Truth, Probability, Certainty, and Skepticism
Hello, Your Honor.
When we raise a skeptical claim against a basic intuition, for example in determinism, after raising the doubt the chance that determinism is true is 50/50, or is it still plausible (> 50%) just doesn’t become a certain claim anymore. The problem is that even the understanding that a claim that is doubted becomes reasonable (and not just 50/50) is an unfounded assumption.
And so I think postmodernism is correct, not because the concept of truth is associated with certainty, but because even if we assume that truth was interpreted as ‘reasonable.’ This understanding also occurs under the unfounded assumption that the concept of reasonable does exist and not everything is 50/50.
What does the Rabbi think about these things?
Ariel
I think you are making skeptical assumptions here that I do not agree with. In your opinion, even if I am convinced of something (which is reasonable, not certain), a second-order doubt arises about the conviction itself (why it is reasonable). No such doubt arises for me. Just as doubt can be raised about our vision, and even if I say that I have a conviction that it is reliable, a second-order doubt will arise about this conviction itself. Here, too, it does not arise for me.
Indeed, one can also raise this doubt regarding the vision, and also claim that there is a demon that is constantly deceiving me.
But what is relevant if I don't feel it… Finally, there is a fundamental objection here that can also be raised regarding the understanding of probability.
So I did not understand the Rabbi's answer if it was indeed stated here.
I didn't understand the question. Do you think it's possible (that there is a demon)? So who told you it's not true?
My argument is that there is no way to answer skeptical claims that bother someone, because every answer will receive a skeptical response of another order. But I don't think they're true and I'm not bothered by them, and that's it.
To Ariel,
The following argument can be made against you:
In your opinion, postmodernism is true because of argument X. But argument X may not be true, and in fact its chance of being true is 50/50. If so, then you may be wrong that postmodernism is true, because there is a 50% chance that argument X is false.
Rabbi,
I agree that there is no way to answer. But your claim that there is no way to answer does not at all resolve the question you raise as to why postmodernism is not true, and shows that your excuse is no different from any other fundamentalism. (Although it can be called more “complex”).
As far as I am concerned, it is indeed possible to raise a doubt that there is a demon. Therefore, I ask you as someone who claims to unravel the postmodernist basis by providing the possibility of a reasonable belief even if it is not the most stable.
But you have not yet answered me how it can be “reasonable”, this concept for you does not really present a reality that is greater than 50%, but you simply proceed from a different assumption.
Oren,
I agree with you.
Not true. A fundamentalist is not willing to examine his claims and subject them to critical scrutiny. I am willing. But you have not raised any claim that challenges my position, and therefore I am sticking to it. According to you, no one is not a fundamentalist, because everyone has basic assumptions. Excuse me, this is nonsense.
Okay, so in your case this is an upgraded fundamentalist. On the one hand you hear other claims but do not substantiate your claims. As you also said explicitly:
” My argument is that there is no way to answer skeptical claims that bother someone, because every answer will receive a skeptical response of another order. *** But I do not think they are correct and am not bothered by them, and that is it. ***”
The argument of postmodernism is to the extent that everything is based on basic assumptions, and all basic assumptions are questionable, so why prefer X over Y.
However, you chose, in a rather fundamentalist way, a side that says that indeed there are basic assumptions that I do not challenge, according to which I know that they can be challenged, but that will not lead me anywhere. In other words, it is between pragmatism for those who have no other choice.
When I explain, I expect you to try to read and understand. If everyone who is not a postmodernist is a fundamentalist, then I am indeed a fundamentalist. But that is a crooked definition. I have explained the important difference between me and fundamentalism.
The fact that something can be challenged does not constitute a challenge. When you present a challenge, I will be happy to try and respond (because I am not a fundamentalist). So far, you have not presented even the slightest bit of a challenge, but have established in a fundamentalist manner that everything for which I have no proof is doubtful. But as someone who is not a fundamentalist, I do not accept this assumption. In other words: one can also challenge the claim that if it can be challenged, it should be challenged. But you accept this claim in a fundamentalist manner.
Okay, we have exhausted it.
You are presenting here that I am falling into a fallacy, that if I accept the claim A1 that everything that can be challenged is a doubt, then also with regard to A1 itself one must ask from where I can rely on it as certain.
But I think this is a mistake because I present A1 only as a doubt and not as certain. So in any case I can continue to attack the other basic premises with it without falling into a fallacy, or is it to the extent that as long as I use argument A1 it cannot be separated from the rest?
What does the Rabbi think?
If you attack by virtue of it, you rely on it. You cannot attack by virtue of a claim of doubt. It is said that doubt does not exclude certainty. You raise a claim of sufficient doubt and by virtue of it want us to give up something that seems reasonable to us.
And is this also a basic premise or is it a logical understanding?
What is the difference?
If this is a logical understanding then it doesn't matter whether I see it as a premise or not.
These are just words. Even if you call it logic, there is clearly no logical necessity here. It is an assumption of methodological plausibility: one does not attack on the basis of a questionable claim.
After thinking about the issue for a while, I think there are two problems that the Rabbi did not address:
1. Your claim that a doubtful claim is inherently self-defeating and that you cannot necessarily use it is only valid with general skepticism (anything for which you have no proof is 50/50 doubtful). But if you break down general skepticism into a group of claims of specific skepticism – for example, why do you think that what you see actually exists in reality? Does what you hear actually exist in reality? etc’ etc’, then it is completely self-defeating.
2. I would indeed agree on a methodological level that one does not attack a certain claim with a doubtful claim if that were indeed the case. But I do not understand why the claim – “What I experience actually exists in reality” is a certain claim? What makes it more plausible than its opposite?!
Perhaps it is important to emphasize that I understand that we do not have logical tools to test these claims due to the ‘emptiness of the analyst’ and in any case require basic assumptions that are outside the logical circle. On the other hand, we do not have empiricist tools to test these claims because they start from the assumption that what we experience is indeed real. But why on earth would we assume that what I experience is more likely than its opposite (see problem 2)
I would be happy if the Rabbi could address these two points.
1. What you are raising is completely general skepticism. There is no reason to doubt one thing I experience over another. The fact that you present skepticism towards a particular claim does not change the fact that it is general skepticism. After all, that is exactly what you are assuming here: that anything for which you have no proof is 50-50.
2. Because it seems clear to me. What answer do you expect? Just like what I see seems credible to me. I have no explanations for that either, except that it seems clear to me.
1. I agree. (After all, it is possible to describe the discussion between the claims, which finally revolves around the question of whether what is felt is proof and if not then it goes back to being 50-50)
2. My question is why start from such an assumption - “what it seems to me that I see/experience etc.’ does indeed exist objectively”? After all, this is the very question of the claim of skepticism.
Indeed, I also feel that what I experience is real, but with that, the fact that I feel and experience this way does not give priority to the claim of skepticism.
We repeat ourselves. Any answer I give you, you can ask the same question about it. There is nothing to answer the skeptic except that I am not a skeptic.
So at least you have to answer the skeptic why you are not a skeptic..?
Absolutely not. Let him explain to me why he should be a skeptic. Without any argument, there is no need for an explanation (and as mentioned, any explanation will be based on basic assumptions, and the skeptic will also question them and in the end I will not be able to explain them, because he will always ask for explanations again and again). I think we have exhausted ourselves.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
