The view from epistemology

I think I understand. The difference is that the position that there is a creator for my complex system is an intuition that comes from thinking (knowledge), while the position that evolution created my complex system does not come only from thinking but from observation and knowledge.

But theoretically there could be a person who tells you that he looks at his reliable knowledge, and immediately the thought occurs to him that ”There must have been a developmental process that gave me tools of knowledge that fit reality, so that I could survive” (This is a hypothetical person, because as you said, no one would probably think it that way intuitively). In such a situation, it seems that the objection that stands against it cannot be that it is circular. For like belief in God, it is a simple intuition derived from belief in the reliability of our tools of knowledge. Do you agree?

Moshe, as an observer from the side, it does seem completely symmetrical to me whether it is evolution or something else, the main thing is to assume some kind of factor.
But the factor itself is transparent in terms of the conclusion of the evidence, what it is.
The idea that a factor outside the human world system is needed to give confidence in the recognition between them.
Rabbi Michi did not write in this reply what I wrote, but I think that is what he believes.
Compared to all the things he wrote, these are only strengthening arguments. And some of them are related to his belief in cognitive thinking, while belief in God makes a significant part of his evidence for this unnecessary.

And also, another thing that occurred to me - you said in the lecture series that you are not proving that God exists in this view, but that the person standing in front of you believes that God exists. But is this a fundamental difference? After all, even in ordinary arguments and not revelatory arguments, the premises of the argument are those that the person believes in. For example, I believe that there is a reason for everything, and I believe that something exists, and therefore I believe that there is God (the cosmological argument). My question is, why is it important in revelatory arguments to say that we have proven that the person believes in God, and not simply that we have proven that there is God? I see no difference between such a revelatory argument and an ordinary argument.

There could also be a person who thinks completely differently than me. I think he's wrong, but that's what he thinks.

The difference is very fundamental and I explained it there. If a person were to tell me that in his opinion it is plausible that a complex world was created spontaneously, that would unravel the "philosophical" formulation but not the "theological" one.

Yes, that's clear to me. My question is intended to emphasize that you did not prove the existence of God in the epistemological proof, but rather that the person believes in the existence of God. But I don't really understand this distinction - after all, every argument proves to a person that he believes in the existence of God, and does not prove the existence of God itself. In other words, if a person believes in the premises, then he must believe in the conclusion. So it is with the proof from epistemology, and so it is with the cosmological and physicotheological argument, right? In other words, if I proved to someone that he believes in the existence of something, I proved the existence of that something in accordance with the specific premises that the argument assumes.

Indeed. It is my contention that a valid argument always assumes what is wanted. And yet there are two types of argument. After all, you don't have to prove anything about the world itself. Any proof only shows you that you believe something. The same is true in geometry.