Gratitude: Between Morality and Ontology

Talley Orot – 5769

Michai Avraham

The author of Obligations of the Hearts, as well as several other thinkers, explains the foundation of serving God as being based on gratitude toward God.[1]  Rabbi Amital,[2] This raises a pointed question about this approach:

Indeed Is a Jew who lost his wife and children able to serve God on the basis of gratitude? Can a Jew whose job was to remove burned bodies from the ovens of Auschwitz serve God when the recognition underlying the work is gratitude? Absolutely not![3]

He then quotes the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi on the issue of Yoma 72:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Why is it called the name of the people of the great assembly – who restored the crown to its former glory? Moses said (Deuteronomy 10) The great, mighty and awesome God, and Jeremiah said: Foreigners are ensnared in His temple, where are His terrors? He did not say terrible. Daniel said: Foreigners are enslaved by His sons, where are His mighty acts? He did not say mighty. And he said: Rather, this is the mighty act of His mighty acts, who conquers his passions, who gives long-suffering to the wicked. And these are His terrible acts – if it were not for the fear of the Holy One, blessed be He, how could one nation exist among the nations? And our Lord, you are my servant, the one who has made the law of Moses! Rabbi Elazar said: Since they know the Holy One, blessed be He, that He is true, therefore they did not lie to Him.

And from them he learns the following principle:

The worship of God must be built on truth, not on falsehood and flattery. Therefore, prophets who did not feel that expressions such as "the Great," "the Hero," and "the Terrible" describe God, the Blessed One, refrained from using these expressions, even though they changed their language from the language of the Torah and the wording that Moses corrected.

The same is true in our case. It is impossible to base our service to God on a foundation of 'gratitude' at a time when the greatest destruction in the history of the Jewish people occurred.

The only possible way out for such a person, according to Rabbi Amital, is work based on faith. This foundation is also based on the words of the author of Obligations of the Heart:

As it is said about one of the Hasidim who would get up at night and say: My God, you have made me hungry and naked, and in the darkness of the night you have made me sit, and your strength and greatness have set me on fire. If you burn me with fire, I will not add anything except love you and joy in you. It is similar to what he said (Job 13:15): “Even if he kills me, I will not [read] wish for him.” And the sage alluded to this matter when he said (Shi'a"sh 1:13): “My uncle's bundle of thorns is between my breasts, and he will lie down,” and Chazal said on the sermon (Shabbat 5:2): “Even though my uncle straits me and bites me, he lies down between my breasts” (Chapter 1, Sha'ar Ahavat Ha-Had).

It is not entirely clear why faith constitutes a substitute for work out of gratitude, and in what sense? If indeed the usual basis for serving God is gratitude, then when there is no reason to recognize gratitude, the reason for serving God in general also disappears. Why does faith, which is fundamentally a reference to a fact (that there is a God or that He created me and the world) constitute any reason to serve Him? Gratitude is a moral norm, and as such it can constitute a basis for a commitment to serving God. But a fact in which I believe is nothing more than a fact. How can a fact constitute a basis for a normative commitment?

We should also note that gratitude as the basis for serving God is a problematic thesis, even without the difficulties raised by Rabbi Amital (and others that will be raised below). It is very difficult to base the sweeping obligation towards God and His Torah, which can in certain circumstances amount to the obligation to surrender one's soul, on the moral obligation to recognize gratitude. If only because the obligation to recognize gratitude is generally perceived as weaker than the obligation to serve God (and perhaps even as a derivative of it).

But it seems that everyone agrees that there is an obligation to show gratitude to God, even if this is not the sole basis for serving God (see below). And here, Rabbi Amital's words do not only deny the possibility of basing the service of God on gratitude, but also the very possibility of showing gratitude to God. His argument suggests that a person in our generation cannot show gratitude to Him at all. This is of course a more difficult conclusion than the one explicitly stated in his words, and also a much more problematic one. Are we truly exempt from the obligation to show gratitude to God? Is this obligation a mitzvah that time has brought about? Is it not part of the immortality of the Torah? Furthermore, is this claim true only for those who have themselves gone through hell? In other words: it is not clear whether Rabbi Amital intends to exempt a person only because of mental difficulty or whether there is a fundamental claim here: in light of these events, God no longer "deserves" gratitude from us.

Some have offered explanations that allow us to continue to show gratitude to God despite these terrible events. Even Rabbi Amital himself tells of a conversation he had with Abba Kovner in which he argues against him that faith in man suffered a harder blow from these events than faith in God. If we take things one step further, we can argue that these events are the work of human hands, and God, who has entrusted His world to the guardians, that is, to us, is not responsible for what humans do to others of their own choosing.[4]

In this article, I would like to suggest a different direction. From an examination of the concepts of gratitude in general and gratitude in relation to God in particular, a different perception of this obligation emerges. We usually understand the obligation to recognize a favor as a norm derived from the fact that we have been rewarded with a favor. The perception we will propose here separates gratitude from the usual basis of reciprocity. We will call this "philosophical gratitude."[5]

A. The obligation to show favor to God Almighty

The Simple Duty: Moral Gratitude

As we have already mentioned, the one with the duties of the heart places the obligation to serve God above the obligation to acknowledge God's favor. He devotes the entire chapter of the exam and a significant portion of the chapter of the work to this. The gist of his words is that God takes care of all our needs, both physical and spiritual, and He does this for us intentionally (and not by accident or by chance). Because of this, we have a moral obligation to acknowledge Him for this, as well as toward anyone who reciprocates a favor with us. This is an acknowledgement of favor whose essence is reciprocity and obligation toward the one who gives us something and acts on our behalf.

Rabbi Dessler also writes:[6]

The worship of God is built on the foundation of gratitude. Isn't it so clear in all the Holy Books that a person must thank the good God for all the good things He does for them, and that for them he must keep all the commandments, laws, and teachings.

We note that in Rabbi Dessler's words we can also see the two elements that we distinguished above: the obligation to acknowledge favor to God, and the fact that this obligation is the basis for a commitment to serving God in general.

The foundation of the duty of gratitude toward God is found in an explicit verse in the Torah (Deuteronomy 23:6): "O God, you will repay this with a scoundrel and not a wise man. Is he not your father? He created you, He made you, and He formed you." Moses himself, later in the chapter, lists the many good things that God has done for us (who carried us on eagles' wings, etc.), as the basis for his claim.[7]

The piyyut "Nishmat Kol Chai" is also largely devoted to this matter: "And though our mouths are full of poetry like the sea, and our tongues are as clear as its many waves, we are not sufficient to give thanks, praise, and laud."

Gratitude for the very creation

Some also consider it an obligation for a person to acknowledge the favor of God for the very creation of him (and not only for the favors that God has bestowed upon him and reciprocated with him). In fact, the matter is explained in the verse itself: "He made you and established you." The claim in this verse to acknowledge the favor of God is based on two foundations: He made you, and He also established you. The matter often appears in various books of thought, and we will give only two examples here. The Ramban (Devarims ibid.) writes:

Is not God your Father - for He begot you and raised you, and He purchased you - whose name is Purchased, for He brought you out of nothing and you became a being, and everyone who is has a purchase, as it is said, "The Lord purchased me at the beginning of his way" (Proverbs 8:22), and so He purchased heaven and earth (Genesis 14:19) as I interpreted it, and He formed you and established you - as the tongue and established us in one womb (Job 33:15).

The Ramban insists on the principle that God created us from nothing as one of the bases for the obligation of gratitude toward Him. He even goes so far as to claim that the fact that God created us creates some kind of ownership of Him in us. We will see this in more detail below. The author of Toldot Yitzchak (Rabbi Yosef Karo's adoptive uncle) expands on this further in his commentary on the verse:[8]

Is it not your father who created you, according to the sage who says that the father is a contingent cause for the son, for this he said, is it not your own father? And since you respect the material father who is contingent, how much more so is the G-d who is a self-contained cause, and this is what he said, and he established you, that the contingent father is not the cause of the son's existence, but the cause of his coming out into the world, or the cause of his birth, but the Holy One, the Blessed One, is the cause of his existence.

The story of Isaac insists that God is the essential and fundamental reason for our existence, and this in itself obliges us to show more kindness towards Him than towards our biological parents.

B. The fundamental difficulties in relation to gratitude towards God Almighty

Rabbi Yoel Schwartz, in his book HaKeret Tevtuf,[9] Elaborates on matters of gratitude from a philosophical and halakhic perspective, and he also deals quite a bit with the obligation to show gratitude to God. But for some reason he does not need at all to go through a long series of difficult difficulties that this obligation raises. This phenomenon characterizes all the sources I am familiar with that deal with this subject, which assume as self-evident the obligation to show gratitude to God. Apparently this stems from the discomfort of appearing to be an infidel in the goodness of a place. And yet, precisely in light of the difficulties raised by Rabbi Amital, and additional difficulties that several students have raised with me over the years, I found it appropriate to discuss the difficult questions that this approach raises. We will divide these difficulties into two fundamental types: the moral and the logical-philosophical. This division will refine the basis of the proposal that will be presented in the following.

Moral difficulties

There is quite a bit of evil and suffering in the world, even in normal times. Is it true that every Jew has received more good than bad from God? Is it true that each of us is supposed to thank God for creating him? I am not at all sure that every Jew would answer this question in the affirmative, even if he himself did not experience the Holocaust, and even if the Holocaust had never happened at all. And Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai have already been mentioned and concluded (Eruvin 13b):

Our rabbis taught: For two and a half years, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel were divided. The former say: It is more convenient for a person who is not created than for a person who is created, and the latter say: It is more convenient for a person who is created than for a person who is not created. They considered and concluded: It is more convenient for a person who is not created than for a person who is created, now that he has been created – he will scrutinize his deeds. And I said to her: He will be used in his deeds.

Even in normal times, the balance of a reasonable person tilts in favor of evil and suffering, and therefore the question of gratitude toward the One who created us is not so simple.

Furthermore, the very comparison that the person with the obligations of the heart makes between the obligation to show favor to a person who has done us a favor and our obligation to show favor to God is problematic. Does God's favor toward us involve any effort on His part? It could be said that even a favor given without putting in any effort requires some kind of gratitude, but it would be difficult to extract from this a commitment to the extent of giving one's soul to fulfilling God's commandments.

We can continue to make things even more difficult than that. After all, all the good that God bestows upon us is required of us only because we have shortcomings and needs, which He also created in us. We only need air to breathe because we were created in such a way that without air we cannot live. Regarding salvation from illness, the difficulty certainly increases even more: after all, God also gave us the illness, and only later did He save us from it. The same is true regarding traffic accidents and other dangers.

The logical-philosophical difficulties

So far we have dealt with the difficulties that exist in the moral sphere. Now we can continue to raise difficulties in the logical-philosophical sphere: Is it even possible to define an obligation to show favor to the one who created us? If he had not created us, we would have no needs, and in any case, the difficulties or benefits we received from him would have no meaning.[10] In addition (and this is again in the moral sphere), the very fact that He created us obliges Him morally to care for us. How should we treat someone who creates some creature and does not care for it? Isn't this an elementary moral consequence of the fact that He is our Creator and that we are His creatures?[11]

Above we saw that there are those who point out the obligation to show gratitude to God for the very creation of us. Is it even possible to speak of an obligation to show gratitude for the very creation of us? The alternative would be that we would not exist. Showing gratitude toward a person is usually defined by comparing the difficult situation he would have found himself in without his giving and the better situation in which the recipient finds himself after the giving. But creation does not allow for such a comparison. If we had not been created, then we would not exist at all. If so, how can one define an obligation to show gratitude for the very creation, especially in light of the Sages' determination in the above-mentioned Eruvin issue that it is better for a person not to have been created than to have been created.[12]

Analogy for clarification: The problem of illegitimate birth

In the legal world, a cause for tort claims is defined as "wrongful birth" (or "wrongful life").[13] This ground of action concerns claims filed by a newborn (usually through his parents) against a doctor, or any other party, who negligently caused that child to be born even though he was expected to have birth defects. In the legal world, opinions differ as to whether such a claim can be filed. The main controversy lies in the question of whether it is possible to sue any party for causing the child to be born, and to claim that it would have been better for him not to have been born (as in "better for man not to have been created"). This problem has various aspects, legal, logical-philosophical, psychological and ethical. Here we will focus on the philosophical-logical aspect, since as we see it is intrinsically linked to the problem we are dealing with here.

The basic legal problem in tort claims for "wrongful life" is that the plaintiff's child had no possibility of becoming a healthy person. At most, his parents could have avoided bringing him into the world. It is accepted that the goal of a tort claim is to restore the situation after the damage to its former state. When a person removes a limb from another person, it is usually not possible to physically restore the damage, but the compensation is supposed to do its best to compare, as much as possible, the person's current situation to the situation before the damage. Therefore, a normal tort claim is based on a comparison between two situations: the person/property before the damage and after the damage. The mere change in the situation for the worse is the cause of the claim, and the amount of compensation is derived from an assessment of the difference between the monetary values (as far as can be estimated) of the two situations. However, in the case of wrongful birth, the child could have been born alive or not born at all. It is not possible to give birth to him healthy. The question is whether a lawsuit can be filed based on the comparison between these two situations, in one of which the plaintiff does not even exist in the world.

Some address this problem in terms of valuation. How should we assess the damage, when the valuation is supposed to be the difference between the monetary values of the two situations, but in one of these situations the plaintiff does not exist at all, and therefore no value can be attached to this situation. The question of what the difference between the values of these two situations is is almost meaningless.

However, it is easy to see that the problem is not only at the level of assessment. A person cannot sue for damages when in a situation where without the damage he would not have existed in the world at all. The damage did not worsen his condition and no one harmed him. Harming a person is some kind of harm to his condition, meaning that he is standing healthy and unharmed and someone comes and harms him. But here the alternative situation is that that person does not exist at all. That is, before the act there was no harm here. If so, the problem is not only a problem of assessment, but the very claim that there was damage here is very problematic.

In England and most US states, the legal system does not recognize the possibility of filing such lawsuits, but in Israel, the Supreme Court recognized, at least with respect to certain aspects, the legitimacy of such a lawsuit, in the Zaitsov case.[14] We note that there was indeed a disagreement between the judges who accepted the legitimacy of the claim. Two of them argued that the values of the two aforementioned situations (in one of which he does not exist) cannot be compared, namely the value of non-life (= the advantage of non-existence when existence is defective), and certainly when the value of life (even if defective) or existence, which is generally accepted as not being quantifiable (would anyone allow killing a defective person because the value of his life is negative compared to his non-existence?), is comparable. For this reason, the pair of judges ruled that the value of defective lives must be compared to the value of a fictitious life defined for the purpose of the discussion, namely the value of the life of a comparable person, who is in a reasonable and healthy condition. Two of the other judges argued that despite the problematic nature, there is no escape from comparing the values of defective existence versus non-existence. In any case, the majority of the judges ruled, each for their own reasons, that this ground is admissible.

As David Head noted,[15] Both types of claims are problematic, and indeed most legal approaches in the world do not accept the claims (see there for an alternative, more logical proposal to resolve the legal problems involved in this issue).

Perhaps a more fundamental and problematic point can be added regarding the very essence of the claim: one cannot sue someone for an act for which the plaintiff exists. If the act (= procreation) had not been performed, then the plaintiff would not have existed in the world at all. In other words, his ability to sue his parents is itself based on the performance of the act that is the subject of the claim. A good example of this type of consideration appears in the article by the Jewish-American logician, Raymond Smolyan, "Is God a Taoist?"[16] It describes an imaginary dialogue that man has with God, demanding that his free will be taken back from him. During the entertaining argument between them, God replies that only the existence of his free will allows him to make this claim.[17]

And beyond the general problem of wrongful birth, there is a much more problematic claim, when the newborn directs his claim against his parents for giving birth to him. Here, the defendant is not a third party (such as a doctor or counselor) but the parents themselves. The reason for the claim can be illegitimate (which is a defect they actually caused), or another defect that they did not directly cause, but the son sues them for not preventing the birth, and therefore the suffering that results from it.[18]

The legal and ethical literature also addresses this problem, and generally even those who recognize the legitimacy of a claim for "wrongful living" against a counselor or third party are unwilling to accept such a claim against the parents.[19] Although in most cases the reasoning is of a technical nature, such as a problem that will arise in the relationship between parents and their children, or a problem in the implicit assumption that parents are required to give up their child if they know that he will be born defective (i.e., ostensibly, this implies an obligation to abort defective fetuses).

Therefore, Jelinek's argument is that from a logical-legal point of view, there is no distinction between these cases, and he argues that if modern law recognizes the legitimacy of a claim against a third party, then it should also recognize the legitimacy of a claim against the parents, at least in certain cases.[20] Indeed, the reasons we have given above are relevant to a claim against a third party (the consultant) as well as a claim against the parents. Yet, my gut feeling tells me that there is also a fundamental difference between the two situations, and we will detail this in more detail below.

This is the place to comment on an analogy between this legal-ethical problem and the issue we are dealing with here. In fact, according to Rabbi Amital, we are "sueing" God for bringing us into a world where our lives are full of suffering. At the very least, we take for ourselves the right not to acknowledge Him for bringing us here, and to renounce our commitment to Him.[21] We will return to this question below.

Another aspect of this analogy can be seen from another angle. Like a tort claim, the duty of gratitude is also the result of a comparison between two situations: before receiving the favor and after. A tort claim arises when the latter value is lower than the former, and a norm of gratitude arises when the latter value is higher than the former. However, if it is not possible to compare these two situations at all, then just as there can be no damage here that would constitute grounds for a tort claim, so there cannot be a situation here that would create a duty to recognize a favor. The creation is not defined as a favor for us, since before it we did not exist at all. To whom was this favor given? Therefore, from this angle too, it is very doubtful whether gratitude can be demanded for the very existence.

C. Philosophical gratitude

Two types of gratitude

The difficulty regarding the obligation to be grateful for the very creation itself constitutes an important key to understanding the proposition we have now raised. The obligation to be grateful for the very existence itself ("He made you and established you") means that gratitude is not just a return for some investment or effort made on our behalf (since it was not made for our sake, since we did not exist at all before it was made). There is an obligation to be grateful towards the one who created me, or the one from whom I came, even though I did not receive anything from him. This is philosophical gratitude. Such gratitude is not measured precisely in light of the effort or investment. It also does not require that the creator repay me with any favor. Such gratitude is a function of the very ontological connection between the creature (the potential benefactor) and its creator (God Almighty or its parents).

The Ramban, whose words were quoted above, spoke of the duty of gratitude toward the One who created us from nothing. Above, we discussed the difficulties that arise from the concept of the duty to recognize favor in the conventional sense of our very creation. Therefore, it seems that the Ramban intended a different kind of gratitude, which we call here 'philosophical gratitude.' This gratitude is not based on an obligation to morally 'return' favors given to us, and probably not on a comparison between a bad situation without giving and a good situation created by giving, and therefore the problematic issue that we presented above does not exist with respect to this gratitude.

As we have seen, the author of Toldot Yitzchak in his remarks draws a comparison between the obligation to show favor to God and the obligation to show favor to parents. He claims that the obligation to God is greater because He is the essential reason for our existence, while parents are only the accidental reason. This entire comparison seems absurd from the accepted perspective of gratitude. After all, parents should invest much more effort in us. They cared for us with devotion and raised us and gave to us endlessly despite their limited means. How can we compare this effort to God's giving to us? Why is the formal philosophical comparison that the author of Toldot Yitzchak draws relevant to concepts of gratitude at all?

It seems that behind his words lies an intuition regarding the philosophical obligation of gratitude. This is not gratitude for effort and giving, but rather the result of an ontological or other connection between us and the object of our gratitude. This gratitude is not a function of giving or effort, and it is also not measured by the giver's contribution to improving our situation (the comparison between the situations), but only by the degree of connection between us and the object of this recognition ("everyone who has has a property," in the words of the Ramban above). From this, the author of Toldot Yitzhak concludes that if the connection is necessary and fundamental, it requires more gratitude, and if it is accidental, it requires less gratitude.

The basis for this claim can be seen in the dispute between Rashbi and Rabbi Yehuda presented in the issue of Shabbat 33b (in the introduction to Rashbi's story of the cave), where we find these things:

And Ammai was called the head of the speakers everywhere? Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon wrote, and Yehuda ben Gerim gave him a speech. Rabbi Yehuda began and said: How beautiful are the deeds of this nation: they built markets, they built bridges, they built baths. Rabbi Yosei remained silent. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai answered and said: Everything they built – they did not build except for their own needs, they built markets – to house prostitutes, baths – to pamper themselves in them, bridges – to collect taxes from them. Yehuda ben Gerim went and told their words, and the kingdom listened. They said: Yehuda, who has sinned – will be exalted, Yossi, who has remained silent – will be revealed to Zipporah, Shimon, who has slandered – will be killed.

Rashbi claims that there is no obligation to show gratitude to the Romans, since the bridges, baths, and markets that they repaired were done for their benefit. In contrast, Rabbi Yehuda believes that even in such a situation, we have an obligation to show them a favor for it. After all, we have an approach that sees an obligation to show gratitude even in a situation where there is no special investment on the part of the giver for the benefit of the recipient, but rather, by the very fact that he is nourished and benefits from it, he owes it to him.

Now that we have understood the existence of the obligation of philosophical gratitude, we can understand that the connection that exists between God and us, His creatures, is so fundamental, and we are so dependent on Him, that it creates a total obligation, to the point of surrendering our souls, when required. This does not stem from the fact that He has bestowed upon us great favors, but rather from the fact that He is the most fundamental reason for our existence. He created us and He sustains us. As the verse says: He made us, and He also established us. Everything we have is from Him, and therefore everything we have is subject to Him and to the fulfillment of His will.

Returning to gratitude as the basis for serving God

This proposal not only explains the foundation of the duty of gratitude towards God, but can perhaps also be seen as a basis for the obligation to worship God. The problem of proportionality that we raised above (how can one derive from the duty of gratitude the duty to worship God, which is stronger than it and even precedes it) no longer necessarily exists here. It seems that against this background, the words of the Maimonides at the beginning of his book The Strong Hand, in the light of Yaqurot, shed light:

• The foundation of the foundations and the pillar of wisdom is the knowledge that there is a first existing name, and it creates everything that exists, and all that exists from heaven and earth and what is between them was not found except by the verification of its existence.
• And if it is conceivable that it does not exist, nothing else can exist.
• And if it occurs to you that all that exists besides Him are not existing, then He alone will be existing, and He will not nullify their nullification, for all that exists need Him and He, blessed be He, does not need them or any of them, therefore His truth is not like the truth of one of them.
• He is the one the prophet says, and the Lord God is truth, He alone is the truth, and there is no other truth like His truth, and He is the one the Torah says, there is no other besides Him, meaning there is no truth found besides Him like Him.
• This present being is the God of the world, the Lord of the entire earth, and He is the one who guides the wheel with a power that has no end and purpose, with a power that has no cessation, for the wheel is always turning and it is impossible for it to turn without turning, and He, blessed be He, turns it without a hand and without a body.
• And knowing this is a good commandment, as it says, "I am the Lord your God," and anyone who presumes to think that there is another god besides this one, transgresses without doing it, as it says, "You shall have no other gods before me," and is primarily a blasphemer, since this is the great principle on which everything depends.

The knowledge that He is the foundation of the foundations and the pillar of wisdom is not only the very existence of the Blessed One, but even more so His being the inventor of all that exists, and that all that exists verifies His existence. Halacha 2 is not just a negative formulation of the content of Halacha 1. There is an important clarification here: it is an assertion of ontological affinity. This Halacha teaches us that dependence is not only chronological (He created us at some time in the past, and then we departed from His power), but it is synchronous (at every moment we depend on Him, and if it were possible for Him to disappear, so would we). Halacha 3 explains that dependence is one-sided and not mutual, meaning that He does not depend on us, only we depend on Him. Mutual dependence does not obligate the dependent towards the dependent.

After several more sources and clarifications, Maimonides concludes, "This is the great principle on which everything depends." Why does everything really depend primarily on this? In our opinion, the explanation is self-evident. This is the basis for our commitment to Him. This ontological connection (dependence) is the basis for everything that will follow in The Strong Hand. The commitment to Halacha and the entire worship of Hashem depends primarily on this.

Indeed, after the philosophical elaboration of the essence of the knowledge of God, which was conducted during the first four chapters of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Maimonides arrives at the following conclusion of this picture (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 5):

• The entire house of Israel is commanded to respect the holiness of this great name, as it is said, "And I will be sanctified among the children of Israel." They are warned not to profane it, as it is said, "And you shall not profane my holy name." How is it that when an idolater stands up and forces Israel to transgress one of the commandments mentioned in the Torah or to kill him, he shall transgress and not be killed, as it is said, "In the commandments that a man shall do, he shall live by them, and he shall live by them and not die by them." And if he dies and does not transgress, then this is binding on his soul.
• What are the things that are said about the rest of the mitzvot except idolatry, open fornication, and shedding blood? But these three offenses, if he is told to transgress one of them or be killed, he will be killed and not transgressed. What are the things that are said about the time when the idolater intends to please himself, such as trying to build his house on Shabbat or cook a meal for him, or raping a woman for her husband, and the like? But if we intend to transgress him only on the mitzvot, if there is between him and himself and there is no ten of Israel there, he will transgress and not be killed. And if we attempt to transgress him with ten of Israel, he will be killed and not transgressed, and even if we do not intend to transgress him except on a mitzvah from other mitzvot only.
• And all these things are not at the time of the decree, but at the time of the decree, and it is that an evil king like Nebuchadnezzar and his companions will arise and issue a decree against Israel to abolish their religion or a commandment from the commandments, he will be killed and not transgress even one of the other commandments, between a rapist among ten, between a rapist among himself and idolaters.

This total demand cannot be merely a derivative of the good that God has bestowed upon us. There is a blatant lack of proportionality here. The only way that Maimonides sees to establish such an obligation is on the basis of the ontological connection that he described at the beginning of his remarks.

Back to "Illegitimate Birth"

Now we can again examine the similarity between the problem of gratitude toward my creator and the problem of wrongful procreation. Above, we presented the problem of wrongful procreation as an example of a problematic comparison, similar to the comparison made with gratitude. However, there is a deeper connection between the two problems. Ostensibly, gratitude is the other side of the coin of wrongful procreation. If we treat the good that parents reciprocate with their child as something that requires gratitude, then when they reciprocate with him evil, this can constitute a ground for demanding compensation. If the parent can be considered to have given me some good in the very act of creating me, then he can also be considered to have taken that good from me when he created me in a defective manner. On the other hand, if it is not possible in principle to compare the two situations (since in one of them the claimant, or the one who recognizes the good, does not exist), then the parent is not considered to have harmed me (or taken from me), and therefore compensation for wrongful procreation cannot be claimed from him. In the same way, one cannot demand gratitude towards one's parents, since one cannot think of them as giving me something. With this presentation of the difficulty, we have concluded the previous points.

However, this comparison is based on the accepted concept of gratitude, which attaches the obligation to acknowledge gratitude to the fact that I received something from the giver. My creation cannot be regarded as something that I received, since before the "reception" there was no one to receive. It was created together with the "reception." In contrast, according to our proposal above, gratitude is the result of an ontological connection. The very existence of such a connection obligates me towards my creator. As we have seen, this obligation does not necessarily depend on the question of how good he has been to me, and it may exist even if he has been bad to me. Therefore, for this reason alone, it seems that compensation cannot be claimed for the fact that he created (begotten) me, since I am obligated towards him by the very fact that he is my "father" in some sense.

Now we can understand the additional problem that the legal world sees in a child suing his parents for bringing him into the world. The newborn is obligated to them by the very fact that he is their creation, regardless of whether they have been good to him or bad to him. The axe cannot complain about the hewer, and his obligation to him is independent. In any case, it is clear that he cannot sue them for his very existence.[22]

Summary and Wonder

In light of this, philosophical gratitude is not exposed to the two types of difficulties we discussed above, both the moral difficulty and the philosophical difficulty. It seems that if this proposal is indeed correct, then it even stands the test of Rabbi Amital's pointed questions. This gratitude, and only it, can constitute a possible basis for the commitment to serve Hashem and the total demand to do so in certain cases to the point of giving up one's soul. The same soul that God Himself gave us (or created for us), we are obligated to sacrifice for Him in cases where this is required.

It is certainly possible that this was the intention of Rabbi Amital, and perhaps also of Baal HaDhuvot, in their words about the obligation to worship Hashem out of faith. Above, we noted that this thesis is incomprehensible on its face. Why does faith, which is nothing more than recognition of a fact, constitute the basis for the obligation to worship Hashem? Isn't an additional assumption required here, such as a recognition of a favor or something equivalent to it (i.e., an assumption in the norm in addition to the assumption in the fact)? Now we can understand that if there is a belief that He is the Creator of the world, and in particular the One who created us ourselves, then an ontological connection is created here that obliges us to recognize a favor to Him, at least on the philosophical level.

Of course, we must try to clarify the meaning of this strange and renewed obligation. After all, the very existence of an ontological connection is a fact. But the obligation to show favor is a norm, or an obligation of some kind. How can an obligation or norm be derived from a fact? Why does the fact that God is the most fundamental reason for our existence lead to the existence of an obligation to show favor to Him and to worship Him?[23]

It is very difficult to answer questions of this kind. It is easier to point out the existence of such an intuition in various contexts, and through examples to try to clarify a little the compromise of the ontological affinity and the gratitude derived from it.[24] We have already seen the common legal intuition that a claim against the parents for "wrongful birth" has less legitimacy than a claim against a third party. We explained that this intuition is related to philosophical gratitude (even though the parents did not reward the newborn with any good thing, at least in their opinion). In what follows, we will discuss two additional examples that illustrate this intuition.

A note on the connection to the concept of "Lishma"

We have come to the conclusion that the commitment to serving God can be based on a factor that does not concern moral commitment. In fact, the conclusion may be more radical: this commitment cannot be based on moral commitment (if only because it places the commitment to morality above the commitment to serving God). In fact, this is a specific expression of a more general principle, which my friend Nadav Shnareb emphasized in his article.[25]

The basis of this is the Rambam's ruling in the Laws of the Worship of Gods 3:6), which states the halachah of the Rabbis (in his dispute with Abaye on the issue of Sanhedrin 6):

The one who worships a god out of love, such as one who desires in this way because of her work, which was extremely beautiful, or who worships her out of fear of her lest she warn him, as her worshippers imagine that she is good and pleasing, if she accepts it from God, she is liable to stoning. If she worships her god through her work or in one of the four works out of love or fear, she is exempt.

On the surface, these things are very puzzling. Why is work out of love or fear not idolatry? What is the alternative that would be considered idolatry? Is work not for its own sake required? Maimonides himself defines the alternative here in his words: "If it has been accepted by God." Maimonides defines accepting God as the antithesis of work out of love and fear, and the reason for this is probably that work out of love and fear is work for motives that concern oneself. Work that is based on satisfying one's own desires and wishes, even moral and positive as they may be, is not work for its own sake.

From idolatry we learn to serve God. Even serving God out of love or fear is not work for its own sake. Work that is based on my own motivations is not work that is considered work for its own sake. Therefore, work that is based on a commitment of gratitude is not work for its own sake, and therefore gratitude cannot form a basis for serving God, just as love or fear of God cannot form such a basis. It is true that there are sources that seemingly contradict this principle (including in the writings of Rambam himself), and there is no place here to elaborate on this further.

 

D. I will lift my eyes to the mountains – the parents[26]

Children who received nothing from their parents

A good example to examine our intuitions would be in relation to parents and their children. There too, there is an agreed and clear obligation to recognize favor, and there too there is room for debate as to its source: Is this an obligation based on the parents' bestowal or on the very ontological connection that exists between the child and his parents? The implication would be situations in which the parents do not care for the child properly, maliciously or inadvertently, or in an extreme situation in which they bring a child into the world and abandon it. In such situations, would we recognize the right they have over their child? Is there an obligation to recognize favor toward them in such situations?

The accepted approach is that even if the parent has not given anything to their child, they still fundamentally have rights over them. This is particularly worth discussing in the case where the separation occurred against the parents' will, since if they themselves were to blame for it, there is a tendency to cast blame on them, and some will favor taking away the rights they are legally entitled to as a form of sanction.

Therefore, let us take as an example a case like the children of Yemen. It seems that no one would argue with regard to the Yemeni children who are forcibly absent from their parents that the parents have no rights over them because they did not raise them. The question is what about the children's duty towards their parents (gratitude towards them)? It turns out that those children will also owe something to their parents, even though they have received nothing from them except their lives. The ontological connection that exists between parents and their children is sufficient to create an obligation at some level. For example, with regard to decisions regarding the care of those parents or the obligation to care for them, will we treat these children just like any other person? Will I, as a stranger, be obliged to care for these parents, and be allowed to make decisions about them, just like their biological children? It turns out not. If so, there is an intuition that regards the very ontological connection as significant on the normative-value level. Thus we find in the Book of Education Mitzvah 33:

The roots of this mitzvah are that it is fitting for a person to recognize and repay kindness to those who have done him good, and not to be a villain, alienated, and ungrateful, which is a completely evil and abhorrent trait before God and people. He must take to heart that his father and mother are the reason for his existence in the world, and therefore it is truly fitting for him to do them all the honor and benefit he can, because they brought him into the world, and they also touched him with some hardships in his infancy. And when he establishes this standard in his soul, he will rise from it to recognize the goodness of God, blessed be He, who is his cause and the cause of all his ancestors up to the first Adam, and who brought him out into the world and provided for his needs all his days, and established him in his proper form and the integrity of his limbs, and gave him a knowing and intelligent soul, so that the soul that God has blessed will be like a horse or a mule, without understanding, and he will consider in his mind how much more worthy he is to be careful in his service, blessed be He.

Creators as parents

Another surprising example of the significance of ontological affinity is found in a legal debate about copyright. We will not dwell on this here, but will only comment on the aspects relevant to the subject under discussion, as they can clarify our fundamental thesis.

In legal thought, there are two main directions for understanding the creator's rights over his creation:[27] (1) The social-utilitarian theory; (2) The property theory. The first view sees the creator's rights over his creation as a convention aimed at promoting social goals and creative processes. In contrast, the second view sees the creator's rights as something he is entitled to by law, and is based on property law. This is the view that the creation is the creator's property.

The perception of a work as the property of the creator is fraught with difficulties. From a halakhic perspective, it is accepted that a person does not own abstract entities that have no substance (in fact, this is the most fundamental aspect that raises the main difficulty with respect to copyright in halakhic law). From a legal perspective, it is also difficult to point to a clear root for a creator's proprietary rights in his work. Out of these difficulties, concepts have emerged in legal and halakhic thought that see the creator's rights in his work as a derivative of viewing the work as the product of the creator.

The father of the property approach in common law is the philosopher John Locke. Locke begins his discussion of what he calls the "theory of labor" (by virtue of which he derives copyright) by arguing that the earth was given to humans by God, and it is He who gave man ownership of the creations of his body and mind. This is a different kind of ownership than usual. Its basis is the fact that the creation was conceived and born in the mind of the creator. He did not buy it and there is no substance in it, but it is a part of him and an object of his own, and this is enough to define him as the owner of it. An interesting source on this subject is found in Plato's book, The Symposium.[28] There, among other things, he writes about the creator's "spiritual children":[29]

And every man will prefer such children to his own children, for he will compare before his eyes Homer and Hesiod and the other good poets and envy them for the descendants they leave for themselves […] And Solon is also honored among you for the birth of the laws.

In halacha, we also find approaches that adopt a similar concept. For example, in the fourth book in the Emek Mishpat series, by Rabbi Yaakov Avraham HaCohen, entitled Copyright, the author claims that the basis of the creator's right in his creation is by virtue of the creation's birth in the creator's mind, that is, by the very fact that they are "the fruits of his mind and heart."[30]

The source of this is Responsa Tzemach Tzedek (Shaar Hamilu'im, 4, Siman Km24, Letter 9), which sees the innovations created in the mind of the sage as creation that grew in his field. From this, the author proceeds to compare this to the law that a person becomes the owner of wealth created from his wealth (such as grain that grew in his field or a cow that gives birth), even without any act of ownership. He goes on to cite several halachic sources to show that a person's creation is acquired by him by the very fact that it was created, or born by him.

In the letter Qa'd, he quotes from the author of Responsa Tzafnath Pa'anach (Siman Ramat), who explained the opinion of Tosafot in the Sanhedrin (68b) that even a small person buys his creation in this way from the Torah, even though a small person generally has no possibility of performing acts of ownership. It is purchased for him by the very fact that it is part of him, even without the need for any act of ownership. It is clear that this right is a result of the ontological connection to the grave. There is no consideration here regarding the question of how much the creator labored over his creation, and how much labor it cost him. The very fact that these are the creations of his spirit or the children of his heart grants him rights over them, and as the aforementioned Ramban says: "All that is has ownership." The implication for the subject of the debate naturally arises. And here he himself in the letter Qa'd cites a source for his words from Rashi in his commentary on Genesis, which interprets the words "buys heaven and earth" (Genesis 11:19): "He buys heaven and earth, as one who makes Heaven and earth. Through you I made Canaan to be his."

After all, we, the one who makes or creates the thing, have rights or ownership over it. Interestingly, the evidence comes from God's attitude towards His creation, which is precisely our topic here. If so, God also has 'rights' over us by virtue of the fact that He made us, even if He does not toil or work for it at all.[31] It is important to emphasize that this argument shows that these rights are well-grounded in ordinary human and legal intuition, and are not a 'scriptural decree' of any kind, since there is no canonical halachic source for this beyond the reasoning of these rabbis. This fits well with the example we saw above of the relationship between parents and their children. There is, however, another important point that must be clarified in this context, otherwise the argument will be found wanting.

From rights to gratitude

The copyright problem does not deal with the duties of the work itself towards its creator, but with the rights of the creator in his work. These rights are not supposed to be in relation to the work. It is not that the work itself owes anything to its creator, but in relation to any third party (who has no right to infringe on the creator's rights over his work). In contrast, our discussion deals with the duty of the creator himself as his creator. Can the second be derived from the first or at least be likened to them?

Our assumption is that if Reuben has rights in Shimon because he begot him, then the one who is obligated to honor them is not only the third party but also Shimon himself. The implication of the determination that Reuben has rights is that Shimon owes something to Reuben (at least the exercise of those rights themselves).

Furthermore, from a comparison between the two issues, it can be argued that just as procreation creates rights for the procreator/creator, it also creates an obligation of the procreated towards its procreator. In both cases, it is a normative relationship (legal or moral obligations) derived from an ontological relationship and nothing more. In other words, the very fact that a normative relationship can be derived from an ontological relationship certainly receives support here.

And what about gratitude? Here we must uncover another layer in this argument. Why does the begetter really have rights over the child? It turns out that it is because something of the begetter exists in his child (in the words of Chazal: "Bara kara davah")[32], and something from the creator is in his creation. Therefore, the creation owes a debt of gratitude to its creator, for the fact that something of him is present in it.[33]

The Meaning of Affinity: Psychology and Ontology

We cannot go into detail here about the argument below, and therefore we will suffice with a brief presentation of it for our purposes here. If indeed we are willing to define philosophical gratitude, based on the very existence of an ontological connection between the Creator/Birth-giver and the created/begotten, then there is room to argue that it is not possible to sue the parents because I am nothing but their evil (to paraphrase the saying of Chazal: "I created as I am evil"). In such a situation, there is no plaintiff and defendant, and two such factors cannot stand against each other,[34] At least in aspects that concern the actual connection.[35] The reason I owe my parents gratitude is not only because of the good they have done me, but also because I am their product. There is something of them within me, and the plaintiff here is an entity of their own. But this very reason prevents me from suing them in the case of wrongful birth for my very existence.

It is true that there was reason to argue that according to this I cannot sue my parents on any legal grounds whatsoever, and not necessarily for "living wrongfully." But this conclusion is not necessary (although possible). It is possible that this gratitude is not comprehensive and there are grounds for a claim that can also be raised against the parents. My mere existence cannot constitute a ground for a claim, since in this existence there is a physical component of the parents, but with respect to other grounds the situation can certainly be different.

At the heart of our discussion is the assumption that the relationship between parents and their children is not only found on a psychological level, but has an ontological aspect. There is something in the child from his parents, and he is perceived as a continuation and extension of themselves. The claim that any relationship, which we perceive as belonging to the psychological sphere, takes on ontological significance, has many implications and examples. We will present just one here for illustration and clarification.

When a person remembers someone, we treat it as a mental event. But in biblical language, the root זכר "זכר" also indicates an ontological aspect. The Torah commands us to "wipe out the memory of Amalek." What does "זכר" mean in this context? Does it mean erasing him from our memory? After all, there is a command from the Torah to remember and mention the deed of Amalek. It is clear that the meaning of this expression is to wipe out every remnant of Amalek, in the physical sense.[36]

If so, "remembering" Amalek is a part or end of Amalek. In any case, it turns out that remembering someone means bringing a part of him into our consciousness. Something of him exists in us. Memory, which we perceive as a mental process, here takes on an ontological meaning.[37]

E. The relationship between the two types of gratitude

We have distinguished between two types of gratitude: (1) moral gratitude, which is based on the kindness or favor that Reuben reciprocates with Shimon. This reciprocation gives rise to a duty of gratitude in Shimon towards Reuben; (2) philosophical gratitude, which is based on an ontological connection, that is, the very fact that Reuben begot/created Shimon. Why do we refer to these two things as gratitude? Does the philosophical duty even deserve the name "gratitude"? What is the nature of this duty? What does it require of me? This question requires a detailed study separately, and here we will only offer initial lines of thought.

The two obligations are similar, only the reasons for them are different.

In another way, the difficulty we raised above can be presented as follows: Does logical gratitude have a moral content? It is nothing more than a derivative of a fact (that Reuven created or begot Shimon). However, it is clear that it is not pure logic, since the ontological relation is a fact, and the duty to be grateful is a norm/value. As we have already noted, in a purely logical way, a norm cannot be derived from a fact. Therefore, it seems that the distinction between these two types is not between two types of duties of gratitude, but between two different reasons (ontological and moral) for gratitude.

What is the relationship between the content of gratitude in the two cases? What does this gratitude require in each of them? Several directions can be raised regarding the difference in content between these two obligations. For example, there is room to perceive that philosophical gratitude requires obedience (as to God or to parents), that is, to do what the creator wants. If he created me, he also has the mandate to tell me why he did it, and perhaps even to demand that I follow his instructions. On the other hand, I am not obligated to obey all the instructions of someone who has done me good. At most, I am obligated to return the favor, in some proportion to what he has done for me.

On the other hand, one could perhaps see this as a difference in itself, one of quantity and not quality. Gratitude for mere existence is more binding, and therefore also derives from it an obligation of obedience. Ordinary moral gratitude is the result of some act of kindness, and therefore is less binding. If so, there is a place to regard these two duties as similar but different in nature and degree.

Why does philosophical gratitude nevertheless derive a moral obligation from a factual (ontological) assumption? If there is indeed a common layer between the two types of gratitude, then moral gratitude can be seen as an extension of philosophical gratitude. When Reuben does good to Shimon, he invests something of himself in him. As if he created something in him (as if "I have taken root in him"). Therefore, an obligation to recognize gratitude arises here. According to this, it follows that the more effort the benefactor invests or gives me, the more of it I have, and therefore my obligation to recognize gratitude toward him is stronger. On the other hand, in gratitude given for the mere act of giving birth, the degree of benefit and effort is meaningless, since the newborn's entire being comes from the begetter/creator.

Halachic precedent for the philosophical concept of gratitude[38]

In Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner's book, Fear of Yitzchak – Rosh Hashanah, in article 3, we find a similar concept of gratitude. First, he raises a difficulty in the conventional understanding of the basis of the obligation to recognize gratitude. In the conventional view, gratitude tends to be seen as a derivative of the matter of not accepting a free gift ("He who hates gifts will live"). In order for a gift not to be free, one must recognize gratitude to the giver. He halachically proves that this is not the concept, and these are his words there:[39]

Anyone who has been blessed with the privilege of serving as true sages knows how strict they were in the matter of gratitude. A person who felt by nature that he was obliged to do good almost became in their eyes a complete disgrace. When we come to find the roots of this matter of gratitude, the first perception in this is that the quality of gratitude is a detail of the general quality of a gift-hater. A gift-hater will live, and by paying a favor for a favor, the gift quality of the first favor is extinguished, and the ungrateful person shows that he is comfortable with the bread of kindness.

But this still does not exhaust the content of the virtue of gratitude. And we have an example that highlights that the virtue of gratitude has roots in another area in addition to its roots in the area of hatred of gifts. And here is the example: Two people ask for help, and a third person is unable to help both of them. One of the needy has a right of precedence according to the laws of the last parent, but with respect to the second, the third person has a duty of gratitude. Which of them comes first?

The loss of his father and the loss of his rabbi [=when both have lost something and he can only recover one of the two losses] the loss of his rabbi takes precedence. And it was ruled in the Shulchan Aruch: What are the things that are said about the father not giving a reward to the rabbi, but if he does give a reward, the father's loss takes precedence.

And simply, in terms of pure honor, the rabbi's honor is also great in the way that the father pays a salary. Only with regard to the acts of kindness of the Sabbath, his father is lost first when he pays the salary. And what does this depend on the giving of a salary?

And it is necessary for this that the rabbi brings to the life of the world to come, and he will be satisfied with it: the duty of respect for the rabbi and the duty of gratitude for the rabbi. And by paying the father, the duty of gratitude towards the rabbi is removed, even though this does not depend on the rabbi's honor at all. And since they insist that because gratitude for the father's loss precedes the loss of his rabbi, it follows that the postponement of gratitude postpones the judgment in the order of the mitzvah, examples of kindness.

And there is no explanation for this except that the recognition of a favor is literally a bondage of kindness, meaning that receiving a favor enslaves the recipient of the favor to repay it with acts of kindness. Only from this perspective is it possible that the bondage of kindness precedes the mitzvah of kindness. And it is clear that the general degree of hatred of gifts is not sufficient to raise the recognition of a favor to the strength of a true bondage of kindness.

Rabbi Yitzhak Hutner proves that the obligation to recognize a favor is a type of encumbrance, and shows that this concept is also taken into account on a halakhic level. The gist of his argument is that if recognition of favor was derived from the interest in not accepting free gifts, then it was the obligation of the one recognizing the favor, and not the right of the benefactor. But if it is indeed an obligation of the one recognizing the favor, it is clear that in the matter of reparation for a lost debt, he still had to prefer the one he owes his favor (or whom the law of precedence requires him to give priority to), since his obligations cannot be fulfilled at the expense of the rights of the other. Hence, if recognition of favor nevertheless changes the law of precedence, it is proven that recognition of favor is also defined as a right (apparently not a legal but a moral one) of the one who reciprocates the favor and not as an obligation of the benefactor. In such a situation, the right of his father can cause a change in his priority vis-à-vis his rabbi (such as a land lien that precedes the rights of the lender in relation to the rights of the buyer of the encumbered land). The benefactor has a right that precedes the rights of his fellow man, and obliges the one who recognizes the favor to restore his loss first.

It is quite clear that there is no formal halakhic obligation to recognize a favor. This is a moral principle, and as such we would expect it not to be presented as the seller's right but as the seller's duty. It turns out that Rabbi Hutner holds that the seller has rights with the seller, since the favor he bestowed upon him creates a lien with the one who received it. As if part of it is with the beneficiary, and this creates a lien to return the favor (as if to compensate him for the part of the giver that is with him, similar to the case of compensation in return for a favor for "a wrongful birth"). It is clear that this is a moral debt or lien, not a legal or halakhic one.[40]

This suggests that in the halakhic view, it is the ontological-philosophical element of gratitude that is more important and fundamental, and not the moral element. The moral element is defined as the recipient's duty and not as the giver's right (no one would say that the benefactor has the right to demand gratitude from the beneficiary). In contrast, the ontological element can be expressed as a type of debt or as the right of the giver of the favor to the recipient: "Everyone who has has a property." Thus, the moral obligation to recognize gratitude is based on the ontological connection. According to this approach, ontological gratitude is more fundamental, and it is also what stands at the basis of moral gratitude.

[1]         See the "Examination Section" and the beginning of the "Work Section" and more below.

[2]         Rabbi Y. Amital, "Even though it is difficult and difficult for me," in World Built, Destroyed and Built, M. Mia (ed.), Alon Shvut 2002, p. 118.

[3]         In fact, two questions are hidden here. The first question is fundamental: the person described has no duty of gratitude towards the Creator. The second question is psychological: even if theoretically there is such a duty, how can someone who has experienced events such as the removal of corpses from the Auschwitz ovens actually live with such a consciousness? In our article, we deal mainly with the first question, but the implications of our approach certainly concern the second as well.

[4]         See on this in my books Two Carts and a Balloon, Kfar Hasidim 5767, p. 485. This also emerges from the words of the Rabbis on the issue of Hagiga 5a. The Gemara there deals with the question of whether there is a person who perished without trial. The Rabbis on the website explain that such a situation exists only in a person who murders his friend. That is, such an act is the act of the person who murders and not a reincarnation of events from above. See on this in the article by Rabbi Mordechai Goodman, "Has He Perished Without Trial?", Tzohar 11 (2002), p. 39.

[5]         It should be noted that on the psychological level it is difficult to recognize a favor from someone who has not reciprocated a favor. However, our argument is that on the philosophical level such a norm does exist. We have already noted above that our concern here is on the philosophical level and not the psychological one.

[6]         A. Dessler, Letter from Elijah, I, Jerusalem 1995, p. 50.

[7]         And see also the words of the commentators on Athar.

[8]         The Chronicles of Isaac, published by Vegshel, Jerusalem 1994.

[9]         Jerusalem 5774.

[10]        And, to be clear, this is not referring to the moral difficulty we discussed above. This is a difficulty that is fundamentally logical.

[11]        This point highlights the fact that some of these difficulties also arise in relation to children's duty of gratitude to their parents.

[12]        Although this statement itself is problematic for the same reason. If the state of a created person cannot be compared to his state if he had not been created, then what is the meaning of this puzzling statement? In what sense is it better not to have been created than to have been created? And indeed, the difficulty does not stem from the evaluation of suffering against the good in our lives, but from the inability to compare the two situations.

[13]        See S. Jelinek's book, Birth in Wrongful Birth – Rights of Claim and Compensation, Jerusalem 1997. And in the Jewish Encyclopedia on the "Da'at" website, under the entry "Birth in Wrongful Birth", also written by Jelinek. See also the article by E. Shapira, "The Right Not to Be Born with a Defect: The Controversies of Logic, Values, and Legal Policy", in Dilemmas in Medical Ethics, Rafael Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Jerusalem 1992, pp. 239–254.

[14]        There, a genetic counselor was sued by someone who was born with a defect for negligence in the scientific opinion he gave to the parents, see A.A. 540,518/82, Zaitsov v. Katz, P.D.I. M. (2) 96.

[15]        In his article "The Right Not to Be Born with a Defect?", in Dilemmas in Medical Ethics (above note 13).

[16]        In his book, The Silence of the Tao, translated by Ofer Shor, Tel Aviv 1997. The article in its English version also appears in the wonderful collection of essays by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett, The Mind's I, 1981.

[17]        In both cases there is no logical problem in the strict formal sense. One can ask to take away free will even if this request could not be made if we had not been given free will. Likewise, on a purely logical level, one can sue the parents for the act by virtue of which the plaintiff himself exists. This is a situation in which, after climbing the ladder, we throw him away (or want to throw him away). And yet there is a strong feeling that there is a problem here, even if it lies beyond the logical level.

[18]        An ordinary defect that the parents caused their child through carelessness, such as the mother's use of drugs during pregnancy, etc., does not concern the subject of this case, since this is an ordinary tort claim. We are dealing with a claim that requires the parents not to bring the plaintiff into the world, or that demands compensation from them for having brought him into the world.

[19]        See also the sources regarding "wrongful birth", cited above.

[20]        It should be noted that in light of the above ruling of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, every person can sue his parents for bringing him into the world, since for everyone, suffering outweighs good and comfort, and it is better for a person not to have been created than to have been created.

[21]        An interesting question is whether there is a difference between God and the parents in the case of a wrongful birth. As we mentioned, the parents could not have brought the child into the world perfect, and they certainly did not cause the defect. At most, He expects them not to bring him into the world in such a situation. On the other hand, God Himself created the defect, and He certainly could have brought him into the world healthy and whole.

Although, from a philosophical perspective, it is perhaps possible to discuss whether when he was created whole, he himself would have been in a healthy state, or whether the defect is part of his definition, and without the defect he would have been another person. From this consideration, it may arise that even God, the Almighty, in His own person, could not have created a complete alternative that would supposedly allow us to claim damages against Him.

[22]        This does not mean that he cannot sue them for aspects other than his birth itself. Although there is room for discussion of that as well, and so on.

[23]        It should be noted that the obligation to recognize a favor based on giving and investment (moral gratitude, not just philosophical gratitude) also requires a similar justification. The fact that Reuven made an effort to give me something is a fact. The obligation to recognize him for that is a value/norm. How can a norm be based on a fact? This is the fallacy known in philosophy as the 'naturalistic fallacy' (attributed to the Scottish philosopher David Hume). Without getting into the analytical tangle of this issue, it can be said that there is an intuition that bridges this gap between facts and norms. The accepted moral intuition tells us that if someone has done us a favor, we should return the favor. Therefore, if we see the existence of a similar intuition regarding philosophical gratitude as well, this would be enough to establish this renewed commitment.

[24]        In the previous comment, we argued that even in the context of moral gratitude there is no convincing explanation, but there the intuition is self-evident to the reasonable person. Our goal here is to show that such intuition also exists in relation to philosophical gratitude.

[25]        N. Shnerb, "Reflections on Idolatry," Akademo 19 (2007), pp. 47–64.

[26]        See the Midrash Bereshit Rabbah, Parasha 68, where Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachman explains the verse "I will lift up my eyes to the mountains" (Psalms 121:1) - "to my parents."

[27]        See on this in my article "The Meaning of Ownership of Money: Between Halacha and Law", Shanat Haim, Petah Tikva 2008, pp. 13–38, and in the sources cited there; see also my article, "Theft of Knowledge and Intellectual Property", Tecumin 25 (2005), pp. 350–366.

[28]        Livs edition, pp. 137–138.

[29]        My thanks to my friend Rabbi Menachem Teitelbaum for this source and additional references.

[30]        See there at the end of section 15 and especially throughout section 16. And also in sections 23, 38 and many more. This is his main thesis in establishing the opinion that there is ownership of copyrights.

[31]        He quotes there from the author of the Tov Taam Ve Daat Responsa, from the Dok Siman Kafa, who explains the ruling that a craftsman buys a vessel in praise. And see there, in the letter Ki, also the words of Rabbi Shimon Shekap, which he brought in his novellas to Gittitin Siman 4, i.e. "and if" (lakh on the pages of the book), in the name of the Rabbi of Brisk.

[32]        A similar principle is "the embryo is the mother's thigh." Although in both cases the embryo/offspring is part of the parent and not the other way around.

[33]        Either because he gave her these things, and for that there is a duty of gratitude, or because of the very fact that she possesses something of his, or something of himself.

[34]        A similar argument is raised in my articles "Is Halacha Hebraic Law", Akademut 15 (2004), pp. 141–163, where I cited the Ritva's explanation for disqualifying relatives from testifying. According to him, the basis of the disqualification is similar to the Rashbam's explanation regarding the disqualification of a witness who becomes a judge. According to these explanations, two different functions cannot be mixed in the court of law, and therefore the plaintiff and the defendant cannot be one entity, just as a witness and a judge cannot switch roles. Therefore, just as a person cannot sue himself, so a child cannot sue his parents. For the same reason, according to the Ritva, a child also cannot be a witness against his parents (and on this the Sages said: "'Fathers shall not be put to death for the testimony of sons'"). The relationship between fathers and sons is the paradigm for the ontological relationship that exists between all relatives, and by virtue of this relationship, all are disqualified from testifying against their relatives.

[35]        It is clear that a son can sue his parents for harm they caused him in his life, just like any other party. Our concern here is with claims that concern the very creation of the bond between them (the procreation).

[36]        I am not required here to give Hasidic-moral sermons about the Amalek in our hearts.

[37]        An example of a similar argument can be found in the books Two Carts and a Hot Air Balloon (above note 4), in the discussion of the relationship between the individual and the collective. There we argued that placing the individual at the center in the value sense is a derivative of an ontological perception, as is the case with placing the collective at the center.

[38]        This topic is discussed in detail in the books Anush Kahtzir, Kfar Hasidim, in the sixth chapter, chapter 2.

[39]        Another, stronger version of this argument is found in the letters of Rabbi Hutner, Letter 15.

[40]        On this matter, see also Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner's book, Fear of Yitzchak – Chanukah, Brookline 1964, article 2, letter 5. There he emphasizes the dual meaning of acknowledgment, in which every acknowledgment includes an acknowledgment (acknowledgment in the sense of a word) of the recipient's servitude to the giver. We note that the source of these words is the commentary of the Rabbi in his siddur Olat Rai on "I confess before you" (as is known, Rabbi Hutner studied with the Rabbi in his youth in Jerusalem).