Response to response – article 'What is a disease?'
Noon – 5770
In my article What is 'Halot' ('Tzohar' 2), I argued that the concept of 'Halot' characterizes a metaphysical halachic entity, like a Platonic idea, that is superimposed on actual entities in our world. My main argument was that it is an entity and not an adjective, and therefore the mere existence of contradictory hallots on a person, or any object, does not necessarily constitute a logical problem.
Rabbi Kehat in his response ('Tzohar' 4') argued against me that 'chalot' is, as he puts it: 'the stage of receiving the result due to the action.' Rabbi Kehat then claims that we have not found halachic chalots that are not legal, such as 'chalot etrog', 'chalot sukkah', and the like.
My argument, as stated, was that halachot is an entity and not a title. It is not clear to me what the alternative that Rabbi Kehat is proposing is. 'Halochot' is certainly not 'halachot halachot', otherwise it is not clear what we are applying in that act of halachot. According to Rabbi Kehat, one should say 'halachot din' and not 'halachot halachot'. However, if so, according to him, there is no concept of 'halachot' in halachah at all, but only the concept of 'din' (which is an adjective and not an entity, as I argued in my article above). Regarding this possibility, Puk Hezi says nothing. Is it really the case that the world of yeshiva and study does not talk about an entity called 'halachot halachic'?
Beyond that, what about the existence of contradictory halyut? Does Rabbi Kehat dispute this possibility? If not, then he does not specify how he would propose to explain it.
Rabbi Kehat's position suggests that the concept of chalot exists only at the beginning of the concrete entity having halakhic status. Does he think that a man's wife does not have chalot on the woman even a year after her marriage? Here too, Pook Chezi Mai Amma says nothing.
As for Rabbi Kehat's second claim, my articles do not refer to the existence of entities that are halakhic (and not legal) halachic, and therefore this point does not concern the main point of the discussion. However, since we have a halachic
Since our concern here is empirical, that is, a discussion of the manner in which the concept of 'chalot' is used as it is customary in the scholarly world, it is appropriate to first provide empirical reasoning in favor of my position. Rabbi Chaim, who is undoubtedly one of the founding fathers of the scholarly world we know today, uses the concept of 'chalot' and even the concept of 'chaftza' = entity, which is more severe, in relation to halakhic concepts that are completely non-legal. 'Chaftza of prayer' is a common concept in his mishna (see in his book on Maimonides, Hal. Tefilla p. 16, 56), or 'chaftza of a mitzvah' (Kap. p. 5, 57). Rabbi Zevin, in his book 'Ishishim ve Shishotos' (in the chapter dealing with Rabbi Chaim)[1] insists on this, and also insists on the connection between the concept of 'chaftza of the thing' and the concept of 'hashem of the thing', which is in fact the concept of 'chalot' as defined in my words.
Therefore, it seems that Rabbi Kehat can at most argue against me that the difference between legal and halakhic haluvs is that the former were handed down to us, while the latter are apparently not handed down to us.
If I may speculate, Rabbi Kehat's intention is to claim that halyuot characterize only halakhic entities that are handed down to us, i.e. legal entities. In other words, halyuot is indeed an entity and not a title, and certainly not the act of halah (and as noted above). It seems that he intends to claim that only legal halakhic entities are called 'halyuot' in scholarly jargon.
Here, as stated, there is no direct contradiction to what is said in my above-mentioned articles, since according to such a position, the 'halut' is still an entity (and not a title or action). Despite this, I would also like to disagree with this softened formulation. The issue of 'invitation to a milta' indicates the possibility of applying halachic halut, which is not legal (for example, 'halut beit kesa', in the terms of the Gemara in Berakhot 26). The same is true regarding the issue of 'choice', which examines the possibility of retroactively replacing different haluts on a certain object. The same is true regarding the condition that delays the existence of halut on an object. All of this was also said regarding halachic concepts that are not exactly legal (see, for example, 'Encyclopedia Talmudic', entry 'invitation' and entry 'choice').
I will demonstrate this specifically with regard to the 'Sukkah', which is one of the examples that Rabbi Kehat himself chose in his response. It is precisely with regard to it that it is very easy to show that it has an independent existence beyond the halakhic concept of 'sukkah'.[2] I will now present, in summary, two pieces of evidence for my statement:
1. The Rema Orch 30 577 ruled that one who sits in the Sukkah when it rains (when he is exempt from sitting in the Sukkah, since 'Ka'in Taduro' is not observed) is called a layman. And the famous question raised by the author of 'Ong Yom Tov' (Besi 49) is why he is only called a layman? Ostensibly, he is a criminal, since he has violated the prohibition of using, or enjoying, the Sukkah (see Gemara Bitza 31: "What is a holiday to the Lord, and a Sukkah to the Lord").
And the Grau explains, in Kovetz Shiurim there (and see also Kahi Sukkah 37), that when it is raining, this is not a sukkah at all. Although the physical structure exists, this structure is not a sukkah. The exemption from sitting in the sukkah is not only an exemption for men, but the hafza itself has changed from a halakhic perspective. If so, the Grau argues, one who sits in the sukkah when it is raining is not a transgressor, since he is not sitting in the sukkah, but in a "pergola" (=a shed).
The halakhic 'sukkah' is not a purely physical structure, even if it is built according to halakhic rules in all its details and grammar. The precise structure is a condition for applying the name sukkah to the structure. The structure without halakhic rules is not a halakhic sukkah, but at most a shed. It seems to me that this example of Rabbi Kehat, itself teaches that there is halakhic rules even in the non-legal areas of halakhic law.
Incidentally, according to many commentators, it is possible to make a condition on the existence of sukkah trees (see the Gemara's Sugith in Bitza, and in Rif, Rashi, and other commentators), and then the sukkah's halachah, or the sanctity of the sukkah trees, will not apply to it. We see that, as with any legal halachah, it is possible to make a condition on the existence of halachah, even if it is halachic and not legal.
2. In the Gemara's issue of Nedim 29, Abaye believes that the sanctity of the body is extinguished by chance (and there is no similar halakha). The interpretation of this is that the sanctity of any object cannot be forfeited without an act of the hands. In Abaye's opinion, a condition is also ineffective in forfeiting sanctity, since the condition is not an act but a word. In the aforementioned issue of Bitza, the Rashba challenges Abaye with the words of the Gemara, where it states that it is not possible to stipulate a condition on the trees of the sukkah. The Rashba proves from this that the sanctity of the body does not expire by chance, meaning that it cannot be forfeited by word of mouth (a condition, in this case), and not according to Abaye's opinion.[3]
The question I would like to raise here is how the Rashba himself deals with the fact that the sanctity of the sukkah does indeed expire for no reason, and this immediately upon the end of the Sukkot holiday. How could anyone deny that after the end of the holiday there is no sanctity (Mahat) on the sukkah, a strict haberdashery that stands in my court? Isn't this proof that the sanctity of the body does indeed expire for no reason? Time simply passed, and the sanctity of the sukkah expired for no reason. This is literally the expiration of sanctity for no reason, and there is not even any stipulation on the part of the person.
It seems to me that we see again that a sukkah is not a physical structure, even if it is built kosher according to all the details of the halakhah. After the holiday of Sukkot, this structure is nothing more than a shed. A 'sukkah' is a shed with the 'sukkah' cloth on it. After the holiday, the 'sukkah' cloth expired from the physical structure, and now there is no sukkah at all. Because of this, there is no expiration of sanctity for no reason. The expiration of sanctity is when an object remains in our sight, while the sanctity has expired from it. In this case, the object (or perhaps more correctly: the object) itself has disappeared. The sanctity is eternal, and the object is what expired for no reason, therefore the Rashba does not have any difficulty with the mere expiration of sanctity for no reason at the end of the holiday.
From these two lines of evidence, it is clear that there is a concept of halal even in non-legal halachic concepts. Even the taniya pertains to them, as does the law of 'invitation' (as mentioned above).
To sum up my words, I say this:
In my previous article, I argued that 'chalot' is an entity and not an adjective. So far, I see no alternative to this (not even in Rabbi Kehat's response article). Here I added more, and this is also contrary to what was said in Rabbi Kehat's response, that all halakhic concepts, even in the non-legal areas of halakhic law, are overlaid with an idea, or, if you will: 'chalot'. The concrete concept is the realization of the halakhic idea, and indeed, it is usually the person who applies it to the object.
Even if a halakhic concept is found whose legality is not in the hands of man (such as the firstborn of an animal, prohibitions on eating milk or pork, and more), it is still clear to say that there is a halakhic legality of this law, but the ability to apply it is not in our hands. Even in these cases, the meaning of the halakhic concept goes beyond the concrete-real concept, in the sense of 'an arya is a darbya aliha'.
Rabbi Soloveitchik in 'Ish HaHalaka' writes that Halacha is a system of a priori principles through which we perceive reality. My argument here was that this system is not a system of principles of mere observation and analysis, but a system of entities that superimposes itself on reality. Those who are equipped with halakhic glasses can discern the halakhic 'shadow' that overlaps concrete reality, the one that is visible even to the naked eye.
[1] And see also Rabbi Zvi Schechter in his book 'Nefesh Rav' on Rabbi Soloveitchik, a similar approach.
[2] Regarding the invitation to the Sukkah, see, for example, Machana Hala Tzedakah 12, and Mab's 138 69 and Sha'at 13, 69a, and more.
[3] The Rashba's excuse does not apply here, nor does his very problematic position, according to which the prohibition of enjoying the trees of the Sukkah is considered "holy," a position that most commentators and jurists disagree with.