Dealing with a skeptic
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask if there is a good argument to make against someone who is skeptical? Other than the claim that his method also has no priority over any other approach because it cuts off its own branch as well.
Moreover, it can be shown from a theological perspective that to the extent that the skeptic asks for proof, this shows to some extent that he assumes on a theoretical level that an explanation can be provided, and if so, does this show that he assumes a regression break to the chain of explanations that will emerge, and present to him that an idea like audibility, as a kind of self-evident fact, can realize this? (Just as according to his method he accepts the skeptical idea that everything is purified by an explanation and as long as it does not have an additional explanation from his point of view it is not true or not worthy of trust, and if so it seems that its source can be understood and the other axioms given the same place in his thinking or as a kind of lex specialis ).
And besides, we don’t have much choice but to rely on intuition and reasonableness. Both because in terms of the weight of the arguments, every discussion will be conducted within it, and also because, in terms of substance, the discussion takes place within a certain set of assumptions and not “in a vacuum” (as the cogito shows), just as a discussion about thinking itself is conducted within the tools of thinking themselves.
So in short, are there any arguments other than cutting a branch or using a different assumption, or is there no choice?
I’ve been thinking a bit about methodological arguments, like thinking about how we should gather information about the world, and if so, there’s no reason to give equal weight to every philosophical possibility, even if it’s logically sound but without any real basis. But I’m not sure that’s convincing, because it’s only a methodological matter and not a substantive reasonableness.
It is impossible to answer a skeptic. What is possible is to try and show him that he himself is not a skeptic, contrary to what he thinks. A true skeptic does not ask for proof of anything because he believes a priori that there is none. Of course, there can be proofs that are based on assumptions that themselves are not proven.
Thank you very much, but I'm not sure I understood.
What do you mean by showing him that he is not a skeptic? And he claims to us that he is.
So did you mean that we could show him that skepticism is also a kind of axiom, and if so, there is no reason why he should hold to another axiom, and consequently, show him that he certainly believes in other axioms such as those regarding understanding, memory, the senses, etc.?
And I didn't completely understand the last sentence, that *of course* there can be proofs that are based on assumptions that themselves are not proven.
Isn't this point itself one of the disputes in skeptical theory, or in any case, regarding the 'reliability' of a sense of self-audience, is it worthy of being used as a sufficient basis?
A person does not always interpret himself correctly. There is a person who declares that he is an atheist and it can be shown to him that he is actually a secret (unconscious) believer. For example, point out the consequences that he strives for that reflect faith. The same is true for skepticism. A person can declare himself a skeptic, and yet you can find things in which he does not doubt and ask him why, and perhaps that way he will discover that he is not a skeptic. One of the arguments in this direction is to tell him that skepticism is also an axiom and the question is whether he does not doubt it himself (as of course he can say that he does).
Regarding the proofs, it is what I said. If the skeptic asks for proofs, he assumes that there is an argument that will constitute proof even though his assumptions are not proven. And if not – then there is nothing to be done with him.
Sorry I didn't respond sooner. Thanks for the reply.
You raised the option in which a skeptic can avoid assuming skepticism as an axiom, for example, by claiming that he also doubts the skeptical approach. As a result, he will be able to continue to be coherent in his claim that he accepts nothing without foundation.
But don't you think there's something strange about that? I can't figure it out. And I still have a feeling that there's a certain contradiction in that. Suppose, after all, he still assumes some kind of implication following that spicic doubt, then this assumption that spicic doubt has a certain power is itself an axiom. For example, if he really were completely axiom-free, we wouldn't expect him to cast any doubt at all, but to remain silent.
According to what I said here, I thought more than that, could there even be a true skeptic who doesn't assume any axioms? It seems that thinking itself already assumes many axioms, and that even the casting of doubt is done within the same framework. If I understood your argument correctly, then in this case we can tell him what I have an axiom about A (such as: memory, thinking, the laws of logic and negation) what I have an axiom about B such as perceptual realism or intuition.
But even this conclusion does not seem entirely intuitive because it seems that there is indeed some range of possibilities in casting doubt, and there will be things that will already sound like they make sense. For example, casting doubt on hearing sounds more possible than casting doubt on the memory of this thought in my mind, but according to what I wrote, this is unlikely.
He is indeed silent on principle. The talk is just because he feels like it. There is no point in making a fuss about it.
Thank you very much!
I would like to know if I understood the main part of the course correctly.
There are types of questions like brain in a vat (BIV), which raise a hypothetical option that explains our understandings in a conspiratorial and non-intuitive way. For example, that the brain is inside an electrical device that creates stimuli that will explain our experience. So that in fact the ‘real’ reality is just the brain that is placed on the operating table.
Of course, countless underground options can be proposed for any of our understandings of the world in a way that is coherent and logically feasible. Like Descartes' demon.
So, in my understanding, the answer here that lies in what you proposed is that since for me the ‘sense data’ are correct, it is simply an axiom just as I believe that the eyes work fine overall.
So I simply know that external reality exists and anyway these options are not true. (I conclude that these options are not true from the fact that I assume that I simply know that I see). It is not because I have a good argument for this, but simply because I do not need to give it any further explanation by defining it as a premise that does not mean that it is baseless.
That is exactly how I answered someone so I am interested to know if I understood correctly. Thanks!
I think so. It's just that although I don't have an argument that proves my position, I still think it's true (and not just live by it). The axiomaticity here is not arbitrary but a truth that is self-evident.
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