Doubts about Halacha and the requirement for a kosher certificate for a vegetable store
Hello Rabbi Michael,
I recently came across a number of laws in Yalkut Yosef that seemingly indicate that there is no obligation to buy vegetables and fruits in a place that has a kosher certificate:
- "…and the Teru"m at this time are only from the rabbis, and even with one doubt they have reached the point of being kollah, according to the majority of the latter. [Yabia says, Ch. Chaiv. 34, 40, page 17]." (From Yalkut Yosef, Hilchot Teru"m and Shmita, sign not, section 17).
- "…and although there is some doubt whether contributions and tithes were set aside in the wholesale market, since sometimes there are some merchants who smuggle their goods away so that contributions and tithes are not levied on them. In any case, since the majority is correct in all respects, and in addition there are fruits that grow on the lands of Gentiles, and are marketed by Gentiles, which are exempt from contributions and tithes, it is permissible to buy fruits from the market, and there is no need to tithe them, and whoever is strict on himself and sets aside contributions and tithes from them, a blessing will come upon him. [Yabiyeh Umar, Part 9, Section 30, Page 11]" (From Yalkut Yosef, Laws of Contributions and Shabbat, Section 20).
- "Grapes sold in the market, [or other fruits with a foreskin] that are sold in the market, and there is a concern that they may be foreskin fruits, are, in principle, permissible to buy and eat without verifying their kosherness according to a certificate from a qualified rabbi. Since most of the fruits in the market are not foreskin, then all are foreskin from foreskin. And the stricter one who only buys grapes brought under the supervision of the local rabbinate will bear a blessing from God. [Even where there is doubt, it is part of Hassidic law to foreskin the doubt]. [Yalkut Yosef Hilchot Orla, Section 10, Chapter 10 – The Law of the Foreskin Question] - It seems that this law applies similarly to Neta Rabi.
Is the conclusion I drew from these laws correct (that one does not need to be careful to buy from a place with kosher)?
Additionally, where it is possible to clarify the doubt regarding the kosherness of vegetables (say, by asking the seller whether the vegetables are kosher or not), is there an obligation to clarify? I saw a source on the Internet that says: When it is possible to clarify the doubt, the Rabbis are stricter and the Rambam is lenient (Shulchan A.H. 26-11 and Mishnah Berurah, s.m.). But the question is how is the halachic ruling today, according to the Rambam or the Rabbis?
Regarding clarification of doubts, a similar question can be asked when one is staying with a secular person who serves fruit and vegetable refreshments. Should one inquire with him where he bought the fruit?
It is accepted in the law that when it is possible to clarify the doubt, one should not be lenient with the rabbinic doubt. And it is like the law of something that has a permit (Beitza 4:1), which was also made stricter with the rabbinic doubt, since one can eat it with permission.
The Shulchan Arba's statement that you cited is not entirely unambiguous. There it is about when he has another option to do something without a prohibition. But in our discussion, it is when there is no other option, but in this option itself, he can ask and clarify the doubt. I do not think there is a disagreement between the Rambam and the Rav.
In my opinion, one should make sure to buy from a place with a kosher certificate. It is true that the 2-3 sources you cited deal in a place where there is a majority (and not just doubt), and there is perhaps more room for leniency, and even in this case, many poskim have been stricter when there is a significant minority and it is possible to clarify.
And source 1 that you cited does state that they are sufficient to vote, but when it is possible to inquire or do so with permission, I do not see in your quote that it instructs permission.
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Asks:
I found a source in the book Ein Yitzhak by Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, which deals with the rules of halachic sufficiency, which says:
"The rabbis doubt, they are not able to say, even here and there, to clarify. However, if the clarification is something that can easily be clarified by asking a question and the like, it is right to clarify the matter, because if it is before us, we must ask and clarify." (See Photo 1 andPhoto 2 There he elaborates on the evidence.
That is, I understand from this that, in principle, one can go to the polls, even where one can clarify one's doubts (and only as proper and correct conduct, one should clarify one's doubts where one can do so easily, but not as an absolute obligation).
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Rabbi:
Hello Rabbi. I quickly went through his words and in my opinion they are unfounded. I did not see a shred of evidence there for his claim that there is no need to clarify the question. This is when there is a majority or presumption (these are not situations of doubt but a certain permit), and even on this the poskim disagreed on whether it is possible to rely on it without clarification when it is possible to clarify. But how does he get that in the case of a regular rabbinic doubt there is no need to clarify? As I wrote to you, the law of a thing that has permission is evidence against it, because it says there that when it is possible to eat with permission, they did not allow it to be eaten with permission. For example, when you have a limited doubt on Shabbat or Yot, it is a rabbinic doubt. But since it is possible to eat them with complete permission on Sunday, they did not allow them to be eaten on Shabbat or Yot itself, even though it is a rabbinic doubt. By the way, the law of a thing that has permission was also said about cancellation by majority, and this means that even when there is cancellation by majority, if it is possible to avoid it, then there is no permission to eat. In short, my argument did not move from its place.
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Asks:
Today I tried to delve deeper into Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef's answer and I really didn't find strong evidence for his statement. As far as I understand, he makes an exception to the rule that a doubt in Torah that can be clarified does not need to be clarified, and since according to Maran Shulchan Aruch, doubt in Torah is prohibited only from rabbis, then in fact a doubt in Torah is equivalent to doubting one of the rabbis, and then he says that in effect the new rule that is accepted is that a rabbinical doubt that can be clarified does not need to be clarified. But he did not address the issue that the clarification that can be made in the first rule is a partial clarification (of one of the doubts) and not a full clarification.
What seems puzzling to me is that a rabbi of his caliber who dealt in depth with this issue and presented evidence for both sides ultimately ruled as he did. Is it possible that there is something we are missing here?
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Rabbi:
What exactly is his level?
His assumption that according to Maimonides, who believes that the rule of doubt from the Torah to the rabbinic text is from the rabbis, therefore doubt from the rabbinic text is doubt from the rabbis, is also completely unacceptable. This was expanded upon by Rabbi Shekap in Shaari Yashar and many others. See for example here:
http://www.yeshiva.org.il/wiki/index.php?title=%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%A7_%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%90
Especially in a discussion about a doubt, a supposition that is reversed does not agree with its premise.
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