Torah from heaven
My question is how can I know that at least the basis of the Torah that we have was indeed given by God, even if we assume that if the people in the Land of Israel did not hear from their ancestors that they were slaves in Egypt and that they came out in a supernatural way, that this appearance made them think that Moses was God’s messenger, and in addition, they heard from their ancestors that they met God in the desert and that he gave them the name Torah, and if their ancestors did not tell them all this, it is hard to believe that anyone would have been able to sell it to them. But if this is what they heard from their ancestors, then the other small details, such as what miracles exactly there were, etc., it makes sense that they did not remember exactly. And if suddenly they supposedly found the book that Moses wrote, then it is possible to sell that this is indeed what happened, and the question is whether the fact that a group of slaves was convinced by miracles and revelation proves that it did happen (by the way, in Judaism it is said that only a fifth of the people came out, and perhaps it was only the group that was convinced by Moses’ supernatural power and therefore went with him). The part of the revelation, in my opinion, is the most unproven, since what was there was fire and trumpets. And Kol, although a rhetorician, can convince them that it is God, but in reality, you don’t even need magic for that, and also the part of the many miracles such as the ten plagues, the only proof is that they came out in miracles, but there is no proof that these are indeed the ten exact plagues, and the Torah describes that something like turning the entire river into blood or maybe even all the water in Egypt into blood is written about that the magicians did that too, and the Torah describes that something like filling all of Egypt with frogs was also possible for the magicians, so is it outrageous that someone who grew up in Pharaoh’s house and was also sent to the best school for magic surpassed his masters and performed slightly greater magic and caused a group of slaves who worked 24/7 and were not given time to become wise and wise to believe that it was more than just magic (and I want to mention that the Sages describe Pharaoh as considering himself a god and therefore did not want to be seen doing his business, and was truly blind because of how many magicians the Egyptians believed he was To).
I will refer you to the fifth conversation in my first published book.
I would be happy if the Rabbi or any of the readers who read the first book of the book could explain the answer to me because at the moment I have no way to read the first book of the
For the sake of this nice site (which I am now visiting for the first time), I will give a review that the nice bot gave me about the “fifth conversation in the first chapter” (after I asked for a “more detailed summary, even really detailed”).
I have not read the book, and the summary may not be exhaustive, which is certain – it is nice! And in any case, the answer to the question is probably in sections 5, 7.
There is also an article available for download online whose content is probably equal to the content in the book – search for “Deism and Theism: From a Philosophical God to Religious Commitment Michael Abraham”).
[A second ago – If I may add a question:
Is there any article that summarizes all the small emphases from Jewish literature in favor of the witness argument (I have already found such in several books, such as the interesting emphases presented here)? If not, it is puzzling, and if there is a puzzling one that is not indicated on Wikipedia in its value or otherwise on the talk page].
Good luck!
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The conversation is divided into three parts: (a) Faith and Revelation, (b) The Factual Discussion — the Reliability of Tradition, (c) The Normative Discussion — the Validity of Revelation.
Part A — Faith and Revelation
A. What is Religious Faith?
The central distinction: Religious faith is not just a philosophical statement (“the existence of God” as a factual claim) — but also a practical commitment to norms and commandments. Religious belief includes a factual component (the statement that God exists) and a practical/normative component (the commitment to the divine command).
Important point: Belief as a factual claim is not certain in every sense, but it can be argued that it is reasonable/justified within the framework of the philosophical arguments in the book.
B. The meaning of revelation — the “metaphysical glass ceiling”
Key idea: There is a limit to what philosophy and pure rationality can provide — revelation comes (when it exists) to break that “ceiling” and bring knowledge and command that are difficult to achieve through purely philosophical means. Therefore, the transition from deism (to a non-interfering philosopher) to religious theism requires an examination of the phenomenon of revelation itself.
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Part B — The Factual Discussion: The Reliability of Tradition on Revelation
C. The meaning of deism in the theistic view
Deism: Acceptance of the existence of God in an abstract way (or that God created the world and then does not interfere). The problem is that deism gives an abstract God but does not provide a mechanism that justifies obedience to religious commandments or the importance of tradition. The transition to religious theism requires a factual explanation (how/why to receive revelation?).
D. On tradition — the argument from testimony
The gist of the argument: Continuous acceptance (historical transmission of testimony about events of revelation — e.g. the Sinai stand) is considered historical evidence, similar to the acceptance of historical testimony about other events (e.g. testimonies about Napoleon). Therefore, in the absence of a strong reason to deny it, tradition must be accepted as factual proof of the event of revelation.
Author's point: When we examine historical truths, we do not require absolute experimental proof — serious testimony transmitted from generation to generation can justify a factual conclusion.
E. The Classical Criticism – Hume’s Criticism of the Witness Argument
The Critics’ Reasoning: A miraculous miracle (revelation) is of low probability; therefore, human testimony of a miracle is less reliable than the natural probability of believing that a miracle did not occur. Conclusion: A tradition of miracles is implausible.
Abraham’s Response – Two main comments against this argument:
Excessive intellectual conservatism – The assumption that one must always favor a natural explanation (and reject a miracle) may be irrational when there is evidence and philosophical support required for accepting the divine possibility.
The Assumption of the Desired – The criticism of the Witness Argument sometimes presupposes that there is no God/miracles; but in the previous discussions, good arguments in favor of the existence of God were examined, and therefore it is unfair to claim that the tradition is being attacked without addressing these arguments.
F. Biblical evidence for gaps in tradition — does this weaken the argument?
Abraham does not advocate the concept of a uniform and perfect tradition in every detail; he notes gaps/changes in tradition and texts (and discusses biblical evidence that shows differences). At the same time, he argues that not every gap undermines the overall authenticity of revelation — and that every claim must be examined historically-critically and not projected from a specific flaw on the entire tradition.
G. Combining considerations — the overall picture
The practical conclusion: There is no single argument that will break the debate; a series of considerations (philosophical, historical, traditional evidence, probability, consistency of transmission) must be accumulated and a reasonable picture must be put together that justifies, from the author's perspective, accepting tradition as a reasonable explanation for revelation.
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Part C — The Normative Discussion: Validity of Revelation (Why Obedience? Why Commandments?)
G. On the Obligation to Obey the Divine Command — The Central Question
The question: Even if there was revelation — why do we have a normative obligation to obey the revealed commands? Does not accepting the fact automatically create a moral obligation? Avraham formulates the problem as the ”question of normative foundation” and argues that it must be examined with philosophical eyes (and to ensure that we do not fall into the naturalistic fallacy).
H. The axiomatic basis for the work of the ’
Avraham leads a discussion in which he clarifies that there is a difference between moral reasoning and religious obligation: not every factual argument can in itself create a command; one must also understand the nature of the moral and halakhic idea, and how God constitutes an explanation for the factor that obliges the idea (i.e.: God provides a metaphysical framework that justifies the validity of the norms).
I. “For its sake” — Intention and Motivation
Another important point: External action is not enough; one also needs the right intention — action “for the sake of” the commandment, otherwise it does not have full religious value. Abraham refers to tradition and the Maimonides to emphasize the need for the proper motive (and to discuss whether intentions can be corrected and what the meaning of “truth” is in religious action).
J. The existential dimension — What is the benefit of keeping a commandment?
The question of “existence”: What does a person gain if he keeps a commandment? Is there an existential benefit to it? Abraham insists that motivation is not merely utilitarian — keeping a commandment is a matter of inner truth, spiritual correction, and participation in a metaphysical framework (the idea of increasing good in the world by choice). At the same time, he also discusses the practical/personal results that observance offers.
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