Halacha and Morality – Double Obligation

Rabbi Michi Shalom
I would like to ask about the analysis in the third book of the trilogy, part two, chapter 5, regarding contradictions between Halacha and morality.
If I understand your approach correctly, morality is a universal normative category that obligates every person as a person. Furthermore, since the obligation in the moral command can only be explained on the basis of a divine command, it can actually be considered as part of the revelation of God’s will. Halacha is the particular normative requirement of the Jews built as a second floor above the universal obligation.
In your analysis in the above chapter, you reject the approaches that identify morality and halakha and advocate normative duality, where a Jew who is obligated to halakha is also obligated to universal morality. According to your analysis, when a fundamental (and not circumstantial) contradiction occurs between the systems, halakha prevails because it is clear that God, who is the source of both systems, intended to instruct us that religious value prevails over moral value (in this context, you bring up the “offense for its own sake” mechanism as an exceptional possibility to act in accordance with morality against halakha).
I would like to challenge the conclusion that in a fundamental conflict between Halacha and morality, Halacha prevails and propose an alternative approach. I would appreciate your consideration.

1. If Halacha is a particular system of norms that is above a universal system, it is not clear how it can exempt us from the universal obligation (in previous chapters, you gave examples of parallel systems of laws that bind us simultaneously. In all of these examples, the particular systems cannot resolve obligations to a broader system and in the event of a conflict, they are rejected)?
2. From my understanding of the way the claims were conceptualized, it is not possible to find a binding source within the halakhic system for dealing with a conflict with a foreign system that is also binding in a sweeping manner and has a divine origin. If this is an opinion, why not hold to the opposite opinion, according to which the moral state of man after the giving of the Torah cannot be lower than before it.
3. Perhaps a model can be proposed according to which morality, being an expression of God’s will, is binding in a sweeping manner and a contradiction between it and other expressions of God’s will is not possible. When we identify a fundamental contradiction, an interpretive move is required – a change in the circumstances of the halakhic situation or of the moral judgment – which turns the fundamental contradiction into a circumstantial contradiction. In a similar way to what was done in the Meiri method regarding the status of the Gentile (and perhaps even in the Sages regarding a rebellious son and a teacher?), it could also be argued regarding the status of women, LGBT people, bastards, etc. (women are not the same women and moral norms have also changed since the giving of the Torah). In this way, when God, for example, commanded a priest to divorce his raped wife, the religious value was amoral. With the change in the attitude towards rape of women, to the status of women in general, to the institution of marriage, to the perception of partnership, etc., the realization of the religious value became amoral. Adopting such a model would require significant halachic changes, but I think you have demonstrated throughout the book that there are appropriate tools for this.
4. In the above proposal, I do not take a position that identifies Halacha with morality. These are still two different categories, and religious values ​​are different from moral values. But we are not obligated to implement religious values ​​that are immoral.
5. It is possible to offer an explanation that in the case of conflict, God’s work is the suspension of moral judgment – the binding model. I did not see in the book that you are inclined to this type of explanation.

thanks