Drinking coffee in a non-kosher place

Why does the Honorable Rabbi believe that there is no problem in using unbaptized utensils that belong to a Jew?
(Apparently, even according to the Rishonim, Desbury’s opinion, it is permissible to use them even before immersion, the Aharonim wrote [E. Bior Halacha 3:37] that it is forbidden.)

Because regarding a restaurant, the poskim wrote to leniently for my reasons: the dishes were not bought for eating but for making a profit (a questionable consideration in my opinion). The obligation to immerse is on the owner of the dishes, and therefore the prohibition of eating, which is a fine, was imposed on the one who is obligated to immerse. For the second reason, there are poskim who leniently even for a guest in a private home.

The first consideration is also renewed in my opinion (which is why I asked).
The second consideration is even more renewed (although I remember that the rabbi, perhaps the rabbi remembers from a more precise source), and not because of the problem that according to the Rambam (this is how some poskim understood it) that immersion is a kind of permission to use it, but also according to other poskim, the simplicity is that it is a kind of rabbinic prohibition and not a fine.
Another consideration that I saw allow (in the name of the rabbinic scholar Auerbach) is that the obligation of immersion is a kind of obligation of the tzitzit mitzvot according to Mordechai, and therefore if he is forced, there is no obstacle for him to drink from the vessel without being immersed (and the rabbinic scholar defines it as such with regard to all rabbinic mitzvot). But apart from what the definition of forced here is, this very argument is also renewed.
And since Daliva says that the obligation of baptism is from the Torah, isn't it appropriate to be strict about this?
(As a new immigrant, this was a new stricture that didn't belong abroad because it's easier to drink in a cafe owned by a gentile)

By the way, I just now noticed that the person who asked the original question is also called Yishai, so sorry for the confusion 🙂

The rabbi wrote: “Regarding a cup of coffee, it is worth checking whether it was washed together with meat dishes.”
Does washing together with meat dishes spoil the dish?
After all, even if you wash the dishes with warm water, it does not reach a temperature that transfers flavors, and in addition, you also use dish soap that spoils the taste of the leftover food?

It does indeed depend on the details of the washing and the material from which the dishes are made. I wrote in general.

Yishai II, I don't know what the difference is between a rabbinic prohibition and a fine. If you mean the issue I brought up (whether it is imposed on the owner or not) then I wrote my opinion. The wording of the tzitzit kotnetach is probably permissible, but regarding the tzitzit it is simply incorrect, and I agree.

I was misunderstood because I tried to be brief.
There is a debate among the Rishonim about whether unbaptized vessels are permitted for use. Besides, there is a debate among those who forbid use (this seems to be the opinion of the Maimonides) about whether immersion is permissible or a mitzvah (and it was decided regarding the issue of the amendment of Mana, Shaja 6:6).
The Aharonim (I have already mentioned it for the explanation of the Halacha) wrote that even in the opinion of the Rishonim who permitted it, the vessel is still prohibited for use by the rabbis.
And in this too, one can investigate as above, but there is no issue in all this for our purposes, since according to this it does not matter who the vessels belong to.
The Rabbi gave a new interpretation of this prohibition, and it is that it is only a kind of fine and therefore it applies only to the one to whom the vessels belong, and I commented on this as it contradicts the simplicity of the Achromit's understanding, and how can one assume that the Sages imposed a fine and not assume that it is a kind of equivalent in the Torah?
Apart from this, I brought another reason to permit in the name of the Gershon, and it is that the prohibitions of the rabbis are similar to the law of a tzitzit torn on Shabbat, according to Mordechai (not that tzitzit is permissible for four corners, but rather that the prohibition stems from the mitzvah) and therefore if he cannot immerse (such as his own) he can use it, and I also commented on this as above.
By the way, does the Honorable Rabbi agree with my understanding of Mordechai's words?

*With (in the penultimate line)

For a review and sources, see for example here:
https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/7172

Revising a manna does not necessarily mean that there is a prohibition on others. Revising a manna for one person is also a prohibition. For example, setting aside a teruma is a prohibition even for those systems in which priests are permitted to dip (see Batavan Da'Orayta, which investigated whether the prohibition on dipping is due to the teruma involved in it, and brought a disagreement between Rashi, Toss, and other rishonim).

If I understood correctly, what you wrote that the prohibition stems from the mitzvah is nothing more than a convoluted formulation of an active cancellation. Do you mean to claim that eating in unimmersed vessels has an active cancellation of dipping? This is parallel to the concept of a fine (although not identical to it, of course). If this is a rabbinical prohibition (and this is what is generally accepted in my opinion), then it is clearly not an active cancellation, and it is very likely that it is a fine.
And in the Mordechai permission, pepper has a good thing, and from the cup, from where it actually seems that it is a fine and not a cancellation of a deed.

I don't want to embarrass the rabbi, I'll just clarify my words and get back to the actual question.
Regarding the mena fix, I meant that the Shacha discusses whether there is a way to dip vessels on Shabbat because of the mena fix, and I said that we will decide whether it is permissible or a mitzvah (and the latter have already written so, and of course there is no need for it).
Regarding the Gershon claim, this is roughly what I meant (), but the main thing I wanted to do was to clarify whether the rabbinic school holds yes to the halakhah despite the words of most of the latter, which do not seem to be the case from their words, and in my opinion this is also the simplicity of the words of the Rishonim (except for the Maimonides).
(I will only quote the language of the Param: “The decree of the scripture that it is permissible to use a vessel without immersion.”)
Does the Rabbi also believe so in all the rabbinic prohibitions that came about on positive commandments?
I did not understand what Mordechai said, because there it is really about the cancellation of a positive commandment from the Torah of the tzitzit commandment, and in the text Mordechai discusses what exactly is the scope of the action and what is the penalty? (By the way, the Shachag in Mark 32 claims to contradict the opinion of the Rabbi on this matter, and so on.)
Thank you very much for the detailed response.

I understood the Shaga (I know him), and what I wrote about him still stands.
I think so also in terms of halakha, if only because it is the reasonable behavior nowadays.
I did not check. Every prohibition must be examined on its merits. There is also a difference between a no that comes from the rule of an act and a regular act, of course.
Mordechai writes that it is permissible to wear a torn tzitzit on Shabbat when there is no way to fulfill the mitzvah. If this is just a fence to nullify an act, I do not see a reason to permit it in such a situation. Therefore, it is actually more reasonable to see in the opinion of those who forbid a fine, against which Mordechai claims that in such a situation there was no fine. But it is not before me now.

Oh, I thought you were contradicting me (regarding Shacha).
Regarding Mordechai, in the issue there it doesn't seem so in my opinion, but I want to remain in general a "question as a matter" (Ezra 17:2 in Avot 5:7) and therefore I won't elaborate (-;
I have a bit of a hard time with introducing reasonableness considerations (external, not internal to the issue) into halacha, but in that I've really gone off topic.
Thank you