The witness’s argument – his weakness in his strength

The claim is that the logical structure of the witness's argument is anti-informativist in Bachelarian jargon.

Oh, now I understand. Why didn't you say so before?!

And your answer?

Irony, irony. I didn't understand anything. If you want to discuss please elaborate. I'm not dealing with riddles here.

Doron, what is “anti-informativist”? Actualist? So what? Why does that refute the argument?

Are you claiming that the Torah contradicts informativism and therefore cuts off the branch on which it sits? If so, how?

There is a problem with responding. When attaching the text, the button disappears. I don't know how it worked now.

The comment system in the reply section is anti-informative. A short comment does not cover the ‘reply’ button, but when the comment is long, the –reply’ button is covered.

The setup is to press the Tab key several times, as it says: ‘Seven times to decree a Delhii Tab…’, and may the hearers be pleased and upon them may the blessing of Tab come.

With best wishes, Sh”z Levinger

First, apologies to the readers of Zeev Bahler who are familiar with Zeev Bahler's concepts. The rabbi knows them very well and by and large he supports most of them (or all of them?).

My starting point is that the Torah was truly given to us by God, as it testifies to itself.
In light of this, it is tempting to accuse the Torah of circularity (and hence also of informative emptiness): before us is a document that testifies to the existence of a God who created it (the document) and gave it to humans. A document that creates a God who creates a document and so on...

However, the Torah was a little smarter than these critics and therefore prepared in advance for this accusation. The Torah (i.e. the argument of the witness implicit in it) seems to say: This circularity can be escaped by using an extra-textual (extra-Torahic) tool, namely historical experience, the Jewish tradition that we know directly and not through the Torah itself.
And indeed, voila! The Torah is truly right! Based on the existence of tradition, it is not at all likely that the story of the revelation at Sinai is an invention. The circular argument has been successfully broken.

All well and good, but my argument is that in the Torah's attempt to escape from one circularity, it retreats into another circularity - that of historicality. The Torah explicitly tells us, "Ask of the early days," etc. In other words: the actual history of humans and their experiences is the primary (and perhaps only) tool for examining the truth of the story. On the contrary, as long as history has not reached its end, it is always possible that the miracle will repeat itself and there will be a mass and public revelation to some group. According to the words of the Torah, if I understand them correctly, such an event (which has probably never happened and who knows if it will happen) would refute its validity.

That is, according to the Torah, the most absolute and authentic knowledge given to humans from heaven (itself) denies the human ability to validate the existence of a transcendent object like God as long as history is not “completed”. And since the historical process is of a relative nature, then knowledge - including knowledge about God and the giving of the Torah - is also relative, i.e. has a purely historical status. Therefore, there is no approval, according to what is implicit in the words of the Torah itself, even to think about God (who is supposed to be “above” history).

It is of course possible to argue that the Torah does not deal with the theory of logic and epistemology and in any case it does not prohibit us from thinking or knowing God through “extra-Torah”channels. If this were true, my argument could be more easily concealed.
In my opinion, this is not true. Actualist theories have a tendency to “spread” and invalidate other competing theories, including competing actualist theories (after all, competing actualist theories are separate from the specific theory given, i.e., they are not “actual” from its perspective). This is especially true when it comes to an actualist theory (the Torah) that is attributed absoluteness. Its internal claim to nullify all knowledge whatsoever (including its own nullification) is much stronger.

In conclusion: The Torah, according to my argument, was truly given to us from heaven, but precisely because of this we have a problem.

The rabbi addressed the issue at length here:

https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A2%D7%96%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%A8-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99/
He does not see this verse as “proof” of the reliability of the Torah, that is, the lack of repeated revelation does not prove the truth of the Mount Sinai status. Here:

“What the Torah says “show the Gentiles God”, in my opinion, is not necessarily meant to prove that there is a God. This is the perspective of a contemporary person who is looking for arguments to prove faith. It is meant to show believing people the close relationship of God to us. He reveals himself to us and guides us in the world (and we still remain alive), because we are important to Him…

“This is regarding the Torah. What is written in various books of thought (like the Maimonides you quoted) that are based on revelation and its uniqueness does not convince me and I do not feel obligated to explain them or agree with them…

“I proposed a different interpretation of the Torah. After all, the verse ends “and he lived,” meaning that what is not heard is not the encounter with God but that we survived it. No one directly met with Him and survived…

“In a parenthetical article, the verse also does not say that there will be no revelation, only that there was not one until then. Therefore, later testimonies do not say much…”.

Doron, it's not clear why you had to involve Bechler and his concepts (it didn't help anything, except for the (unfounded) claim that since the Torah is an actualist theory it has a tendency to "spread out", etc.), but in any case the Torah really doesn't present the witness' argument or try to prove anything. It's an anachronism. See the context of the verses and you'll discover that the "is trying to show the greatness of the people of Israel surviving an encounter with God."

I assume that the Rabbi will have a good and instructive answer as usual.

I will repeat my argument in a slightly different way that may also answer the questions that were directed at me.

1. Regarding the usefulness of the term actualism in this context: the advantage of Bachelerian analysis is that it is suitable for examining many (if not all) patterns of thought and cognition. Why not use it? I don't understand.

2. In my opinion, Bacheler himself did not insist on this, but the characteristic of "expansion" is essential to any actualist theory. The reason for this is simple: the actualist theory (whatever it may be) denies the existence of abstract entities separate from it. A given theory sees abstract entities (potential for the state of knowledge) as "annoying". But what, from the perspective of the given theory, all theories separate from it (scientific, moral, religious, etc.) are also abstract entities. Therefore, they must be discarded. See, for example, the attempt (which I think is unsuccessful) of Wittgenstein's treatise to take the meaning out of every abstract theory (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, etc.).

3. I don't understand how it can be claimed that "the Torah does not present the witness argument", even if it does not call it that. After all, the verse "ask of the early days" explicitly recommends (or perhaps commands) the skeptic to conduct his own historical research and thus receive confirmation of his skepticism. The skeptic is asked to investigate whether there are parallel testimonies in history to the testimony of the Torah. Why do you call attributing the witness argument to the Torah an anachronism?

4. It is possible that from the perspective of the Torah, the absence of a repeated revelation event is not proof. I think so, but that is not the main point. The main point is that the Torah turns to logical recourse from history (tradition) itself. This is an attempt to turn to an extra-textual source in order to substantiate the text itself. The problem: the Torah itself (this is implied even in its name - “Torah”, which is a halachic codex that is supposed to take root in a real way in the hearts and actions of people, that is, “spread” within history). In my opinion, this position implies that from the perspective of the Torah, there is no separation between it and the historical process. In any case, there is no place for a transcendent factor to the Torah.

5. Aharon quotes the Rabbi:
“What the Torah says, “He showed the Gentiles God,” in my opinion does not necessarily prove that there is a God. This is the perspective of a contemporary person who is looking for arguments to prove his belief. It comes to show believers the closeness of God to us. He reveals himself to us and guides us in the world (and we still remain alive), because we are important to Him…”
So, the rabbi agrees with me - the question of God's separate existence from the Torah is not important to the Torah. That's roughly what I argued. The Torah probably doesn't intend this, but it reluctantly not only makes the assumption of the existence of separate entities like God superfluous, but it also implies that as history (and human knowledge as part of it) progresses, faith will become weaker, or at least should become weaker.

Wow, this is a very complicated and complicated formulation. Bottom line, I don't see any difficulty. The Torah tells us that the tradition that accompanies it, together with itself, constitute as a whole evidence of a revelation at Sinai that was like no other. What's wrong with that?
Aharon wrote well (on my behalf) that it doesn't say that there will be no such revelation. But even if it were talking about the future, I still don't see what the problem is with that. The argument is that you won't see such a mass revelation in the future, and any reader who reads the Torah at some date in the future can examine whether such a revelation has indeed occurred by his time or not. Maybe in the future there will be? Maybe. Maybe in the future the law of gravity will also be refuted, and yet somehow it stands the test, so far we have been adopting it.
After all, there is no internal contradiction or circularity here that I can discern.

Perhaps you intend to raise a skeptical question: Who said that we should believe our senses? The senses themselves? After all, we have no independent feedback. But then you are talking about mere skepticism and I don't see the point in engaging in skepticism when dealing with a specific question about the status of Mount Sinai.

Another side note. As far as I understood your words, all of Bechler's terminology is inappropriate and unrelated to the discussion. Beyond that, even if it is related, it only complicates things and there is no point in including it here. Written simply and clearly is always more effective.
(Forgive me for allowing myself, as someone who is often criticized for this, to recommend simplicity. But I do think that I formulate things simply. I use technical and specific terminology only when it is necessary and helpful for understanding to the best of my judgment. Maybe I am wrong, others will say. But that is at least what I am trying to do)

In short, if you see any difficulty here, then in Mota it is written briefly and clearly and without confusing terminology what exactly the difficulty is. I do not see the slightest difficulty here.

I have a hard time understanding why it is not worth using Bacheler. You yourself have done so in your books several times. On the contrary, Bacheler created a meta-theory (whose subject is other theories) and it is fruitful and valid in my opinion, and probably in yours as well. It is true that I, the little one, am trying to go a little beyond Bacheler (my idea that the actualist theory cannot compensate for the existence of competing theories), but in my opinion everything I say is logically implicit in his view.
However, if readers feel that this confuses them, I will try to present my argument differently.
I fail to understand: where do you see in the witness argument an attempt to appeal to transcendent factors, that is, to appeal to factors separate from human history and the bodies of knowledge created within it?
How can someone who takes the witness argument seriously as a highly plausible argument (like me, for example) separate the description of revelation from the revelation itself and the historical impact that these ”two” have had on the rest of history, up to the present day. In my opinion, the Torah encourages us (at least within the framework of the witness's argument) to abolish these separations.
(First, it seems to me that you yourself pointed out a similar difficulty to the supporters of Darwinism when they came to explain how the Darwinist theory developed from biology. Please don't take me at my word because I may not have understood you in this example. But if I did, then the same logical structure that nullifies Darwinism in its failed naturalistic interpretation is also present in the witness's argument.)
An example of a more successful and more ”potentialist” explanatory model (sorry, give me a break) is found, for example, in Pauline Christianity. The heart of the Christian Torah, formulated in the New Testament, does not sanctify history and tradition but rather the appeal to the heart, to intuition, to private revelation, etc. In my view, the Christian believer God is not “blocked” By his Torah (“For the letter kills, but the spirit gives life”).
I tried to make this as clear as possible.
So, do you feel comfortable being addressed in this context as “Rabbi”? I certainly don't feel comfortable, but as long as I am your guest here, I respect what is customary.

I feel very comfortable addressing you as Mikhi. Some people find it bothersome and prefer the rabbi, and I don't object to them. So be it.
I used this terminology when it was relevant and I didn't see a better alternative. In your case, it seems completely irrelevant to me, unrelated, and certainly not clarifying. The fact is that although I think my understanding of the text is reasonable, I can't understand what you're getting at, and so up until this very moment I don't see the slightest problem here. Therefore, I will try once again to focus the discussion.

The witness's argument (in your opinion. In my opinion, it doesn't necessarily exist in the Bible, but we won't argue about that) goes like this:
Assumption 1. The Torah scroll describes the situation at Mount Sinai.
Assumption 2. In your opinion, the book also adds that there has never been and will never be a similar situation. I will go with you on this as well. This was said for the consideration of the future reader, as I explained.
Assumption 3. The book is accompanied by a seven-fold tradition that the book is authentic and that what is described in it is true (that there really was such a situation and that these things were said in it - including the instructions for testing).

Summary of the arguments' assumptions: The book is the means that generation A points to when they pass on the tradition to generation B, as if telling them: Look what is written here. It is really true. Please pass it on to your children (and continue to check whether something like this already happened in their generation or whether this is still a unique event. According to your opinion, of course).

The argument itself: The book and tradition create a fairly reliable chain of transmission of the Torah.

I do not see such a structure as the slightest problem. I mean, of course, a structural problem. There are objections to the argument from all sorts of angles, but that is not our topic here.

Now I will ask you to point out briefly and clearly what exactly of the structure I described here you are challenging (or perhaps in your opinion it is not the structure).
And please, no topicalism and no cumbersome and confusing terminology. Simple and focused on human language.

Rabbi,

“Michi” with a firm or loose spoon?

Dagosha. Why?

The question is:
Is the slackness of the cap its emphasis, or is the emphasis of the cap its slackness?

With greetings, Michael Maoz, known as ‘Michal Meisel’ or Micki Mouse

It seems that in the Song of the Sea, Moses and the Children of Israel used two methods: ‘Who is like a blow’ the first with a slack cap, and ’Who is like a blow’ the second with a tight cap.

In my opinion, the tools that Bahler offers are very relevant in this case as well, and the limitation you place on me makes it more difficult for me to explain my words. Okay.

To your words in the summary you wrote above:

“The argument itself: the book and tradition create a fairly reliable chain of the giving of the Torah.”

My argument is that the test of reliability that the text offers us does not allow us to separate it from the way it is embodied in the actions of humans in history.

Another argument: If we are making this distinction (as I think you are doing), then it is not in the name of the text but in the name of reason. The assumption of such a separation is a methodological fallacy since it does not try to extract from the text what is logically implicit in it (what is logically implicit in my opinion is that there is no separation).

Conclusion: If there is no criterion of distinction built into the Torah itself between the reality of the observer (everyone who belongs to the second generation and onwards to the present day, like you and me) and it, then a tautology is created: Torah = human history = the actual people living in it = human knowledge. Actual human knowledge, and it alone, generates the supposedly transcendent status of the Torah. If according to the Torah itself its transcendent status is not authentic, then it is not a “Torah from heaven”.

Within the framework of my limited abilities, I have tried to be clear, understandable and simple. If I have not succeeded in this, I take responsibility for it, of course. However, please note that the logical structure I am describing is truly of a very subtle and elusive dialectical nature. Maybe you said to yourself something like: “He can't really mean that the reality described is ”so upside down”. etc. What can I do that I meant that.

I am very poor. I don't understand a word. I have given up.

(The problem with Bechler's formulation is that they are moving to talking in slogans and not in actual words. If his analysis is good, there should be a way to translate it into Hebrew in each specific case. The fact that you have difficulty doing this is a sign that you cannot use his analysis here)

“My argument is that the reliability test that the text offers us does not allow us to separate it from the way it is embodied in the actions of humans in history.”

What is the problem with separating the Torah from history? There is no problem at all, and you, as far as I understand, have not been able to show the problem either (that is, you tried to “excuse the rabbi's opinion that it is possible to separate and ”failed”, but you did not explain at all why in the first place one should think that there is no separation).
This is exactly what I wrote in parentheses at the beginning: your only reason why they should not be separated is the decision that the Torah is “actualist” Torah And therefore “spreading”. These are empty slogans, and as long as you haven't explained what you want, they are worthless. Analysis (Bechler's, in this case) is supposed to help us *think*, but if the arguments (which the analysis helped us discover) cannot be translated into Hebrew, they are still worthless, no matter how clever the analysis seems.

Now I will take a step back and ask a question in Hebrew: In what way exactly do you think the Torah “does not separate” itself from history (the Torah is a book, and history is events. The difference between them is clear to me)?
Perhaps you define the concepts ‘Torah’ and ’history’ differently than I do?

It is indeed frustrating.
It is possible that I do not understand the argument implicit in the Torah, do not understand Bachler, and do not even understand your words.
In my opinion, this is not the case. I tried to explain in the clearest, most concrete and simple way what I meant when I spoke about the inherent tendencies of the actualist theory to “spread”. Even if I failed, it does not mean that “it cannot be used here”, as you say. (I would be interested to know how you justify this statement of yours, but I do not want to scatter and spoil the discussion when we do not understand each other well anyway).
The fact that you do not see the relevance of Bachlerianism here – specifically you, who understand Bachler well and even agree with him on many things – does not make sense to me at all. Bachler’s theory is actually a meta-theory that deals with knowledge as it is (theories of ideas, etc.). The witness argument implicit in the Torah is definitely an idea, that is, it has a certain logical structure. Therefore, it can be studied through a Claretian lens. On the contrary, Clare himself uses his meta-theory to examine questions of morality (and perhaps even aesthetics). In my view, this is a reinforcement, even if indirect, of the relevance of his method to our question.
In general: In my opinion, when one side in a discussion brings a paradigm that is well known to both speakers, is largely accepted by both, and especially when it is a paradigm that is convenient for the party bringing it up, it is more appropriate to allow him to present things from his point of view. If the other side (the listener) does not understand the first side's intention, the flaw may be in the explainer, it may be in the listener, or it may be in both. It is even possible that the other side is right and the paradigm really is not applicable to the discussion. But in any case, it is not right to “prevent” the explainer from continuing to use a paradigm that he is convinced (even if mistakenly) is applicable to the discussion.

I am not “scolding” you, of course, but rather pointing out a methodological issue that I believe is central to our discussions.

In any case, I will attach an article I wrote about Buchler and this matter. The article is long and I am probably not sure that you have the time and desire to read it. I do not expect you to make such an effort for me. Only if you feel like it.
Shabbat Shalom.
PS
Mikhi, without a dash of flattery (with a psychological twist) it is of course impossible: I consider myself your student and am deeply impressed by you and your words. You will not receive more than that from me.

I am not forbidding you or preventing you from anything, of course. I asked you to omit these concepts that I believe do not contribute to understanding (and as far as I understood, are also irrelevant. But this may be a result of my misunderstanding). This is not a question of methodological clarification but of trying to progress towards understanding your points. But it turns out that I do not understand the other formulation either. That is why I gave up. I am sorry, but I cannot discuss claims that I do not understand.

It is possible that Doron thought that my previous response was written by the rabbi, since he commented on my wording and in the same breath praised the rabbi.
—-
Shu”r Perhaps he did address me and only the PS is dedicated to the rabbi. If I am right, I would be happy to see the article in question (and actually, even if I am wrong :).

The tearful signer
D’

I would also be happy to read the article, as I would be very happy to read anything related to the witness argument. For now, I would recommend that you read Jacob Licht's "The Establishment Argument," which explains the witness argument that emerges from the entire biblical history and its various claims about the number of events of the people's establishment, even before their territorial possession. He concludes from this that it is correct (without accepting the supernatural dimension). If you wish, I will send it to you at giladstn@gmail.com

The weakness of the Torah's implicit witness argument can also be explained by creating an analogy (admittedly loose) to Popper's philosophy of science. As with Popper, the basic motivation here is based on the need for demarcation. In the case of the Torah, it is not a question of demarcating science but of demarcating authentic religion, that is, in an attempt to prove or at least explain the claim that the Torah is true (from heaven), in contrast to other teachings that are fabrications.
Similar to Popper, the proposed method for testing the authenticity of the Torah (compared to competing teachings) is to conduct a “crucial experiment”: the Torah sends us into the field of human history to conduct observations and collect positive data that will refute (or at least weaken) its own claim to authenticity. “If you don't find any”, she tells us, “I'm probably trustworthy, that is, authentic Torah”.

The problem behind this quasi-Poperian method is that the Torah assumes that the main (if not the only) way to know God is through history, of which the Torah is, at least in its opinion, its main protagonist. First, the Torah rules out - or at least greatly diminishes - the value of alternative channels of knowledge to God (for example, intuition, or through rational-philosophical reflection, or private revelation to man, etc.). The main gateway to God is a document that burst into history and dramatically changed it (and how could it be otherwise if the Torah is from God and is unique and special?!).

Think about it: Does the Torah “allow” us to communicate with God through channels alternative to itself? Even if so, from its perspective they are on the margins.

The problem I see with this “method” is of course that the most basic ontological status, which was supposed to be attributed to God, is attributed to the Torah itself. If it cannot be separated from God, and if the Torah exists for us in a topical way, that is, as a text rooted in history (and this is self-evident), then it cannot be separated from the same God who was supposed to create it in the first place. We are left with a topical Torah (a body of knowledge) from which only we can and are allowed to derive God.

In my view, this is circularity.

Finally, things are clear.

A few comments:
1. The Torah *does* not assume that history is the only and main way to arrive at faith in it. This is nonsense that you assume and try to screw into some remote verse that does not at all try to present the argument of the witness but rather the affection of G-d for the people of Israel.
2. Even if we accept your wild and puzzling assumptions, I do not see the circularity. Indeed, from history we prove the truth of the Torah and from there the existence of G-d. What is circular here? (That G-d gave the Torah that proves His existence? If I send you a letter saying that I exist, is it circularity because he testifies about me even though I preceded him?! I probably did not understand your intention)

Now I understand the words (although the wording is incredibly awkward, please forgive me), but I still don't understand the argument and I also flatly reject its premises.

As mentioned, I don't agree with your interpretation at all, but for the sake of the discussion I will adopt it.
The Torah tells us to examine it in the following way: If you discover in history another divine revelation to an entire people - you are exempt from the obligation to serve G-d.
Where does it say that this is the only or even the main way to know G-d? It is not written anywhere, not even according to your interpretation (which I do not agree with). Where does it say that emotional-experiential-intuitive or other knowledge is not acceptable? This is a mere invention.
What is written is at most (and again, this is only according to your erroneous interpretation) that if the Torah does not pass this empirical test we are exempt from the obligation to it because it has not been proven that the Torah was given. Does this mean that there is no G-d? This doesn't even mean that He didn't give the Torah. It just absolves us of the obligation because there is no clear evidence for the existence of the giving of the Torah and we are not required to uphold something that is not sufficiently solid.

And even if these two strange and unfounded assumptions were correct, I still don't see any problem. This test confirms that there was a revelation that gave us the Torah. What's wrong with this test? Just as the test of a body falling to Earth confirms that there is a gravitational force that causes this fall.
My feeling is that there is a strange insistence here on finding a difficulty where it doesn't exist. And, strictly speaking, not that I have any excuse one way or another. I don't see even the slightest bit of difficulty here.

First, I would like to suggest the source of the error in reading the text in Deuteronomy as a “witness argument” or, unfortunately, as a version of it. The error stems from the assumption that this is a written text, a kind of story, and not authentic Torah. In other words, “there is a thought here of a written document that tries to convince the “reader” of the credibility of the status. In a certain sense, this is the hidden assumption of biblical criticism in relation to “this important episode” (a physician) that raises some kind of theological argument, supposedly written at a later time in order to try to convince.

But the truth is different. This text is a transcription of a real speech that Moses delivered to the people of Israel on the eve of their entry into the land. He tries to show them their kindness (”Hear the people”) their prophetic virtue (” The voice of God out of the fire and they lived!”) and of course the greatness of their God – who did two great things for them – revealed himself to them at Sinai, and brought them out of Egypt ”a nation from among nations” something that would have been completely impossible for the gods who ruled territorial spaces and could not just enter a land that was not theirs and pull out a people from there… etc. (”Ayyish in Alexander the Great's "Hear the Words"). And other various explanations. Of course, there is no attempt here to prove the status of Mount Sinai, which was clear to the generation of the wilderness and self-evident.

Thus, if you accept the reliability of the text, you believe in it anyway (and unfortunately believe that it was said by Moses to the people of Israel in the era of the Exodus from Egypt - and in doing so, the recognition is hidden that if he said to them such things as "you have seen" - then it is likely that he did not lie to their faces and they did see the revelation of God). And if you do not believe that there is an accurate transcription of Moses' words here, but rather make hidden assumptions that the text was written later - only then are you likely to get caught up in the complexity of the "evidence argument" and the hidden theological attempts that the "author" is trying to preach to you. (Of course, a third possibility is possible, and it explains that Moses spoke thus and then also wrote it down in a book. However, his writing acted like a transcriber, and therefore one should not draw all sorts of wild speculations about the "arguments" and "persuasions" that the "writing" is trying to make the "reader" believe. In conclusion, by accepting the assumption that there is a real speech here before a people at a certain moment in history, all the assumptions about the witness' argument become self-evident. This is the "seat in life" of the writing. And Doron's assumption that asks that 1. The Torah sends us into the field of human history to make observations and collect positive data that will refute (or at least weaken) its own claim. Authenticity is wrong. It does not “send us”; it speaks to them.
2. The assumption that the verse “Ask in the early days” explicitly recommends (or perhaps commands) the skeptic to conduct his own historical research and thus receive confirmation of his skepticism is false. It does not speak to the skeptic but to the people of Israel who hear Moses in that generation and are not satisfied with that (they are satisfied with how much they are desired before God, and whether God is unique and so on).
3. Also the assumption that “if you discover in history another divine revelation to an entire people – you are exempt from the obligation to serve God.” (in Rabbi Michai’s formulation) Doron) is wrong - it does not claim any of this, as stated, and even the history it does talk about is only the history that concerns the past from the point of time of the Exodus from Egypt. It does not at all send any future reader to perform any experiment.

The basic premise accepted by both of us (so I thought and still think) is that the strength of the argument in favor of the authenticity of the Torah (its divinity) lies in what we call the witness argument. And what is the discussion about if not about that..? The witness argument is the main guarantee - at least in this discussion (but in my opinion in general) for that authenticity.

Regarding the problematic (in my opinion) ”method” that I pointed out. It seems to me that you have deviated from the discussion now when you try to show that in the Torah there are additional “methods” for getting to know God (of course there are!). This deviation undermines my understanding of your argument.
The main problem is not the totality of the ”methods” that are in the Torah, but the question regarding the main method as presented by the Torah in the place most relevant to the discussion (in the part of the witness argument). The logical form of the witness' argument prevails over parallel arguments or opinions or ideas (in short, "methods") that of course also exist in the Torah.

This, in my opinion, is the meaning of coherent philosophical interpretation. Take the heart of the theory before you (its logical skeleton), and extract from it with the most severe consistency what is implicit in it. I suspect you, Mikhi, that you agree with me on this matter, but in this context, in my opinion, you are not faithful to your path.
I will add and emphasize: I see no flaw in the fact that any theory or argument (and in this case, the Torah is also a theory or argument) uses a historical-empirical "method" - perhaps one could call it "naturalistic" - to strengthen their position. There is no problem with the Torah sending us on a mission to “ask the first days” and I do not claim at all that there is circularity here.
Rather: the circularity stems from the fact that the argument implicit in the Torah, as far as it is concerned, precedes any document that claims to have a metaphysical character. This characteristic demands that the interpreter “take seriously” the norm that the Torah posits as the basis of its “method” (= the norm that sends us to a “Poperian” historical study). Either way: two different methods of argument should not be mixed up - both have their place and necessity, provided that we distinguish between “higher” and “lower”.

More on the “naturalistic” bias Yours (in this case) is in another place where you write:
“For example, I will not relate to a story about a miracle that happened to so-and-so if I know so-and-so as a primitive who believes in all nonsense, but if a scientist who is accustomed to critical thinking tells it to me, and certainly if his story has support from an independent source (historical or otherwise), I will believe it more. This is the difference between alternative medicine and conventional medicine. That is why we accept quantum theory despite its absurdity, and do not accept miracle stories from this or that tribe.
Although what I have said indicates that much of it stands or falls on trust in tradition and its transmitters” (emphasis mine).
In these things you choose to believe the testimonies of the senses and the historical story (rightly!), while the main question you should have asked the tradition is about its logical skeleton.

In addition, you claim that at most (and you also disagree with this):
“… If the Torah does not pass this empirical test, we are exempt from the obligation to it because it has not been proven that the Torah was given.”

What do these words of yours mean, “We are exempt from the obligation to it”? Don't they actually mean “We are exempt from the obligation to it because it is not authentic Torah (from heaven)”? Isn't it obvious that if a person disbelieves in the reliability of the Torah's testimony about itself (testimony that explicitly states that its source is heavenly), then he also rejects its claim regarding its emanation from that source.
Again, I get the feeling that you are “giving up” to the text and you do not examine it with all the logical rigor required (a phenomenon that is astonishing to me when it comes from a person like you with extraordinary intellectual integrity).

Regarding what made it difficult for me:
” If I send you a letter saying that I exist, is it circularity because it testifies to me even though I preceded it?! I probably did not understand your intention”

My answer: If you were a supernatural being (an abstract metaphysician) sending me such a letter, I would indeed see this as a credibility problem stemming from the circularity of the argument at the basis of the letter. On the reasonable assumption that the sender of the letter is a real creature of flesh and blood and hence can be recognized by the senses and by ”historical” knowledge (let's say the testimony of a person I trust who will tell me that you are his friend), then there is really no logical flaw in your letter. A letter from one person to another containing the writer's own testimony of his own existence is not problematic and is not circular.

Regarding Gil's claim that the things that appear in the Torah are merely a transcription (writing down) of God's living speech to humans.
My response: I have no idea what this claim is based on. If it appears in the oral tradition of the people, it is based on a faith-based, psychological, and even logical reliance on what is actually written (and not in living speech) in the Torah. Since most of us do not have direct access to the historical/metaphysical event that occurred at Mount Sinai, we have no choice but to turn to the text that testifies to it. (As mentioned, there is also extra-textual evidence, but they are not the main focus of our discussion. This revolves around the logical structure of the text.)

In conclusion, I will increase the amount of confusion I have caused to readers and say that I myself tend to believe that the Mount Sinai event did indeed occur in practice as a supernatural revelation. The witness's argument (+ the testimony of tradition according to him) is quite strong.
The problem, as I understand it, lies in the interpretation given to the very existence of the event.

Okay, so I would love to understand your argument. It's hard to deal with such a long text, please clarify why when a metaphysical entity sends me a letter it's circular (although in the last paragraph you admit that you would believe this letter. So where is the problem? Not on the logical level, because otherwise you wouldn't believe it at all. Maybe the problem lies in your unnecessary assumptions about the nature of metaphysical entities?)

I began to think that this was a random word generator, one that had not yet reached the level where it passes the Turing test. Really, really. I am not writing cynically.

Anyway, even if there is a flesh-and-blood writer here, unfortunately the language he uses does not flow to me. I have the impression that the writer does not read Hebrew either. Therefore, I see no point in continuing and I suggest stopping here.

As for the suspicion of dishonesty, I have nothing to say. Apparently, your words are very understandable and logical in your opinion, and therefore you conclude that I have no way to cope. Maybe.

Anyway, if someone here volunteers to translate the question into spoken Hebrew and present it in a clear and focused manner, I could try to respond. Otherwise, as far as I am concerned, we will stop here.

Doron, thanks for the reference. I will just comment in the margins of the issue, not as you quoted me: “Regarding Gil’s claim that the things that appear in the Torah are merely a transcription (writing down) of God’s living speech to humans.” Moses is the speaker of the above speech in the Book of Deuteronomy, and he speaks from his perspective about the revelation that he and the generation were part of. There is no “transcription of God’s living speech” here, but rather Moses’.

Hi Doron. I would highly recommend that you continue it with Rabbi Sharki who really likes the witness argument. Moreover, you should contact Dr. Meir Bozaglo who elaborates in particular in his book ”Sefah Le'manimin” on the witness argument. At a conference he attended together with Rabbi Sharki to publish a commentary on the book of the Kuzari, he praised him for perfecting the witness argument that he developed.

Here is a taste

http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=10762

Miki
To the best of my knowledge, I am not a random word generator (but even if I am, I probably wouldn't know it).
I have to admit that I failed to provide a clear and understandable explanation, and the responsibility for this probably lies primarily with me. I still think my overall argument is correct.

If I “accused” you of anything, it was inconsistency, not ”dishonesty”.
I will say it explicitly: in my opinion, you are a model of intellectual honesty: I have read many of your publications and, in my opinion, this quality is clearly evident in them. (Now I have also come out as a liar: I solemnly promised not to praise you anymore and I did not keep my promise).
In my attempt to compliment you, I wrote that I was surprised that a person like you, with extraordinary intellectual honesty, is inconsistent on this point, on this point alone.
I still believe - and it is certainly possible that I am wrong - that I was right on this point.
I must add that I think you tied my hands in a way when you asked me to avoid the Bachelarian organization. I have already explained why.

Gil, you have confused me a bit: Moses, according to you, created the Torah, fabricated it from his mind? Are you saying that he did this by using living speech, which was only later transcribed into written language?

D’, Miki explains much better than I do the distinction between scientific discourse (naturalistic, empirical, etc.) and philosophical discourse.
I can receive a letter from someone in which he introduces himself and claims to exist. In the field of scientific discourse, I can conduct empirical research and check whether such a person exists (for example, by doing a Google search, asking other people if they have heard of his existence, etc.).
As soon as the letter I received states that the originator and creator of that letter is God, then one cannot rely on the evidence of the senses, on historical-empirical investigation, etc. (There is no point in searching for God himself on Google, at most only the references to him by flesh and blood people).
If the main evidence (let alone: if the only evidence) about the metaphysical status of the writer of the letter is found in the letter, then how can I separate this evidence from the entity that supposedly wrote it? I have no tools other than empirical investigation, and this, as mentioned, is not relevant here.
Note that in doing so I did not at all deny the possibility of the existence of metaphysical entities (like God), but only denied the logical validity of claims that testify to themselves.

Nice. I don't see any circularity here. I didn't understand this line:
“How can I separate this testimony from the entity that supposedly wrote it? I have no tools other than empirical investigation, and that, as mentioned, is not relevant here.”
What do you mean by “separate”? The paper with the testimony is not God. What is there to separate?
The argument itself is clear: I have no way to confirm the testimony and therefore I will not believe it. So what? What is circular here and not logically valid?

(Could you mean that there is no way to confirm the existence of God separately from the testimony, and therefore the letter cannot be accepted?)

The key sentence of your statement is the concluding sentence:

“Could it be that you mean that there is no way to confirm the existence of God separately from the testimonies, and therefore the letter cannot be accepted?”

That was roughly what I meant, although instead of the word confirm, which makes a certain concession to the attesting text, I would say something like: The only (at least the main) way for the recipient of the letter to become acquainted with the God who wrote it (supposedly) is through the letter alone. This is the desired assumption in my opinion, namely circularity.
In short: In my opinion, the main problem is not the lack of confirmation ability, but rather that it is more serious.

This does not mean, of course, that such a letter cannot be accepted, but that if I received it I would think - in the absence of external evidence for it (extra-textual evidence) - that its logical status or validity is problematic.

Why is this the assumption of the requested?! I receive a letter from God and conclude that He exists.
What did I assume here?

Are we talking about a mere letter now or about the Torah and the evidence it provides for itself?
My intention from the beginning was to show the circularity (or at least the logical problematicity) of the Torah, a problematicity that stems not only from its own testimony but also from the fact that the ”proof” it brings to its credibility involves the historical process that it itself caused (or claims to have caused).
Perhaps the “divine” letter you received should not be considered as logically problematic as the Torah. That is how it seems to me when I think about it now. Although I have not yet completely lost my suspicion of its circularity.
But even if there is no such circularity in your letter, in any case it does not seem that I should accept its credibility (unless I have other evidence that supports the fact that the letter I have comes from such a high instance).

Okay. What is circular in the Torah? So what if it triggered a historical process, etc.?
I suggest you try to formulate a logical argument with detailed assumptions and conclusions. Maybe that way we will understand ourselves and each other better