torah, but it is still not clear whether his judgment is correct and clear in this, and the Gemara states that according to the student's knowledge, the Sanhedrin's teaching is so erroneously a reversal of the law of the Torah that there is no way to justify this teaching on any side, even according to their opinion, and as I have specified above in the language of the book.

But Rashi, the late, in his commentary on the Torah, brought these words of the scribe literally, even on the right, which is left, which is a complete reversal of the law of the Torah, which is known to him as being obligated to listen to them. This is a miracle, because what Rashi and the Rabbis understood as the intention of the scribe is in complete contradiction and reversal against the Gemara Didan. And how did they turn a blind eye to the Gemara compiled by the Rabbis Didan and perceive the opinion of the scribe as being against our Talmud?

However, in any case, this is clear, because what Rashi and the Rabbis understood as the intention of the scribe is against the Gemara Didan and against the Jerusalemite. And since our rabbis omitted this example from their books, we have only what is explained to us in the commentary of the two Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, and any teaching that clearly appears to be the opposite and contradicts the words of the Torah, such as eating milk and killing pure blood, and the like, the teachers will be whoever they are, and do not listen to them, and as explained in the Jerusalem Hadiya and also in the Gemara Didan, if one errs and believes that he is obligated to listen to them and eats milk according to their teaching, he is obligated to commit a permanent sin, as for any eating of a forbidden thing by mistake.

(Rabbi Eliezer Segal, Wagda, Lviv, 1986)

Tosafot HaRash Tractate Kiddushin Page 5 Page 1
Since it is ruled over and enslaved to him by the possession of his money, even jealousy in the bill and in its possession

Copenhagen, I did not understand your comment. The discussion about a mistake in the mitzvah of listening to the words of the sages does not begin with the king. If it is clear to you that it is a mistake, do not listen. But how can it be clear to someone that the Torah does not want kiddushin? At most, it is possible that it is moral that it does not want property. And yet the argument is problematic on two levels:
1. I have great doubts whether such a moral argument is unambiguous enough to reject a Sanhedrin ruling. And that the killing of Amalek, which is explicitly written in the Torah, is not equally contrary to morality? So does the Holy One not want that either? If so, why did He write it in the Torah?
2. As I explained in the article, kiddushin are a contract and not property. So what is the basis for seeing the law of kiddushin as property and by virtue of this to declare them a clear error of the sages and all the decision makers of the generations? This is ridiculous.

Itamar,
This will be discussed and answered in the article.

Regarding the claim that there is no moral argument strong enough to reject it, it is completely clear to me. The question arises regardless of the subject in question, following the sentence: “Even if they were wrong, they have authority”. From which it seems that even if it were clearly clear that the ruling of the sages is against what is stated in the commentary on the Torah, the instruction should still be heard because of the authority.

The wording of Yad HaMelech seems more emphatic. Not only when it is clearly clear (usually understandable) that this is an error, but any instruction “which the individual (the private person) knew in his heart that it was against what is stated in the commentary on the Torah” is not allowed to be heard.

“Even if they were wrong, they have authority,” meaning even over the party who was wrong. If he is convinced that they were wrong, and provided that he reached the teaching, this is indeed said about an individual. This is how the Gemara explained the instructions.

Indeed, I did not notice. Yad HaMelech does not add to the plain meaning of the Gemara. But it seems to me that the mere fact that there is a side that the Sanhedrin is wrong does not mean that it may not be the will of God. But only (according to this side) that if the ruling had not been issued, the will of God would have been different. But in the current world, this is the will of God.

But a more practical question is whether this can be extrapolated to rulings that arise from the Talmud or later rulings solely because of the authority given to rulings by virtue of public acceptance (which is an assumption and not an explicit commandment). Perhaps there is no need for conviction that they were wrong, but a lower probability is sufficient.

One could innovate something like this, but from an explanation it doesn't seem to me that there is a difference. Either way, it doesn't save Lubitz's arguments or undermine mine.