On monism and pluralism
Rabbi Michi Shalom
I will begin by saying thank you for the site and the trilogy. I have a number of issues that arose from reading the third book that I would be happy to expand on depending on your time and requests. For convenience, I will divide them into several questions and send them separately.
In the third part of the discussion on the issues of “these and those” you distinguish between a pluralist and a monist position. Later in the chapter you note that there are monists and extreme pluralisms, and in between there are intermediate positions. However, in the analysis, the reference to pluralism is actually only in its extreme version (there is no truth) when all other positions, including the “harmonist” one, are classified as a type of monism. You make it difficult for the pluralist interpretation of the “issue of the these and those” and show that it reaches an internal contradiction (which characterizes extreme pluralism and postmodernism in general). Your claim is that even the positions of the Sages and the sages of the generations from which voices that appear to be pluralism emerge are in fact “tolerant monism.”
The question is, what is the philosophical consideration for drawing the map of positions in this particular way? Once we are willing to accept, as you point out in the book, that a halakhic problem has more than one correct solution and that sometimes these solutions contradict each other, we have already departed from the realm of monism to a type of pluralistic approach. It is possible to draw a reverse mapping of positions: the position that advocates that there is only one halakhic truth is a monistic position, while all other positions can be classified as soft or moderate pluralism to varying degrees, which they all have in common – recognition of the possibility of multiple truths, from which one can choose based on discretion and in accordance with halakhic tools. This does not mean that all possibilities in the world have a truth value, or that positions cannot be classified as erroneous (monism, for example…). For the sake of argument, this is more consistent with some of the voices that arise from tradition, while their interpretation as tolerant monism is, in my understanding, narrow. In the same way, there is no logical contradiction in the pluralist interpretation of the issue of “these and those.”
thanks
Every theoretical discussion focuses on simplified models. It is usually impossible to discuss reality itself because it is very complex. Therefore, there is a variety of ways to discuss extreme cases and learn from them the plot lines. We see that extreme pluralism is inconsistent and does not correspond to the sources. From this it is clear that you must be a monist in this sense that there is truth and there is falsehood. There can still be cases of several correct answers, but in principle this is no longer substantial pluralism. Even people who advocate an intermediate model are usually unaware and speak in the language of extreme pluralism, and therefore it is important to discuss it. From now on, when I am accused of not being a pluralist, I can answer that you are not either… the whole question is one of dosages.
The important point here is that the debate between monism and pluralism is precisely around the pluralist pole. A substantive pluralist believes this not because he happened to be accepted in some problems that have several answers, but because of a fundamental perception that there is no single truth. In contrast, the monist believes that there may be one truth, even if not always and in all questions. This debate has no intermediate positions. Anyone who is not an extreme pluralist is a monist in principle.
Thanks for the answer.
I still don't understand why the discussion focuses on the pluralist pole and why there is a push to define a moderate pluralist position as a shade of monism. This position does recognize that there is truth and falsehood but also opposes the possibility of a monistic explanation of truth. The moderate pluralist also believes this because he sees that monism cannot provide a solution to the complexity of normative problems and that there are voices in the tradition that are not consistent with a monistic approach. Again, since we are talking about doses, it is not clear to me that the determination to draw the line precisely on the question of whether there is or is not truth and not on the question of whether truth appears as plurality or unity.
In addition, since the sages did not conceptualize their positions in terms of monism and pluralisms - then this is an interpretive debate. What is most important to me about your analysis (and that of Avi Sagi and other scholars) is that it points to the voice in the tradition that opposes essential monism and accepts that there is more than one true solution to normative problems. An attempt to bring this voice under the wing of monism obscures, in my understanding, a real disagreement that exists in the sources and empties them of an essential part of their content.
By the way, there are also people who will agree to an intermediate model and unconsciously speak in the language of extreme monism. This is also important to address, and when they claim that I am not a monist (as religion/law/correct view requires), I can claim that they are not either.
You can define the two poles differently and then of course the results of the analysis will be different. That's semantics. I was dealing with what I called pluralism.
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