The Sanhedrin’s Status

Hello.
Note. I don’t think the rabbis are being arrogant. They are an integral part of this crazy move. A combination of delusional messianism with frustration at the High Court’s usurpation of authority in several annoying cases. They have taken power into their own hands and now want to achieve everything they couldn’t over the years until now in the sense of “we want Mesaia now.” Woe to us from such a messiah.
To your question, I don’t think there is a clear answer. In principle, it is clear that the Sanhedrin determines everything. What it legislates or interprets is binding on all of Israel. It also appoints all the lower courts and is of course also directly or indirectly responsible for the ordination. But that does not mean, of course, that the Sanhedrin uses this authority of its own. In my opinion, the correct model is for the Sanhedrin to intervene only where uniformity is needed, and where it does not, it leaves the decisions in the hands of the people and the communities. This is the division that Yedidia Stern talks about in his booklet between several types of judgments. By the way, even in the proposed law that gives the rabbinate authority over the rabbis of the communities and cities, it can be said that they can only determine but will not necessarily use this authority. The problem is that you cannot trust these scoundrels whose whole tendency is to corrupt every good part of the land.
This is the factual situation that prevailed in the past during the Sanhedrin. The question of what the ideal model is, especially in a situation where there is no Sanhedrin, is a question that anyone can answer as they wish. I do not think that an authoritative and binding halachic answer can be given here. And even if you find something written, it will be the personal opinion of the writer. For example, the Education Ministry writes that authority is needed so that the Torah does not become two teachings. This can be interpreted in a centralist direction, but I interpret it in my own direction (this is a framework that can be established when necessary, but it is appropriate to leave freedom to the extent possible in the hands of rabbis and communities).
As for Cartman’s words (I don’t know him), these are his own musings that he attaches to verses as is customary in our district. No one learns halakha from verses, and among other things this is because, like the vorts he extracts from the verses, I can extract opposite vorts from them. The verses also say, “eye for eye,” and so on. [That’s why I don’t study the Bible at all, because no one learns anything from it. Everyone forces it into the direction they believe in. I have never seen anyone extract from the Bible an idea that they themselves didn’t think of and agree with first.]
The appointment model in the past was really not like this. I know of no evidence that the public decided who the dayan or rabbi would be or proposed candidates. According to halakha, the ordination comes from the top down and no one is asked. Regarding the appointment of a rabbi by the public, it is written that the public appoints (it is not so clear who appoints. Apparently the public itself appoints). After the ordination was discontinued, there was no one to appoint rabbis and dayanim from above, and then they moved to a model of a community electing a rabbi from below (with various ordination alternatives, one of which is the rabbinate exams today. This has no binding basis and no validity, of course).
In the margins of my remarks, I will say that if they establish a Sanhedrin today, I will flee to Australia. The collection of scoundrels who are currently running the rampage will serve in it. Therefore, I pray every day that a Sanhedrin will not be established in our time. And if the Chief Rabbinate is a copy of the Sanhedrin, then Australia is already too close. We need to talk to Elon Musk about a flight to the moon. This corrupt and corrupt institution wants to corrupt even plots that are still clean. God will help us all.
Ironically, the Haredim have revived the concept of exile under Jews, here in the country. Now they have revived an even more radical innovation: exile under the rule of religious Jews who want to impose Halacha here. And the second exile is more bitter than the first.
Regarding writing, at first glance I don’t know what there is to write here. It’s non-personal. I can spout what anyone else can spout. State what I think and “base” it on excerpts from verses and hollow ideas that are good for speaking Torah in Sheva Brachot. In my opinion, there is no way to establish a solid halachic position on this subject. Perhaps sources can be found that have written about it, but my opinion of such sources is that they have no meaning or validity. The musings are empty. Therefore, I do not engage in collecting and writing such things.
But on second thought, there are still a few points that are related to the matter, and could form the basis for more serious writing. I will list a few of them (most of them are discussed in the third book of my trilogy):
1. I have written more than once about the value of autonomy in jurisprudence, and perhaps this is the most tangential issue that can be seriously substantiated. See, for example, my article here:
https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=f18e4f052adde49eb&q=https://mikyab.net/%25D7%259B%25D7%25AA%25D7%2591%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2590%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%2590%25D7%2595%25D7%2598%25D7%2595%25D7%25A0%25D7%2595%25D7 %259E%25D7%2599%25D7%2594-%25D7%2595%25D7%25A1%25D7%259E%25D7%259B%2 5D7%2595%25D7%25AA-%25D7%2591%25D7%25A4%25D7%25A1%25D7%2599%25D7%25A7 %25D7%25AA-%25D7%2594%25D7%259C%25D7%259B%25D7%2594&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwilt7v7l5mAAxW9VaQEHT_NClsQFnoECAUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1CguF1-RneRCwYUPMpeELr
If a judge has autonomy, then there is no place for a central authority to determine what to rule.
2. If we go down one level, a similar discussion can be made of the role of a judge versus the autonomy of the common man (less related, but there is a connection), you can see here:
https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=f18e4f052adde49eb&q=https://mikyab.net/%25D7%259B%25D7%25AA%25D7%2591%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2590%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2599%25D7%259D /%25D7%25A2%25D7%259C-%25D7%25A7%25D7%2595%25D7%259C%25D7%2590-%25D7%2595%25D7%2597%25D7%2595%25D7%259E% 25D7%25A8%25D7%2590&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiN4-KNmJmAAxUZTaQEHVOLBhcQFnoECAUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2qE6GAEqdS-Kwdx70P3gET
3. I remember reading an article by Hanina Ben Menachem that explained that it is impossible to integrate halacha into state law because of its decentralization and lack of uniformity. A legal system in the practical world needs to be uniform for legal certainty (this is a common criticism of Aharon Barak’s doctrine of good faith and contract interpretation). This is also relevant, of course. But it deals with the legal part of halacha (and note that there is also the rule of ‘Kim Li’), and not with the other parts of halacha.
4. Of course, there is the Rosh in the Sanhedrin, p. 106, who speaks of the fact that there is no authority after the Talmud and that every posek is supposed to rule according to his understanding. But it is not certain that we can understand that this is in his opinion the ideal model. He describes the normative situation in our time (in which in practice there is no authority). Some of his words were also quoted in the rabbinical commentary, p. 25.
5. It is perhaps possible to link this to the controversy over the appeals court, which arose when Lord Bentwitz, His Majesty’s envoy, discussed the establishment of a Chief Rabbinate and its courts in the Land of Israel and demanded as a condition that there be an appeals court. The rabbinical opposition to this demand was unanimous, and this reflects a perception that there is no place for a central halachic authority and that each court rules according to its own understanding and that no one can control it. Although they did eventually accept the law and established an appeals court (the High Court of the Rabbinate), this was in retrospect due to the British demand and without it they would not have been able to establish rabbinical courts. In this context, there is the discussion about “where did I get my data” which assumes that the Rabbinate can demand reasons in order to appeal to a higher court and appeal (see R. Caro’s response to Abakt Rochel on the subject and more).
6. Another point that I addressed in the third book of my trilogy is the involvement of halakhah and poskim in the management of a community (through the decision-making of the city’s best men, their powers, and more, which were also included in the Shulchan Arba’ah). This is the result of a historical accident following the loss of the monarchy, when in the absence of the king, secular powers passed to the president of the Sanhedrin (therefore, he was a descendant of King David). From then on, a situation arose in which all questions regarding the management of secular life were also referred to the poskim. The regulations of the community required the consent of an important person, etc. In my opinion, there is no halakhic basis for this, and I would delete the laws of managing community life from the Shulchan Arba’ah. They are there by mistake and are not binding. And the fact is that no one takes them into account in any community.