The status of Mount Sinai as a historical event

You are misunderstanding the naturalistic fallacy. The fallacy does not mean that there is no connection between facts and norms, but that in addition to facts, something else is needed to derive the norms. For example, the fact that hitting causes pain and sorrow has a connection to the principle that hitting is forbidden. However, in addition to it, the principle that what causes pain is forbidden is also required. The fact that a painting is composed of colors and shapes of one kind or another has a connection to its beauty, but the facts themselves are not enough (principles of aesthetic evaluation are also needed). The same is true regarding the status of Mount Sinai. If historically it did not exist – there is no reason to keep the commandments because they were not given. The fact that someone dreamed of a collection of commandments does not seem to me to be a reason to keep them. It is true that even if such a status existed, it does not necessarily result in an obligation. The historicity of the status is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an obligation. ————————- Asks: If I understand the argument correctly, in your opinion, receiving a TOM can be justified based on the following assumptions:
1. The word of God must be kept – this is the ethical assumption.
2. The Torah is the word of God – this is the factual claim supported by the occurrence of the event at Mount Sinai. In my understanding, the occurrence of the Mount Sinai stand is not even sufficient for claim 2 alone (nor is it necessary). Does an impressive pyrotechnic show at the end of which someone arrives with some commandments make these commandments the word of God?
In my view, the question of what is the word of God is a value question. It is my judgment as to how I determine that something is the word of God. The factual determination is less relevant here. By analogy, when I say that a painting is beautiful to me, then the claims that are relevant to me are the existence of the painting and the feelings it evokes in me. I may believe that the painter used brush x to paint the painting even though in fact he used brush y. The question of how the painting was created is irrelevant to my judgment of it.
Similarly, it seems to me that it could be said that the manner of transmission of the Torah is irrelevant to the question of our obligation toward it. ——————— Rabbi: Clearly, the path is irrelevant if you think that it is indeed Torah that was given by God. I just don’t understand how you come to the conclusion that something was given by God if there was no transmission status. If you believe in hallucinations, then good luck. My assumption is that without a transmission status, there is no justification for the assumption that Torah was given to us. Of course, even if there was a Mount Sinai event, you can doubt it and say that it was a show and not a divine revelation (just as if you ask someone what time it is, you can doubt their answer, lest they lie). But without the revelation, I don’t see how you would decide that the Torah was given. As stated, revelation is a necessary condition even if not sufficient. And that is what I wrote in the previous letter. ————————— Asks: I still don’t understand how the situation at Mount Sinai leads us to the conclusion that the Torah was given by God. ———————– Rabbi: I don’t understand the question. If God gave the Torah at Mount Sinai, then the Torah was given at Mount Sinai. ———————– Asks: What in the situation proves that God was present at Mount Sinai? ————————- Rabbi: The Mount Sinai status is a revelation of God. This is its definition. To say that there was a status without God means that there was no status. You can of course wonder whether there was such a status, but then you are just asking a historical question (how did such a status exist, and how was it not an illusion). What does that have to do with the naturalistic fallacy you opened with? That is a completely different discussion. ————————– Asks: My argument is that saying that God was present at the event is a value-based claim, while what they saw at the event is a collection of facts.
In other words, to deduce from some pyrotechnic display that God is present there and is giving us the Torah is an inference of value from facts. ———————- Rabbi: Here I have completely lost you. It’s like saying that the fact that I met you does not mean that you were present at the meeting. It’s just skepticism, perhaps legitimate, but I don’t see what that has to do with the naturalistic fallacy. The assertion that God was present there is a factual assertion, whether true or not. —————————— Asks: Unlike a meeting with a human being, which can be confirmed with the basic senses, we experience the meeting with God with the “eyes of reason.” From this perspective, I would classify the claim that God is in a certain place as a value claim (just as in value claims we use the eyes of reason). Empirically, what is observed in a situation are some effects on top of some mountain. If I understand correctly, you are making the following claims:
1. God was present at the event.
2. The status is a unique event of revelation and any other form of revelation is problematic. Accordingly, my questions are: 1. What in the description of the event indicates that God was there?
2. What is unique about that status compared to other forms of revelation? ———————— Rabbi: According to this, you can ask what is the evidence that if I see a wall in front of me, there is indeed a wall here. The assumption that my senses are indeed reliable is an assumption of reason and not an observational assumption.
As mentioned, this question, as well as your own, has nothing to do with the naturalistic fallacy. What you are asking is the usual question of why one should believe in the existence of Mount Sinai. I tried to answer that in my fifth notebook. The accumulation of evidence together seems reasonable enough to me. I have nothing to add beyond that. —————————- Asks: The difference is that, unlike the wall, God cannot be seen. ———————- Rabbi: True. But as I wrote here, even what can be seen can be questioned as to whether I see correctly. And the assumption that I see correctly is informed and not tangible, and therefore it is again exposed to the same skeptical attack. There is no fundamental difference between the two. My book The Science of Freedom opens and ends with a prologue about Descartes. Descartes showed that our trust in the senses is based on reason, not that trust in reason should be based on the senses. And these are my words. ———————- Asks: My question is not how we know that the Mount Sinai event occurred, but rather what is special about it in relation to other revelations.
Why is a story in which God performed feats on a mountain the form of revelation that can be relied upon? ————————– Rabbi: God also spoke there in front of all Israel. The stunts did not come without a background. And again, you may not accept these testimonies or some of them, but that is a completely different discussion. I am not aware of any parallel revelations and therefore cannot compare. See also the entire discussion here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A2%D7%96%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%A8-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99/ At the very bottom of the page there is also a reference to other revelations. ————————- Asks: I feel like I’m repeating myself and you probably feel the same way… I probably didn’t make my point clear enough. My question does not challenge the existence of the status – for the sake of discussion, I accept that there was some status with “hocus pocus.” My question is why the “hocus pocus” that was there was supposed to prove/confirm the claim that God was revealed. ———————— Rabbi: Indeed, we are repeating ourselves. The class described in the tradition was not hocus pocus, but God spoke to the entire people (with the addition of pyrotechnics in the background). If you accept the existence of the class, then what is the question? Maybe some demon spoke to them from the belly? And if you doubt this, we are back to the previous point. ———————– Asks: How do you think all the people knew that God was speaking to them? ——————— Rabbi: Since I’ve never had this experience, I have no idea. Like a blind person asking how do I know I see something? If he hasn’t had the experience, it’s impossible to explain it to him. So he can always ask, maybe it’s an illusion? Go explain to him that it’s not. How do you know someone is talking to you? They understood it from the situation. ———————– Asks: That’s strange to me. You assume that some group has had some kind of experience that you don’t know about and that’s what you’re basing your conclusions on? It seems strange to me that we don’t know what the experience in which God reveals himself to us means and yet still rely on it. It reminds me of what I read in your article against expressions like “things beyond the understanding” (what is that anyway, etc.). remark, Following the correspondence, I have now started reading your fifth notebook (I thought to myself that the Quartet and the Yedioth Ahronoth books were enough, but I am finding new things that I did not know). You may feel that if I read it I will find an answer there. If that is your feeling, then tell me and I will stop pestering you until I finish reading… Regardless, it seems to me that there is an editorial error at the end of page 12 (the fifth notebook) – it should say “critical importance” and not “critical thinking.” ————————- Rabbi: There is nothing beyond reason here. People report to me that they have encountered something and I believe them. What is beyond reason here? Maybe you should read there. ————————- Asks: Well, I read the notebook, she added, but I still have some doubts… There’s a group of people here reporting a phenomenon that I have no idea what it means. It really sounds like an “experience beyond reason” to me. If I understand correctly, the argument goes something like this:
You don’t understand how someone comes to the conclusion that God reveals himself to them (like a blind person who doesn’t understand what it means to see), but the fact that they managed to convince so many people of this makes the claim plausible. If I am correct in my analysis, the realization of the Mount Sinai status does not seem significant to me. It is enough that they succeeded in convincing many people to observe the Torah and commandments, and it is not critical to understand how God, the Holy One, succeeded in convincing them. ———————— Rabbi: Like any other event. For example, they managed to convince many people that they saw clouds in the sky. Should I believe that? I don’t know. And even if I am one of those who saw the clouds, the question still arises whether to believe what I see or not. This is also an “absurd” argument because I have no way of knowing that my vision is reliable and not deceptive except for the vision itself. Or, a scientist reports to me about an unknown event (supernova, quantum tunneling). Believe him? No one has ever seen it. That’s also a preposterous argument. Ultimately, you have to decide whether you trust people’s judgment or your own, or not. ————————– Asks: When someone reports to me about a supernova, they explain to me what they saw and why they concluded that there was a supernova. In the case at hand, it’s not at all clear to me how they came to the conclusion that they had met God. Do you think an encounter with God and sensory empirical observation belong to the same genre of experiences? ———————— Rabbi: They will also explain everything to you. We met with God and He said to us, “I am the Lord your God.” How do you know? Because we experienced it clearly. Just like the wise man’s explanation to the blind man. When you see clouds, do you have another explanation for it? You saw clouds and that’s it. ———————— Asks: Are you claiming that they heard some kind of voice and had an intuition that it was God? ————————– Rabbi: When you see me, do you see a mirror and have an intuition that it is an encounter with me? ———————– Asks: Certainly, the senses give me information and then, through considerations of intuition and common sense, I interpret them. ————————- Rabbi: So it’s the same thing as the encounter with God. There too, there was an experience of a meeting and intuition told them that it was an encounter with Him. ————————– Asks: Nice, the difference is that this time people are talking about an experience that I have no idea how to capture. That is, we don’t really understand what happened there at that time, only that we know that in the end a considerable number of people accepted the yoke of Torah and commandments upon themselves. Which brings me back to the claim that it is enough to recognize that many people accepted the halakha and it is not critical to define when, how, and where this happened. ———————— Rabbi: A baseless claim. Why accept something just because some people accepted it? If those people claim that God revealed Himself to them and I believe them – then there is a reason to accept the commitment. But if there is a group of people who decide to run a marathon, should I do it too? I think we’ve exhausted it. ————————- Asks: I’m a little sorry because I feel like I wasn’t able to clarify my position and wasn’t convinced by yours. Please, to check that I understood you correctly, tell me if the following statements are true in your opinion: 1. At Mount Sinai in the New Testament, they experienced a revelation of God. 2. Just as a blind person does not know what vision is, so we do not know what revelation is. 3. In the concepts of people who do not know what revelation is – the meaning of the Mount Sinai ceremony is that after it the Israelites received the yoke of Torah and commandments upon themselves. Thank you for your time. ——————– Rabbi: Assumption 3 needs correction: The significance of the Mount Sinai event is that those people came to the conclusion that God revealed Himself and gave them the Torah, and then they accepted the obligation to it. This is exactly what I explained in the previous message. I still think we are repeating ourselves.