Why is the majority of dayanim a majority of dayanim?

I saw the Rabbi’s eloquent words on the subject of Ruba Daita Kaman, in which the Rabbi explained that according to the division that appears in the Acharonim, Ruba Daita Kaman is actually talking about a “rule in nature” while Ruba Daita Kaman is based on reason. And this indicates that in Ruba Daita Kaman, an experiment can be done that will teach us the rule, while in Ruba Daita Kaman there is no way to really test, as with a piece of meat, there is no experiment that can be designed and tested to see whether in most cases where there are 9 kosher stores, the piece supplied is indeed mostly slaughtered, etc. And I saw that the Rabbi explained that based on this, the question of Sha’ari Yashar regarding the education, because even according to the education’s explanation that in most cases the majority of dayanim are right, there is no experiment that can be done in reality, and therefore we determine this from reason and this is Ruba Daita Kaman.
However, this only excuses the second problem of Sha’ari Yashar about education, which stressed that according to education, it would be the majority of Dalits, although his first problem, as I understood it, is that the mechanism between the case of a piece of meat and the case of judges is simply not the same mechanism: in pieces of meat we say something like: Since most of the possible scenarios lead to the piece being kosher, then it is probably kosher, while in judges there is no collection of “scenarios” that we decide on, but simply claim that it is more logical that most of the judges are right.
I will try to explain the issue further (and if this is not what Rabbi Shimon meant, I am making it more difficult): I am unable to formulate a single formal rule that explains what “ruba daita kaman” is, and in which cases this rule can even be applied. Based on the case of a piece of meat, I would say that ruba daita kaman is something like: “In the event that I have a doubt about a certain object, and I have two known groups from which the object could have come, I assume that it came from the majority group and not from the minority group.” But in my opinion, this formulation does not work for dayanim, since the object did not “come” from the dayanim, it is not that there are two groups of truths or two groups of laws and I am saying that the law came from group A and not from group B. Therefore, although I use reasoning to decide both in a piece of meat and in the dayanim, I am unable to formulate a single formal rule that would unite the two cases and explain what is considered a case of “ruba daita kaman”, in which cases this rule can be used.
Does the rabbi have a solution to the problem? Can the rabbi, based on his explanation, formulate a formal rule that explains exactly in which cases Ruba Daita Kaman can be applied, or that explains why the formulation I suggested is appropriate in the case of dayanim?