Wisdom, Intelligence, and Knowledge – On the Dialectic of Torah Study and Academic Research

Noon

Michael Abraham

The relationship between religion and science has undergone many ups and downs throughout history, in both Judaism and Christianity. In the Christian world, such problems were discussed much earlier, and in Judaism they came much later, and with less intensity (it should be noted that the basic processes and approaches are largely similar). The Torah-based confrontation began mainly during the Enlightenment and Haskalah periods and after them (see more details in the next chapter).

From the beginning of the Enlightenment until the middle or end of the twentieth century, the direction was mainly conflictual. At first, the discussions dealt mainly with Talmudic and historical research, but later the main issues focused on the natural sciences. They dealt with questions such as the age of the world, evolution, etc. The religious approach during these periods was mainly apologetic, with various attempts to cope with the increasing prestige of the natural sciences. In our generation, the center of gravity is shifting to the social sciences, and even more back to the humanities. The conflicts there are more intense, but it is precisely there that the possibility of mutual fertilization between the fields also arises.

Beyond the mere passage of time, there seems to be a fundamental reason for this change. In the natural sciences, it is difficult to see potential for enriching Torah study. At most, they can be used to clarify historical, medical, and other facts. The two fields 'play' on different fields, and therefore if a contradiction or problem arises, it is naturally directed to the Torah field (since it has no authority regarding the clarification of facts) and not to the scientific one. In contrast, in the social sciences and humanities, the conflict is more intense, since there the competition is conducted on the same field. Both the academic-scientific fields and the Torah field deal with the same questions, and sometimes offer different answers to them. On the other hand, precisely because of this, one can also see potential here for further development of Torah study. The methods that are developing in these fields, as well as various results of scientific research, can enrich and refine Torah study.

The 'scientificity' of the humanities and social sciences is questionable, and many use this to dismiss the problems that these fields raise. But this is a mistake. The fact that this is not 'science' in the strict (=rigorous) sense of the term does not mean that the claims made there have no weight, or that nothing can be learned from them. Even methods and claims that are not scientific in the strict sense can be true (and sometimes intelligent), and can even teach us and give us various tools for study and research.

For the purposes of the discussion below, I will refer to all of these fields as a single entity. From now on, the term 'science' will appear here in the sense of modern academic research in its fields and varieties, despite the lack of precision.

The approach to issues of Torah and science, both to conflicts and to the possibility of mutual fertilization, is based, among other things, on different fundamental conceptions of the Torah. Some automatically oppose anything that originates outside the Torah, and certainly when it comes to introducing it into the Beit Midrash. The basic argument is that it is not possible to subject the Torah to any test of common sense or science, and some even claim that the Torah field should not be refined from other fields of knowledge (except for factual inquiries, if at all).

On the other hand, there is an opposite approach, according to which reason is the supreme standard, and everything, including the Torah, stands up to its test. Such a position seems contrary to faith and tradition, but Rabbi Shimon Shekap, in chapter 5 of his book Shaarei Yosher, after renewing his well-known innovation on the 'Torat Mishpat' (meaning that there are non-halakhic legal principles that bind us just as much as the halakhic principles), writes the following:

Just as the type of owner and the rights of the owner of property are a legal matter, even without the warning "Thou shalt not steal," and as we explained above, it is in no way possible to say that the reason we attribute the object to Reuben is because Shimon is warned according to the Torah not to steal it from him. Rather, the matter is the opposite, that the prohibition of stealing is after the matter is decided in the laws of the owners' boundaries...

And even though at first glance it is puzzling, what necessity and obligation would a person have to do something without the command and warning of the Torah? But when we delve into the matter thoroughly, this matter must be understood. After all, the obligation and necessity to serve God and fulfill His will is also a matter of obligation and necessity according to the law of reason and cognition, just as it is an obligation and the enslavement of money is a legal obligation, which is imposed according to the ways of the owners…

Rabbi Shimon explains that we also accepted the burden of the Torah upon ourselves by virtue of our intellectual decision, and therefore, at least from our perspective, the authority of our decision stands above, and certainly not below, the authority of the Torah. This is a clear and sharp presentation of the approach of the superiority of the intellect, and Akmal.

Even without deciding the dispute about the superiority of reason or the Torah (in which I, the Holy One, side with the opinion of the Harash), it is possible to agree that scientific pursuits can bring great benefit to Torah study. In contrast to those who constantly see the dimension of conflict and confrontation, and the need to solve problems and make excuses or evade difficulties, it is possible to take the opposite, constructive approach, and see science as an important tool that can contribute to Torah study and understanding. And to be clear, I do not mean only clarifying facts (historical, medical, or other), but also adopting methods and ways of learning, in the sense of the beauty of Yafet in the tents of Shem. It would be naive to think that there were no such adoptions throughout the generations (from Greece to the present day). The Baal Shem Tov and his disciples converted niggunim, but also the great Lithuanians, and even before them the Tannaim and Amoraim, as well as the Rishonim and Aharonim, engaged in an intensive 'conversion' of methods and ways of thinking (even if sometimes this done unconsciously).

In this article I would like to propose a form of synthesis between these two fields. But as a background to my proposal, I will briefly discuss the evolution of the conflict between Torah and science.

A. The Relationship between Torah and Science as a Drama in Five Acts

We begin with a schematic and not entirely accurate description of the evolution of the relationship between Torah and science in modern times.[1]In the first period, it was dominated by The comparative approachThe main effort made in it was to refute the scientific claims that contradicted tradition. Then, when science had already assumed a status that was difficult to deal with, The apologetic position, in which the main effort was to reconcile what was said in the Torah with the results of science. At this time, it was already common to engage in both fields, in an effort to reconcile them. The focus of the discourse was still the conflict, but there was a feeling that it could be resolved and reconciled.

These two periods parallel the modernist era, which developed and glorified science, and saw in it the essence of everything. Both the modern deniers of tradition, and those who deniers of science on the basis of the claims of religious tradition, shared the dichotomous view, according to which we must choose between the scientific worldview and the Torah-traditional worldview. Apologetics attempted to grasp both areas, but still saw a need to reconcile them with each other.

In the following period, a different position developed, which was The parallel position (=parallel), which sees Torah and science as two fields that are not interconnected. According to this approach, each of these fields deals with a different aspect of phenomena, and therefore one should not complicate problems with the other, nor is there any need to reconcile them. One of the prominent representatives of this position was Prof. L.[2], who claimed that as a religious man he believes that the world was created six thousand years ago, and as a scientist he believes that the age of the world is several billion years.

In many fields we adopt parallel levels of explanation, and therefore such a position should not be seen as a logical contradiction.[3]For example, according to the prevailing 'mythology', Newton was sitting under a tree when an apple fell on his head. He asked himself why apples fall to the ground, and thus discovered the law of gravitation (=the law of attraction between bodies with mass). Newton, as a believing Christian, was supposed to be satisfied with the theological answer, that the apple probably fell on his head as punishment for some sin he had committed. He was not satisfied with that, since he was looking for a scientific answer and not a theological answer. And what about the theological answer? He could believe in it, and at the same time look for a scientific answer[4]. So, we find different answers to the same question here, and each one relates to a different level. On the scientific level there is one answer, and on the theological level another answer. The same is true with regard to the promises of the Torah, according to which rains and grain depend on our commandments and transgressions, while from a scientific point of view it seems that these phenomena are the results of physical-meteorological factors. Incidentally, this is also true in the various fields of science. For example, the same mental process can have psychological and physiological explanations at the same time, as well as on the social level, etc.

Among many who advocate this position, it is common to say that science deals with 'what' and the Torah deals with 'for the sake of what', and therefore these are parallel planes of reference.[5]For example, the theory of evolution describes how the world was created, but it does not address the question of who led this entire campaign. In other words, there is no reason to say that God created the world through evolution.[6].

After some time, the parallel concept undergoes further development, and is created The subjective-postmodern positionDuring this period, various thinkers treated science, as well as other fields of knowledge, as subjective. This attitude provided a comfortable cushion for religious apologists, who jumped on the postmodern bandwagon and claimed that we, as religious people, can also join the 'dance of differences' (in the words of Rabbi Shagar zt"l in his book 'Broken Vessels,' which was one of the representatives of this postmodernist view).[7]According to those who advocate this approach, apologetics is not even necessary, since we are 'dancers' with equal rights in the circle. From several sources expressing such a position, it is implied that religion is something subjective, and it may not be compatible with science, but since the choice of science is also arbitrary, it is therefore legitimate to choose the religious tradition as a narrative (=discourse) no less than the scientific narrative or any other narrative.

This argument is convenient and effective, as it neutralizes the possibility of discourse, thus relieving us of the need to apologize and make excuses, but it 'throws the baby out with the bathwater.' When one gives up on the objectivity of belief in God and the Torah from heaven, and treats it as a myth whose historical or metaphysical truth is unclear (and unimportant), then one implicitly surrenders to the atheistic position. Faith becomes a type of subjective discourse (narrative), which is the result of personal (arbitrary) choice. God here transforms from 'being' into an 'idea', a feeling or paradigm (= a conceptual framework for discourse). Such an approach is prevalent among contemporary religious (and not only religious) thinkers (mainly in academia), who apparently do not succeed, and therefore do not even try, to reconcile their religious lifestyle with their scientific beliefs. They advocate a religion that does not deal with facts and does not make factual claims about the world, and in any case it is not subject to scientific criticism.[8].

Despite all the theoretical expedients and semantic twists, in many cases this is a position of de facto heresy. It is a belief in a God, but not one that truly exists. In this regard, we can cite the words of the Rabbi, who wrote: "There is a faith that is like heresy, and there is heresy that is like faith."[9]A God who is nothing more than a subjective creation of the believing person is exactly what Karl Marx called, and rightly so, "the opium of the masses."

In recent years, a fifth position has been developing, which is not always explicitly distinguished, but can be called The synthetic periodSuch a position holds that not only does science not contradict tradition, and not only is it of positive value, but it can even be used as an important component in the study and understanding of Torah. Some have gone so far as to actually identify the two fields. But even if one does not go that far in terms of content, more and more academic methods are being introduced into study in the study halls (a phenomenon that is accompanied by difficult polemics, as is well known).[10].

In the next chapter, I would like to define this approach sharply, but in a softer version, so that the distinction between the fields is not completely blurred.

B. Wisdom, intelligence, knowledge[11]

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I would like to highlight two characteristics that distinguish scientific thinking. Both underlie its power but also limit it. The first characteristic is that it deals with form rather than substance (independence), and the second is that it has a separating and distinguishing nature (analysis) rather than a unifying one (synthesis).

2. Wisdom and Understanding: Bones and Form

The best way to demonstrate the first characteristic is through an ancient-modern scientific theory: the formation of opposites from nothing. As a background, we will note that creation from nothing contradicts the basic conservation laws of physics, as well as intuition. And so, Anaximander, who was a Greek physicist and philosopher, a student of Thales of Miletus, proposed a solution to the problem, and this is what he wrote in the only original passage we have of his thought[12]:

The unlimited is the beginning and foundation of all that exists. It is neither water nor any other of the things called elements, for it has a different and unlimited quality, and from it came the heavens and all the worlds in them. From where the being of all that exists comes, there also goes the reincarnation, according to necessity. For these give each other ransom and reparations for their wrongs according to the order of time.

To modern ears, these things seem like ancient cosmogony that has already lost its appeal, but at a second glance, one can see here the foreshadowing of modern scientific principles. He makes two claims here: 1. The world was created by a process of creating various opposites: cold and heat, liquid and solid, and so on. 2. These opposites were preceded by a Yulian (=unbounded) substance that does not have the characteristics of the matter we are familiar with. It is the splitting of Yulian that created these opposites.

The first claim seems like an ingenious solution to the problem of creation from nothing and its relation to the laws of conservation. If we assume that every particle of matter that is created is accompanied by the simultaneous creation of an antiparticle with exactly opposite properties (=charges), then the total charge in the world does not change in this creation. For example, if the particle that is created is an electron, which has a mass M and an electric charge Q, then an antielectron will be created with it, whose mass is M-, and whose electric charge is Q-. Now, although there are two new particles in the world, the total mass and total charge in the world have not changed, and therefore no physical conservation law has been violated. Such a picture also emerges in modern physics (quantum field theory), which describes the creation of such pairs from the vacuum, in a manner that is consistent with the laws of conservation.

Still, something about this process seems problematic. Finally, two new entities have been created here, and they were created out of nothing. Before, the world was empty, and now it is populated. Although there is no law in physics that prohibits this, there is still something disturbing here. This can be defined as a violation of another 'conservation law', which is the law of conservation of entity. This law does not deal with the characteristics (charges) of matter, but with its very existence, or its essence. Interpretation: Two entities were created here out of nothing.

And here, this improbability is "transparent" from the point of view of physics. It does not notice it, since it deals only with characteristics (properties, charges), and not with the things themselves. In cases and not with selfhood.

I think that Anaximander tried to answer this problem as well, and in this sense he proposed something more sophisticated than the proposal of modern physics. As we have seen, he states in his words another principle, according to which the world has always had a Yulian element, devoid of properties (since all properties came from it). It was not physical matter in the sense familiar to us, since matter in its present form came from it. The only thing that can be said about it is that it changed. This theory is more complete, since the creation of opposites from Yulian matter preserves all the properties (=charges) in the world, and now also Law of Conservation of EntityIt seems that only the two assumptions together offer a real solution to the problem of creation from nothing.

Why does modern physics ignore the second problem? As mentioned, the plane of things as they are does not exist in scientific terms, and therefore the problems it raises are not addressed by scientific tools.[13]In the language of Kabbalah, it can be said that science deals with creation (there is from something) and not with creation (there is from nothing). On the intellectual level, the relevant distinction is between wisdom and understanding. Science deals with understanding (=thing from something) and not with wisdom (=power from something).

In this context, the words of the Ramban in his commentary on the Song of Songs (3:9) are interesting. He explains that according to Plato, creation comes from nothing and is not prevented, and therefore the existence of the material substance must be assumed before creation.[14]On the other hand, in his commentary on the Book of Genesis (1:8), he seemingly contradicts these words, and writes that the world was created out of nothing.[15]It is possible that the Ramban intends to claim that the initial hyolic matter was indeed created from nothing, but according to Plato, the matter we know today was created from hyolic matter, and this is because of the law of conservation of being. Hyolic matter is separated into various opposites, and thus the reality we know today was created. In the process of creation (after creation), the laws of nature and reason are no longer violated, and therefore at this stage creation must be explained in a Platonic manner.[16].

From another angle, although very similar, it can be said that also at the level of forms (charges, qualities, or degrees) another "conservation law" is broken, since this is where the concept of cargo And the concept mass, which did not exist before. Although amount The charge or mass did not change during the creation process, so the laws of physical conservation held, but The concepts And these qualities themselves did not exist in the previous stage. Something nevertheless broke here, even if not on a scientific level.

To answer the problem of conservation of qualities, we must add to Anaximander's unlimited and indefinite matter the properties of the Joule, that is, qualities such as charge or mass. It is still the Joule, for we cannot say that the Joule substance was charged to any degree of charge, or had any amount of mass, otherwise it would not be the Joule. These came into being only after the splitting, and then the Joule was removed. But these properties in themselves, that is: the concepts mass and cargo themselves, were already embedded in it before[17].

This question is also "transparent" to scientific eyes. Science does not question itself about the very concepts it uses. It uses them as if they were self-evident, since they constitute its language and perception of reality. Questions about them have no scientific significance, since science operates within them, and the questions it asks are asked within this conceptual framework. In another way, it can be said that from a scientific point of view they were not created at all, since they are not applicable. What exists is a certain mass or charge. Here again, there is an opposition of science to Platonism, which sees applicable ideas as existing.

We have seen that science does not deal with the self (of objects and concepts)[18], but only in cases that apply to them. In Kabbalistic terminology, it can be said that science deals with law (virtues) and not with grace. Law/virtues is the force that limits grace and gives it form. Grace is the power and virtue/law are the characteristics (the attributes, the form). It is true that the distinction between grace and virtue is found on the level of attributes (the three Sefirot HaGaat). In the corresponding terminology on the intellectual level (the three upper Sefirot, those at the head – the Mochin, the Chabad) it is said that science deals with understanding and not wisdom.[19]This leads us to our next distinction.

3. Wisdom and Knowledge: Analysis and Synthesis

Our second distinction about science is that it deals with separation, not unification. Although science (especially natural science) tends to generalize separate phenomena and associate them with one general law, its method is a separating method. It distinguishes between cases that belong to and those that do not belong to the law in question. In the humanities, this is much more pronounced, since there the main concern is with distinctions and classifications (unlike the natural sciences, there are very few general laws, if any).

Many articles in the humanities (including Jewish studies) discuss a distinction between positions or methods, setting them against each other. Quite a few times the traditional scholar feels that these two opposites can be united and merged into a unified theory. But when a resolution of the contradiction or synthesis of the seemingly opposing positions is proposed, the academic researcher will treat this as speculation (or unfounded harmonization). The researcher focuses on analysis, that is, on pointing out differences and distinctions between methods, and is not inclined to make syntheses. We should note that in Kabbalistic terminology, this is also a characterization of 'law' versus 'kindness.' The most effective way to show this is through a few general examples (admittedly somewhat trite. There is no room here for specific examples, but the things are simple and well-known).

The first example is the attitude towards the thirteen virtues of the sermon. It is common among scholars to deny that they were a halakhah from Moses at Sinai, since there is much evidence that they were formed at a later period. With Hillel the Elder, when he ascended from Babylon, there were seven, and later with Rabbi Yishmael, who followed the method of Rabbi Nachoniah ben Hakana, we find thirteen. Rabbi Akiva, his friend, disagrees with him on the classification of virtues, since he follows the method of Nahum Ish Gamzu.[20]After that, there is a baraita of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yossi of Galilee, which contains 32 Midots. Rav Sharira Gaon has already listed many dozens, and inbook The amputations Several dozen more appear. It seems likely that this is indeed a long historical development, and not a Torah given from Sinai. In contrast, all the Rishonim and Aharonim agree that the Midod (at least in the halakhic sermon) is the halakhah of Moses from Sinai. At first glance, there is a frontal contradiction here, but looking at it from a different perspective, it can be explained that the methods of sermon were given to Moses from Sinai in a juridical manner, and then they underwent conceptualization and formalization, and were cast into fixed canonical molds. The historical development that the researchers are talking about concerns the process of conceptualization, and this does not contradict the tradition according to which the tools of sermon were given in one form or another to Moses at Sinai.[21].

In general, the 'archaeology' that studies the historical-geographical stratification of the Talmudic texts is mainly concerned with separation. Researchers find the distinguishing characteristics between references from different study schools and different periods, while traditional scholarship sees the Talmuds as harmonious texts.

Another example is the distinction between different sources in the Torah (what is called the 'doctrine of certificates'). Here too, the research is mainly concerned with distinguishing between the different sources, but from another perspective it can be argued (as Rabbi Breuer did) that the different 'certificates' are nothing more than different perspectives on the issues under discussion, and were all given to Moses by the mouth of the hero. Here too, the researcher engages in a separate analysis, and the traditional perspective offers a synthesis.

Another example is the relationship between the plain text and the sermon. The conventional view of the scholarly world is that its concern is to take the text out of its plain text and adapt it to the values/needs of the preacher and the society in which he operated. For example, the biblical commandment "an eye for an eye" instructs us to put out the eye of the captain. But the Sages demanded that he pay a fine, thereby taking the Bible out of its plain text. However, in this case too, as in other cases where the sermon seems to contradict the plain text, it can be shown that there is a possibility of synthesis between these two interpretations, in such a way that the complete halakhic picture consists of both layers together.[22].

Here we are not talking about first-person intelligence or self versus form/chance, and therefore if we define scientific research as 'intelligence', then the relevant contrasting sphere is not 'wisdom', but 'knowledge.' 'Knowledge' represents the synthesis, which combines 'wisdom' with 'intelligence,' while 'knowledge' is a separating presentation, the essence of which is the distinction between thesis and antithesis. See more on this below.

4. Judgments

In the scientific world, it is customary to demand that claims be objectively testable, that is, capable of objective criticism. Ironically, this requirement mainly characterizes the humanities, as it is a measure of their 'scientificity'. When we describe facts or positions of various thinkers/ruler, then our claims are subject to scientific criticism. The claim that Maimonides was a pluralist is supposed to be examined against sources in Maimonides' writings. This way, it can be confirmed or refuted. On the other hand, the claim that it is more correct and appropriate to be a pluralist is not an objective claim. We have nothing against which to test this claim. Therefore, a claim of this type has no place in scientific research, and its place is on publicistic or Torah-traditional platforms.

It is this objectivity that underlies many of the limitations of the humanities. Claims that do not separate but unite, claims that deal with explanations rather than descriptions, and claims that deal with things themselves rather than their actual appearance, are almost all objectivity claims. That is why rigorous academic research usually steers clear of them. This limitation is part of what defines the research as academic. It is what gives it its power, since it describes facts that are difficult to deny, but on the other hand it is also the source of some of its weaknesses and limitations.

5. The advantages of the scientific method

As mentioned, the limitations of the academic-scientific method are what give it its power. This power is based on its systematicity, adherence to established facts, examination of things in the entire range of sources and contexts (and not just local innovations in a particular subject, as in the traditional way of learning), and strict adherence to the validity of conclusions and their scope of application (i.e., if one finds any view in the Babylonian Talmud, or in a particular subject therein, the conclusion is presented as the Babylonian approach, or as the approach of the Beit Midrash where that subject was discussed, and not as a necessary and general conclusion).

This rigor greatly narrows the scope of academic practice, but it has many virtues and virtues that should be used. Traditional study is much less systematic and rigorous. On the other hand, studying such methods alone greatly limits our possibilities of understanding the essence of things and their roots. Such goals require a degree of speculation that the academic method does not allow for.[23].

C. Such is the way of Torah

1. The proposed model

We can now present the main argument of this article. Nowadays, when the dominant approach is the fifth in the development described above, scientific-academic research can and should certainly take part in the study of Torah. It is usually supposed to place before the learner the facts as being. This description is the platform for synthetic study, the purpose of which is to ask why, to deal with the self and not just with descriptions and cases, and thereby to unite the various streams that are revealed and distinguished in academic phenomenology.

There are quite a few examples of the power of this model. If we return to the examples we gave above, scientific research can outline for us the path that the Midot Harash took, and the various Batei Midrash that developed in relation to them. But this is only the initial stage of the investigation. In the second stage, we should ask ourselves what this sequence tells us, and what is the overall structure created from all the shades that were distinguished in the scientific analysis. What is the synthesis that emerges from all of this?

In the case of the 'Torat HaTeddot', there is a masterful work by Rabbi Breuer and his students, who took the academic analysis that divided the Torah into different parts and sources, which the traditional scholar was unable (and unwilling) to do, and carried out syntheses that point to the unification of different angles of those issues. Rabbi Yosef Avivi went even further, proposing to see the four basic Torah documents as representing the halakhic and Torah subjects from the perspective of four different kabbalistic worlds (Avi'a).[24].

In this picture, academic-scientific research creates, with its analytical tools, the factual foundation that is placed before the learner, and the reader asks the synthetic questions in relation to this foundation. The historical description or the distinctions themselves are sometimes the first step in Torah study, but usually do not exhaust it.

2. Example: A positive commandment against the Levites[25]

Let's take a slightly more detailed example to clarify things. Aharon Shemesh, in his article "On the History of the Meaning of the Concepts of Positive and Negative Commandments"[26], discussed two approaches in the literature of the Sages regarding the distinction between positive and negative commandments. The first approach he calls the "executive approach," and it bases the distinction between the two types of commandments on the manner of performing the commandment: commandments that are fulfilled by doing something are positive commandments, while commandments that are fulfilled by returning and refraining from doing something are negative. The second approach, the "linguistic" approach, bases the distinction on the language of the text: commandments that are written in the Torah in a positive manner are positive commandments. Commandments that are written in the form of a warning not to do something are negative.

The distinction between the approaches will be expressed in the positive commandments that are fulfilled in the absence and in the absence of work (such as the commandment to strike on Shabbat, which is fulfilled by not doing work), or in the Levites that are fulfilled in the presence and in the absence of work (such as "You shall not put blood in your house," which is fulfilled by building a railing or removing the obstacle). According to the performance approach, there are no such categories, since for this method, every mitzvah that is fulfilled in the absence and in the absence of work is a no, and every mitzvah that is fulfilled in the presence and in the absence of work is a yes. On the other hand, according to the linguistic approach, such categories also exist.

Shemesh, as is the custom of scholars, focuses only on Talmudic literature, within which he distinguishes between different layers. From this, he shows the development of these approaches, and claims that in the earlier period Talmudic literature is characterized by the performative approach, and in a later period the linguistic one takes over.

A traditional scholar who examines this question will do so without paying attention to the division of periods in the Sages, and without distinguishing between the Sages and the Rishonim and Achronim. On the other hand, the conclusions of the academic research here are significantly lacking (by virtue of being academic, the research itself certainly deserves a rigorous and appropriate scrutiny). The question I asked myself as a traditional scholar was whether it is possible to base the distinction between positive and negative commandments on language alone. After all, the difference in the language of the Torah is supposed to express some fundamental distinction. It is unlikely that the Torah defines any commandment as a no in an arbitrary manner. The language of the Torah is an indication that it is a no, but we still have to ask ourselves why this is really so? What does this linguistic distinction express? The obvious conclusion is that there is a fundamental distinction underlying the linguistic distinction. Admittedly, this distinction probably does not coincide with the performance distinction, since the linguistic method has two other different categories of commandments that do not exist according to the performance method, and so on. Therefore, the result of traditional thinking, when confronted with the results of academic research, is that there is not a performance approach and a linguistic approach, but two fundamentally different approaches.

Now I went on to ask myself what could be at the root of the essential distinction that is not based on performance. The conclusion I came to was that the mitzvot-esa are commands in which the Torah indicates to us a desirable state in its eyes, and the mitzvot-t'a-t'a are commands in which the Torah indicates to us a undesirable state in its eyes. When the Torah commands us to put on tefillin, it does not say that being without tefillin is an undesirable state, but rather that being with tefillin is a desirable state. On the other hand, when it forbids us to eat pork, it does not say that not eating pork is desirable, but rather that eating pork is undesirable.[27].

From this we will also understand the examples of the two categories cited above, which exist only according to the linguistic approach (and not according to the performance approach). The commandment to strike on Shabbat is a positive commandment even though it is fulfilled in a positive way, because the Torah here indicates a desirable situation (that the person should sit), and does not prohibit an undesirable situation (that the person should do work, although in our case this is also prohibited in some way for doing work). In contrast, "You shall not put blood in your house" is a negative, even though it is fulfilled in a positive way, because it indicates an undesirable situation (a house in which there is an obstacle and a malfunction).

I would like to point out that I drew this conclusion from a study of the Rishonim and Achronim, without distinguishing between the Talmud and commentators from later periods, as is the custom of a traditional scholar. Every scholar understands that in our current accepted jurisprudence there is no possibility of the performative approach. Almost all the enumerators of the mitzvot (although the method of the Rasag should be discussed, and see the aforementioned articles, etc.) enumerate the evi that are fulfilled in the act of doing and the asim that are fulfilled in the shev and al-ta'a'. Therefore, it is clear that the performative option does not exist at all.[28].

So far I have tried to demonstrate the fact that academic research is mainly descriptive. It sticks to the facts and does not get to the roots of things. It does not allow itself to speculate, and therefore it asks the 'what' and not the 'why'. But the traditional learner also needs the essence and not just phenomenology. He wants to understand why this is so, and what is behind things, and therefore he asks himself about the causes and the essences.

Now I will try to show with this example the second characteristic of traditional learning compared to academic research: The synthesis. In the final stage of examining the differences between Levites and doers, I asked myself why this is really the distinction between Levites and doers. Intuition certainly hinges the distinction between them on the question of performance, since "no" in our case refers to staying and not doing, while "do" refers to getting up and doing. The severity of "no" compared to "do" also seems to be a derivative of these dimensions. Is there a connection between these two distinctions? Is it possible that two factions of sages would see the division between "no" and "do" as completely different divisions, without any connection between them?

The answer I gave myself is negative. It turns out that the division is the same division, and the dispute does not concern the distinction between no and do. To understand this, let us examine the following question: What is the meaning of the distinction between indicating a desirable state and indicating an undesirable state? When the Torah indicates an undesirable state (such as the prohibition against doing work on Shabbat), then the one who transgresses the commandment, that is, does work on Shabbat, has acted directly against the Torah's command. He is doing exactly what the Torah does not want him to do. On the other hand, when the Torah indicates a desirable state (such as resting on Shabbat), then the one who transgresses and does work on Shabbat is not acting directly against the will of the Torah. He is just not resting. He is not in an undesirable state, but simply not in the desired state.

When we examine the performance-oriented, intuitive approach, we will observe the excessive severity of an offense in the act of doing as opposed to an offense in the refraining and the do-not-doing. It seems that an offense in the act of doing is serious because it involves an active action against the will of the Torah. An offense in the refraining and the do-not-doing is less serious because it does not involve a direct offense against the will of God, but only a failure to act in accordance with the will of God. We have learned that the "linguistic" division, which we have translated into a substantive division (pointing to a desirable or undesirable situation), is nothing more than a different perception of the severity of the non-doing versus the doing. Essentially, this perception also divides the non-doing and the doing according to an offense in the act of doing as opposed to an offense in the refraining and the do-not-doing. However, according to this approach, an offense in the act of doing does not necessarily manifest itself in a physical act, but in being in an undesirable situation. Whereas an offense in the refraining and the do-not-doing is not being in a desirable situation.

Therefore, according to both approaches, the distinction between do and don't is related to the distinction between do and don't and do. The disagreement is marginal, and it is certainly possible to extract a picture that is agreed upon by everyone regarding the distinction between do and don't. This is a certain synthesis between the two possibilities presented by the research analysis. This presents us with two sides, and what remains for us to complete the picture is to make a synthesis and understand the common and unifying thing between the two.

To conclude the example, it is important to emphasize that, despite its limitations, academic research was an important stage in this study. In most cases, such simple questions (such as the difference between non-doing and doing) are not asked by traditional scholars. A researcher's sensitivity makes it easy for him to dichotomously position two sides of the investigation. From here, the path is short to find them in various sources, and to outline the historical development of these ideas. On the other hand, those who are satisfied only with academic analysis miss the point, and do not get to the roots of things. To remain with the perception that the distinction between non-doing and doing is purely linguistic means to remain with phenomenology without any understanding. This is precisely the role of traditional research.

As an aside, in my opinion, these conclusions would not be acceptable for publication in an academic setting, as they are difficult to substantiate. Perhaps it can be argued that some of the early thinkers believed this, and prove it. But as a thesis that aims to explain the Sage approach, it is not conclusive. There is nothing to compare it to, since it offers an explanation of the approaches, not a description of them. Hence, the study of the final stage is essentially non-academic, even though the initial stage was essential for its completion. This example illuminates the significance of the two-stage dialectical model proposed here.

3. Implications for the teaching method and rulings

In recent generations, traditional yeshivah studies have come very close to academic analysis. Yeshivah "investigations" present two polar sides, and attempt to distinguish between them, find them in the various commentators, and define them by different interpretations. These "investigations" use a system of concepts and principles, some of which are a priori, to analyze Talmudic issues.[29]This is an influence of the modern-analytical way of thinking, which has passed into the world of yeshiva (usually unconsciously).

But in the last generation, it seems that learners are beginning to get tired of this method, and to go back and search for syntheses. Our analytical skills are much higher than those of previous generations, and therefore analytical separation is very easy, and not really sufficient. After a more refined investigation, and entering into shades and sub-shades, we notice that the polar sides of the investigation are getting very close to each other, to the point that sometimes they almost disappear. As a result, some aspire to break away from classical Yeshivah learning (which some call 'Brisk'), and return to the intuitive learning that characterized the earlier generations. This learning is closer to common sense, and less a priori and detached. The accepted perception is that this learning is good for the order of 'research', but the ruling of halakhic law is done differently.[30].

The model proposed here leads us to a different conclusion. Analytical-Briskian study is an important and essential infrastructure for our study, but it constitutes only the initial platform. In the second stage, we must seek the commonalities, reduce the polarity of the sides of the investigation, and try to create syntheses between them. Skipping this initial stage usually yields superficiality, and sometimes even real errors. Just as academic research has an important role as the first stage in Talmudic study, so do yeshivah investigations. These too are analytical tools whose concern is separation. Synthesis should come only after the thesis and antithesis have been presented in the sharpest possible way. Both stages in the model proposed here are essential[31].

4. Final note

Both in the model that generalizes academic study of Torah study, and in the conclusion regarding the role of Briska investigations and methods, we conducted a dialectical process in two different senses: 1. Dialectics in the study method itself – first, presenting two sides of investigation (both yeshiva and academic) as thesis and anti-thesis, and then including them into a more complex and general picture through synthesis. 2. Presenting academic research and traditional study as thesis and anti-thesis, and then synthesizing them into a more complete structure, in which each complements the other.

This dialectic takes 'wisdom' and 'understanding' and synthesizes them into the whole of 'knowledge.' 'Knowledge' is a combination of these two, which is more complete than its two parts, just as 'glory' is more complete than the 'kindness' and 'strength' that compose it, and so on.[32].

[1]    A. Before the modern era, there was generally no distinction between science and Torah, in both Christianity and Judaism. For example, many of Aristotle's claims were perceived as religious truths. In modern times, the difference between the fields has become more pronounced. We are here dealing with only the second stage of this drama.

     B. The description in this chapter is presented chronologically, but in practice the division between the positions is not always according to periods. In recent years, several approaches have been mixed, and sometimes the same people raise arguments of several types. For our purposes, the main importance is in distinguishing between the positions themselves, and the historical question is marginal.

[2]    Avoiding mentioning the full name as required by the system.

[3]    See my book 'That which is and that which is not' in the fourth chapter, at great length regarding parallel levels of explanation in various shades.

[4]    This claim is not simple at all, and seemingly has a logical problem. An 'explanation' is usually required to be necessary and sufficient, and therefore seemingly there cannot be two different explanations for the same phenomenon, see my aforementioned book on this. Here we will suffice with pointing out the fact that people accept such a reference as plausible, and therefore it can be applied equally to such conflicts between Torah and science. There are, of course, factual conflicts, in which it is not a question of explanations but of facts. For example, the question about the age of the world. Here there is seemingly only one answer: either it is 6,000 years old or it is billions of years old. Here too there is room for several parallel answers, if we distinguish between different concepts of 'age' (or time). There are several answers to these questions, and therefore I will not go into this point here.

[5]    There is room to distinguish here between phenomenological (=descriptive) theories and substantive (=explanatory) theories, and so on.

[6]    My friend Nadav Shnerb once told me that he doesn't understand why evolution contradicts our tradition any more than gravity. If we assume that the laws of nature operate without an operator, then gravity contradicts our faith no less than evolution, and if we accept the fact that science describes the action of God, then there is no fundamental contradiction between any scientific theory and religious tradition.

[7]    See my review of the book in 'Nekuda', as well as the review by my friend Nadav Shnerb, in 'Tzohar', 18.

[8]    See on this in Gili Zivan, 'Religion Without Delusion', Kibbutz Hameuchad 2006 (and also in her supervisor, Avi Sagi, in several places). See also in the collection 'On Faith', Moshe Halbertal and Avi Sagi (eds.), mainly in the articles by Moshe Halbertal, Roni Miron, and others. A similar approach appears in several of Moshe Meir's articles (see, for example, Akademot 12, and in my response there in the next issue). For a sociological description of this phenomenon as part of what is called "the new religious Zionism", see Yitzhak Geiger's instructive (and entertaining) article, in Akademot 11. Such an approach also appears in many books on faith and God published in recent years, and Akmal.

     I will note that among researchers in Jewish studies, there are blatant expressions of this approach, and precisely among researchers who are committed to halakha. Various researchers reach conclusions regarding the origins of various laws or customs, and the conclusions of their research place these in a problematic light, or unfortunately not binding, and yet in practice they continue to maintain them. For them, there is a disconnect between the facts revealed in research and halakha, and parallelism constitutes a solution, at least on a practical level, for them. I will note that such a phenomenon is expected to appear (although not necessarily) in an extreme manner among academic researchers who also serve as rabbis. For two prominent examples, see the criticism of Rabbi Prof. Rosenthal that appears in the article by his student Menachem Kahane, "Talmud Research in the University and Traditional Learning in the Yeshiva," in 'Circles of Transformation and Tradition', Rehovot 2009. A similar phenomenon is found in the article by Rabbi Dr. Benny Lau, "The Appearance of Truth – Rabbinics and Academia in the Writings of Rosh Rosenthal on the Salvation of a Gentile on Shabbat," Akademot 13, and in my response there in the next issue. Also, see Baruch Kahane's article, 'Where the Wind Blows,' Akademot 20, section 2, in a polemic with the positions of Moshe Meir.

[9]    See Orot Ha'Amunah, p. 25. Also, see my thread on this topic in the 'Stop Here, Thinkers' forum, dated September 21, 2005.

[10] See also the article by Rabbi Amit Kola, 'Tzhar' 13, in the ongoing discussion on the 'Ravadi', 'Tzhar' 15-18, and in the articles by Eliyahu Shai, 'Tzhar' 13-14, 29.

[11] For the things briefly mentioned below, see in more detail in my book 'That which is and that which is not', in the fifth chapter.

[12]   The translation is taken from Shmuel Samborsky's book 'Physical Thought in Its Formation', Bialik Institute, Jerusalem 1973, p. 62 (and in one sentence also in Samborsky's own introduction on p. 30). See also the Hebrew Encyclopedia under the entry "Anaximander".

[13] Immanuel Kant already made this point (albeit from a completely different angle), in his famous distinction between the world as it is in itself, the noumena, and the world as it appears to us, the phenomenon. He states that science and human cognition deal only with the phenomenon and not with the noumena.

[14] We note that the midrash in the chapters of Dr. Eliezer, on which the Ramban bases his argument, is cited in the book of Moreh Hanebuchim (Chapter 2, Chapter 26) as the most wonderful and puzzling midrash (!) that he encountered in the words of Chazal. The reason for this is that it stands in opposition to the belief in creation from nothing.

[15] There he interprets the aforementioned midrash from the chapters of Dr. Eliezer in an allegorical manner.

[16] Indeed, in his sermon Torat Ha-Had Temima (The Writings of the Ramban, published by the Rabbi Kook Institute, p. 19), the Ramban writes: The thing that the Greeks called it… primeval, – and a matter from Tirya. And it is a creative force in which the elements are suspended… For the sages of Israel, the elemental was created, in the beginning God created the elemental of the heavens and the elemental of the earth… and the consensus of all the sages is. And from this point on, He did not create anything, but He brought forth being from being. And so in His commentary on the Torah: Tohu and Bohu… The Holy One created, He brought forth from nothing, a very fine element in which there is no substance, but it is a creative force, ready to receive form. The first matter, was called to the Greeks the elemental, and in the sacred language it is called Chaos, And the form and the shape worn by this material, in the Sha'q – Boho.

[17]   It is very easy to identify the hyolic material with the Kabbalistic light of the AS. It is a light that has no end, since it is not limited. It has no attributes, since attributes are limitations (it is this and not that). And here, the author of the book 'Leshem Shevo and Achlama' (see, for example, the Book of Interpretations, Drushei Igulim ve Yosher, Branch 2, Letter 7, Letter 9, and more), proves by virtue of such consideration and more the claim that in the light of infinity there were hidden hidden sephiras. The sephiras in Kabbalah are the various attributes (the ideas, in Platonic terminology). In the light of infinity, the attributes were in a completely hyolic state, meaning that they were not yet in the form of attributes at all, only their concepts were hidden in it, similar to what we saw here.

[18] On the relationship between these two distinctions, see more in my book 'Two Carts and a Hot Air Balloon' in the second chapter.

[19] As is known, intelligence is concerned with understanding a thing from a thing, that is, creation and not creation (which is from nothing). Wisdom is a 'power from nothing', that is, it deals with the Self and not with characteristics, or form. Wisdom does not derive from something outside itself, but is connected in some way to the crown sphere (which is equivalent to the hyolitic matter, and so on).

[20] See Shavuot 26:1 and parallels.

[21] We discussed this in several of our articles.Good measureSee, for example, the article on Parashat Netzavim 5765, the article on the second root 5768, and more.

[22] On this subject, see the instructive articles of David Haneshka (then a yeshiva student, and now an academic researcher), dated 1977-1978.

     The subject of the articles is the relationship between Peshat and Darsh, but see there the discussion on the ownership of a slave who is released, which deals with two contradictory passages in the Bible. Par' Behar instructs us to release the slave in the Jubilee, and Parashah Mishpatim instructs us that he is a servant forever, and the Sages make a midrashic harmonization – “forever – for the life of the Jubilee.” The people of the ‘Teudot’ will separate these two passages and attribute them to different sources, but here the Neshkah proposes a harmonization. This is an example that touches on the previous topic we brought up, the Torah of the Teutodot, no less than on the question of the relationship between Peshat and Darsh.

[23] One might get the impression from my words that scientific research is always characterized by rigorous methods, and to a very small extent by speculation, in contrast to traditional learning. It should be noted that the research literature in the Jewish and spiritual sciences is replete with quite a few worthless works, as well as those that contain a great deal of speculation and superficiality. In these works, one can find mainly the shortcomings of academic methods without the positive bonuses that exist in them. In my words here, I am only dealing with responsible and serious research that deserves the name.

[24] I once saw a manuscript of his words. As far as I know, they have not been published to this day, which is a shame.

[25] See this in great detail and in great detail in the article 'Good Measure' for the Sixth Root, 5768.

[26] Tarvitz, year 26, booklets 1-2, Tishrei-Adar 2, 5763, pp. 133-149.

[27] The above articles present the basic principles and extensions of the matter, and the practical aspects.

[28] Although it is not necessary to deny the claim that in the past there were rabbis who held to it. This is the advantage of the research approach that allows us (and even encourages us) not to be 'captives' of the approaches of the first and the last.

[29] See the famous words of Rabbi Soloveitchik in his book 'Ish HaHalakah', especially in chapter 5.

[30] On the distortion in this separation, see my article "Autonomy and Authority in Halacha Ruling", Meishram I, Yeruham 2002.

[31] A discussion from a different angle can be seen in my article, "The Essence of Theoretical 'Investigations'", Meishram 3, Yeruham 2004. Another example of the method of synthesis between halakhic concepts (already in the Sages), is found in my article, "Two Types of What is the Side: Conceptual Construction", Meishram 2, Yeruham 2003.

[32] And indeed, as is known, in certain instances, the Sephirah of Knowledge appears above the two lateral Sephirahs that compose it (Keter, above Hochma and Bina: 28b), and not below them as in the usual painting (Chabad).