The naturalistic fallacy in the Torah?

Thanks
D”A I think that the image of God is often assumed to have a certain value and that is how this can be resolved. For example, linking the value of freedom or the sanctity of life or man as the center of creation.
But I didn't understand exactly why. After all, the image of God is usually used as having factual characteristics such as intelligence or the ability to choose or control the environment.
So where does this point turn this fact into a value dimension? And above all?

I explained it. What's not clear? I didn't understand what was added in your second question. When I say that it is forbidden to kill so-and-so because he is a human being. Is that also a naturalistic fallacy?

” Clearly there is an additional assumption here in the background that his commands must be fulfilled.”
Doesn't the naturalistic fallacy reject making assumptions of this kind? Just as it does not jump to binding conclusions by virtue of any assumption.

The naturalistic fallacy does not reject assumptions but rather validates arguments.

Thank you, I did understand what you explained earlier, but I asked something a little different:
That there is a perception that is widely heard today that all human rights come as a result of being created in the image of God. From values and meaning such as the sanctity of life to equality of rights and personal freedoms.
And I saw that this verse is used as evidence for this.
That the image of God is the one that really serves as a normative source of values, and not a purely factual one.
But I did not understand why this is so.
In your words above, you do not follow this approach, but rather that there are sentences that connect us prior to this text, and perhaps this is part of your general approach in studying the Bible.

Maybe you understood me but I didn't understand you. What's not clear here?

How do the values of democracy stem from the fact that man was created in the image of God, as B'Tselem says?
For example, to the animal kingdom.

How do you explain the moral obligation towards humans and not towards rocks?

Because I suppose that humans are fundamentally different from rocks. But I don't think that requires creation in the image of God.
But what is your explanation?

I don't understand. How are they different?

consciousness

And monkeys or ducks?

One could say that man is much more developed, for example that he also thinks and again another essential feature is found.
But I agree that this is indeed more of a problem and indeed there is already talk of morality towards animals like the sword, but it is still intuitive. I remember that this is why the Rabbi opposed vegetarianism.
But what is the explanation for the rabbi, other than saying it like that.

What man has beyond these is the image of God within him (the will and intellect, not just consciousness). This is what distinguishes him and gives him his moral status.

The Rabbi did not explain why the logic of the naturalistic fallacy that rejects obligation from any fact would be limited to the conclusion only and would not apply to the premises as well.
A temperate day to all!

The naturalistic fallacy says that there are conclusions that cannot be drawn from facts. But bridge principles are claims, and claims are not related to fallacies. A fallacy deals with the logical derivation of a claim from other claims. A claim is measured in terms of truth or falsity.
Therefore, a naturalistic fallacy is not concerned with premises or conclusions. These are all claims. It is concerned only with the derivation of a conclusion from premises (an argument).

Okay. This is the original case about which the fallacy was stated. Let's say that the logic of the fallacy also exists in the assumption. Does the rabbi hold that the logic of the naturalistic fallacy does not exist in the assumption, or that assumptions are immune to any fallacy? (Perhaps this has to do with my misunderstanding of the rabbi's method regarding the emptiness of the analytical)

Thank you, you used the definition of the image of God of the Rishonim regarding the intellect, and its book and the vision as a demon regarding the will.
But, I do not fully understand then, what is the innovation of the Torah. That we have intellect and will? We also knew this before, apparently… after all, the image of God is described as something much more significant than this fact.

What is the innovation of the Torah, since the Rishonim already say this?
The Rishonim explain that the innovation of the Torah is that there is a moral obligation towards humans since they have within them the image of God (consciousness, will and intellect). That's all. I don't understand this whole discussion.

a
The fallacy says that a norm can be inferred from facts. It does not say that there is no connection between norms and facts. The claim of the bridge principle indicates a connection between a norm and facts, but does not deduce a norm from facts.

I tried Google and couldn't find an explanation for the bridge principle, so I'm going to go with the Rabbi.
A. What is the connection that the bridge points to based on?
B. I'm not familiar with the world of concepts, so I'll ask if there is a connection between a norm and a fact, then why isn't it derived?
Thank you

Thanks,
Rabbi, speaking of this discussion, why do we assume that the normative being that enforces moral values must be a transcendental and not an immanent entity? Because it is simply that intuitive to you, or something more than that?
a,
Excuse me for interrupting, but as far as I understand, the reason is along the lines of the following:
Let's take an argument like this: It is forbidden to hit because it causes pain.
1. So first of all, there is a fallacy here, because norms cannot be derived from facts (it is forbidden to hit because it causes pain).
Therefore, this argument that deals with the natural world from a value perspective (a world of factual claims) is called a descriptive argument.
2. But it is possible to create a bridging sentence along the lines of “It is forbidden to cause pain”. Then it is forbidden to hit anyway because it causes pain, and it is forbidden to cause pain! If so, by this assumption, this is already a valid sentence.
And ethical claims of this type are not ordinary claims of fact, but claims that are supposed to arouse a certain value attitude in us. And it is called a prescriptive claim. Here usually if you still ask why it is forbidden to cause so much pain, most likely they will tell you “like this”. Because it is understandable and if you don't understand then no.. like why do you think the table in front of you is black or something..

Second, if we assume such claims, the question arises whether it is possible to attach truth or false values to them. If, for example, you think that an argument about the claim that ”it is forbidden to cause pain” is in the same position as subjective claims such as an argument about whether ”vanilla ice cream tastes better than strawberries”. Then you may assume that everything is subjective. But since many people assume that it is really forbidden to cause pain, which is true.
So you think that the first claim can be attributed true or false values, and therefore, you advocate moral realism. Then the question arises that there needs to be a source that defines good and evil (to attach true or false values to it).
And that “Is” be it whatever it may be or God. That validates the moral norms.

Need to correct: I meant in the last line *he*

“If you still ask why it is forbidden to cause pain, the Rabbi will probably tell you “like this.””
I really look forward to reading how the Rabbi formulates it and whether it is a parallel formulation to ”like this”…
I liked how you emphasized how people first make assumptions and then substantiate them. After all, there is no reason to assume that morality is not subjective. “But since many people assume that it is really forbidden to cause pain, and it is true.” Arbitrariness at its best. And then you found an explanation for arbitrariness by our God. The correct process in my opinion is that you know that God guided us and therefore morality is realistic. Moral realism is a consequence of God. In your speech, you invent a consequence and then also find a father for it.
Speaking of a moral that is valid from God, then you mean the 33 commandments. I am not aware of anything else that God commanded. And if you have come to represent the Mera Da'tra, know that he distinguishes between the 33 and the moral. So what is the validity of the moral? Was the giving of the Torah separate from what you call moral? Or is intuition a divine message that is valid?
I would appreciate an answer from the esteemed rabbi. (K would also be fine)

a
a. The bridge principle is my term (so there's no point in searching on Google). Its truth is based on intuition (for those who have one).
b. It can be argued that it is forbidden to kill a creature that has the image of God. This is an argument that if your intuition says it, then you think it is true. A valid argument is an argument that a conclusion necessarily follows from its premises. The assumption that a person is in the image of God is not enough to validate a conclusion that it is forbidden to murder him.

K,
I don't know what the difference is between an immanent and transcendental entity. It has to be something that is not me. That's all.
The distinction between descriptiveness and prescriptivity is an analytical-linguistic reflection of the naturalistic fallacy.
In my opinion, yes. The claim “it is forbidden to murder” is true, as I am a moral realist. Let's just not start an argument about it now.

a
In your last post, see the fourth notebook on the difference between pragmatism and argument from intuition.

The discussion in this thread takes us into some complex philosophical realms and there is no room to go into them here. I have explained them well in several places. As far as I am concerned, we have reached the end.

Rabbi,
Okay, interesting, because I remember that you hold that there is some kind of such a distinction. It is clear to you that if we take a person from the market, we will not treat him as obligated to obey his commands. Maybe you mean that he cannot be a person. But also towards an alien from Mars, when we see him we will probably say that we do not really have an obligation to obey him either…
In addition, I wanted to ask what you think about Moshe Rat's approach, which he says that the will of people influences your will. And’ simply is the strongest and most basic general will in creation, and therefore its influence is the strongest. Or something like that, I simply did not really read his words on the subject from a book.

a,
I will start from the end, the Rabbi's approach on this matter is quite well known to me, and you forgot to mention column 15…
If I really think that murder is forbidden, then why assume that this is an incorrect insight? The desire to present the whole world as if it only stems from the side of “cold” thinking It doesn't seem at all from my acquaintance with B”A and from what I read on the internet and in history.. Not that everyone was great righteous… but even the wicked delegitimized the victims… i.e. even the principle of induction, which you could say evolution has instilled in me until now, but not tomorrow morning.

Anyway, because I see that you like this way of evidence so much, then I must say that the fourth notebook is exactly for your approach 🙂 And in particular you will like the evidence from epistemology there there.

Guys, you've driven me crazy. I've explained everything, and I don't see anything else here. If you want to discuss Moshe Rat's argument or any other argument, you can open a separate thread for it.

a, this is not related to column 15 in any way that I can see.

With regards 🙂

Tor 15 is well-connected for him, because he thinks that I don't know that you divide between Torah and morality, so I told him that it's strange that he didn't refer to the source of the things in Torah 15 in Akitza.
Therefore, regarding the answer to his question, the status of Mount Sinai is also a fact and therefore it will not help establish the acceptance of religious laws, but the idea that one accepts the commandment of the ’ (as a form of lishma) “prior” to the implications due to the status of Mount Sinai.
Therefore, the fact that he will change his ways in working for lishma given the status of Mount Sinai means that he is probably a secret believer already now.
But if he does not intend to work for lishma, but for other reasons, then it is possible that even without this, the status of Mount Sinai will indeed cause him to keep the commandments. Let's assume that this is the good thing, etc.

Humans do not have rights. Rights are a social concept invented by humans.
Over the years, humans have come to understand that rulers who claim to have something that others do not have are simply charlatans and do not deserve any special rights.
So as part of the war on lies, most humans (and unlike charlatans) have understood that there is no a priori reason to give more rights to one person than to another. Even if he is up there in power.

Rights are a social decision as part of the rules of the social game. It is not something ontological.

And we can learn this from the verse. For in the image of God He created man and that image is found in every person, and therefore it cannot be said that one has something that another does not. This is from an ontological perspective.

From a utilitarian perspective, it is clear that it is said that a plane full of senior doctors and scientists that crashes is a much greater disaster for humanity than a plane full of immigrants from Africa. But we must note that this stems from utilitarian considerations. Not that a great scientist really has something fundamentally different from that migrant worker.