Lex specialis in deciding between the intuitions of freedom and causality

Follow-up question received by email:

I did not understand the response. Does the rabbi mean that intuition is not a mental phenomenon at all, or that after the mental phenomenon comes objective cognition?
If he means that after the mental phenomenon comes objective cognition, why is cognition supposed to discuss only the two mental phenomena (causality and freedom) and not additional intellectual considerations (such as the strangeness of the possibility that within the vast universe there is a certain organ in a certain species of mammal that is excluded from the laws that govern the entire universe. etc.).

My response:
Intuition is a mental state that expresses cognition (does not create cognition. And be very careful). Sight is also a mental state, but the assumption is that this mental state is a representation of a fact that is outside of me. In my eyes, intuition is a type of perception (in the eyes of the mind, of course, not in the ordinary senses).

Follow-up question received by email:
Now I have another question. After all, the libertarian also assumes that the intuition of causality is true for the entire universe except for the brain. If so, the conflict is not between the intuitions of freedom and causality, but between the intuition of freedom and the explanation that it is unreasonable to exclude the brain from the rest of the objects in the universe. Both of these considerations are private, and relate only to the subject himself, so the doctrine of decision, which is intended to decide between a general consideration and a specific consideration, does not apply here.

My response:
According to this, there is no consideration of lex specialis at all. You can always focus the dilemma on the particular issue. But that is not true. The question is what your intuition really is. The two conflicting intuitions are general causality and the freedom that a person has. I do not have an intuition not to exclude something or I do exclude it. The question of whether to exclude or not is a derivative of the dilemma.

I was asked again:
Thanks for the response on the site. But I didn't understand why the conflict must be between two intuitions. Why can't there be a conflict between intuition and a rational consideration (such as that it is not reasonable to exclude the brain). After all, the considerations in the discussion are those that relate to the object in question, and if the discussion is about the brain only, then the considerations in the discussion are those that relate to the brain.

My response:
Because the fact that it is not reasonable to exclude the brain is not a rational consideration. It is not true that it is not reasonable to exclude it. Yes, it is reasonable to exclude it if there is an intuition of free will. This consideration comes, if at all, at a stage after the presentation of the dilemma. As I wrote to you, in your opinion there is no lex specialis in the world.