Justification – Inductive Thinking and Deductive Arguments

Thank you very much, I thought I would repeat and make it difficult that this is a circular argument (not pragmatic!),
but perhaps I did not fully understand the argument.
As I understand it, it can be understood to consist of two independent parts:
1. The first part deals with the inference about the very existence of a coordinating factor.
2. And the second part deals with the characterization of the coordinating factor.
(1. How do we conclude? We proceed from an immediate feeling that our theory of cognition reliably reflects the reality that there is a factor that coordinates thinking and the world).
(2. And how do we characterize? If it is a question of 2. being independent of 1-
Then seemingly any person lacking the intuition that God exists, for example an atheist, will be able to propose any correlative factor he wishes if that factor would indeed constitute a sufficient correlative in itself,
For example: a kind of harmony of Leibniz, or pantheism like Pinochet and some of the ancient Greeks, evolution and natural laws that managed to do the impossible in hundreds of millions of years like Darwin, etc., and from his point of view there will not be much preference for any theory over another theory based on this argument, except that at most that correlative factor does indeed “exist” whatever it may be if it is even an entity and not a theory
Except that all of this is according to your view that thinking consists of a cognitive component, but anyone who disagrees with this seems not to be able to prefer one possibility over the other, and also according to your view as these hypotheses are constructed “Within” the framework of thinking, the hypothesis about God is built within the framework of “sensation”-intuition but it does not necessarily have priority over the other framework, although of course if we have the same cognition then we are not forced to an alternative explanation, but of course here I was talking about the atheist who offers another possibility and his status is the same as here’ the status of your explanation will be whatever its source may be).

And if 1 is truly independent of 2. And in particular if God is an inference from 1 and is not an intuitive insight in the sense of “this is to me” then the argument itself seems to be circular, because why do we trust thinking? Because there is a correlative factor, and how do we know about its existence only because there is trust in thinking. And so on, but it is possible to think that psychologically the feeling and sensation that thinking is coordinated will remain (even skeptics will not usually disagree on this point) while indeed thinking is not coordinated from a substantive/philosophical point of view if that coordinating factor does not exist. Then it seems circular, doesn't it?

When I said a correlating factor, I said nothing about it. Therefore, there is no point in discussing whether there are other suggestions. Without such a factor, there is unlikely to be a match. Harmony explains nothing (who determined it? How do I know there is one?). And a theory does not cause anything but describes causative processes. The argument is that there is no other option.

This is precisely the point I am asking, do we really have to connect the two parts of the argument together in order to provide an explanation? Because it seems that the parts are really independent of each other.
At most, the argument leads a person to conclude that a correlating factor exists. But it does not at all characterize and say what that factor is! At most, it can even deny a person current views that are inconsistent with the conclusion about a correlating factor, such as the assumption that everything is arbitrary. (The stones fell from the mountain)
But does a person really need to provide a description of the nature of the factor in order to validate his belief in his senses? It does not seem so.

Therefore, if I think in the opinion of the rabbi who accepts the idea of intuition as a cognitive tool, and that not all thinking is done inwardly with us, then of course it is appropriate for him to provide an explanation and we can provide an explanation.

But for those who believe that intuition is only part of analytical thought, this argument does not seem to be much different from any other philosophical inference and argument for the purpose of identifying the correlating factor as a kind of physico-theological evidence.
Because towards the inference of the nature of this correlating factor, *only* on the basis of this argument, man does not find any preference for belief in God over any other a priori or even a posteriori hypothesis as an explanation of the coherence in the world, for example, such as the idea of Leibniz or Spinoza.

On the other hand, if we do indeed need to show the nature of the correlating factor, (and the two parts do depend on each other)
Then we can learn from this either that we do indeed have an intuition that serves as a cognitive tool (hence your questions regarding the other theories “Who determined it? How do I know that there is one?”, questions that previously did not need to be answered, because it was enough for a person to point out the possible feasibility of a correlating factor and not actually show that it exists, and therefore the use of the argument based on elimination as you say at the end of the answer “The argument is that there is no other option” is incorrect, because it presupposes that we are capable of answering this question directly through the sense of cognition).

Or does it show that circularity can be used to answer these questions. (For example, using the inference tool of evolution and concluding that it is the factor that correlates with the senses themselves and that they themselves are correct because of it) Although intuition also has a bit of a problem with such use, especially if we can talk about a distinction between a psychological sense of the rationality of the world that exists even if philosophically it does not, although in any case it is less evident than the possibility here that it is right within thinking.

I've completely lost you. I don't understand what the discussion is about and what the problem is. I explained my argument about a correlating factor, and indeed I'm not saying anything about it.

Um, it's really simple, I'll try to ask something from a different angle than I initially asked, I finally divided it into 3 small questions, hoping that it will now be much more understandable 🙂

Does the rabbi's use of the revealing argument of justifying the system of thinking *as evidence of God* actually presuppose intuition as a cognitive tool? Or perhaps you might even say it proves it!

Because the argument shows that in order for a person to have justification for the system of thinking or the rationality of the world, one must conclude that there is a correlative factor between thinking and the world…
This is a trivial conclusion at first glance. But is the language inference equivalent to a regular “philosophical” inference? It seems not, because the hidden assumptions that are inferred here are a condition for the current ”conclusions”. And without them, the conclusions have no validity.

Now, if we assume for the sake of the discussion framework that there is no such thing as intuition in the sense of a cognitive tool. And let us now assume that the person in question does not have a hidden belief in any entity or theory that explains the system of thought. Except that he does indeed intuitively assume that he can study the world.
Then at most that person will be able to conclude with this type of inference that there is “something” that correlates between him and the world. Even if he does not know what this factor is. And from the point of view of this evidence *purely* (without additional external “philosophical” evidence such as cosmological or physico-theological or from morality, meaning, etc.) I do not see that there could be for him any indication or preference for the hypothesis that God is the coordinating factor over any other possible hypothesis, however puzzling it may be, such as harmony of the world or pantheism.

1. So my first question is whether for that person who concluded that there is indeed “something” that correlates without being able to indicate what that factor is, the Rabbi believes that ”he has fulfilled his obligation” and indeed he now has justification for the correspondence between his thinking and the world?
If not, and that person needs to characterize and indicate *what* that factor is in order to be justified, then the direct conclusion from this is that the rational person is obligated to conclude that he has familiarity with that factor, and if so, there are two options:
2. If an explanation within the system of thought can justify it, (-inferred in a “philosophical” for example an evolutionary process or God or a big bang, etc.) would not be considered circular, then it seems that this is another option. But then the question would be how he was justified until he reached it.
3. Or indeed, one must assume that one has an intuition that comes from outside, and this largely proves the Rabbi's entire idea of intuition (whether it is internal or external observation). In addition, this argument becomes much stronger as evidence for God, because this is the best hypothesis that we would have a hidden belief about an entity that is inherent in us. And many more proofs can be added to this.

Hope it is clearer now,
Merry Christmas.

A revealing argument assumes intuition as a cognitive tool and does not prove it. This is the essence of this type of argument.
I explained that the coordinating factor is called God. That's all. Therefore, there is no sense in the question of whether the coordinating factor may be different, as long as I have not said anything concrete about it.
I did not understand the rest. Your paragraph 3 describes my argument.
That's it. I've exhausted it.

Thank you very much, so I have a few questions but because I'm a lighter – I would like to ask two final questions from two directions, against the two holidays 🙂
(Although it is tempting to ask on the basis of the same question how much longer we will not do this as a matter of fact.

1. A person who starts from the assumption that his thinking is coordinated (why? Like this), but does not have intuition for the source of the correlation (and if so, we can think of a hypothetical person who is disabled and deprived of this ability).
But he only concludes this following the same formal structure of the argument that there is indeed some correlating factor, for his part you will call it a “hat”. Will the Rabbi see that he is justified in his original art? And if you say yes, then I will ask in general about the idea of a revealing argument:

2. That the revealing argument supposedly begins following an axiom (let's say the thinking is coordinated and concludes that there is a correlation), then the question arises as to why the person is required to justify his thinking in the first place, since the argument is built on An axiom that is itself does not require further justification? (In your opinion, if the person did not justify that axiom, then there is a kind of abrogation in his aphetic state)
Or do you believe that the entire argument is more of an investigation on the ontological level - a clarification of reality and an additional understanding of the structure of reality. And the abrogation exists only when the person is in a state of contradiction - for example, there is a positive argument against his axiom, for example when someone holds on the one hand that the world is arbitrary and on the other hand that it is coordinated and then is forced to abandon one of the foundations of the dilemma. But the argument is not an aphetic defense.

We assume that a person from the market does not assume a metaphysical assumption on either side (and therefore does not have the positive question if he assumes atheism), and on the other hand he also does not think about the source of justification for his beliefs.
So is he justified Do his beliefs follow the original axiom (if we put it another way), or do you think that he is now not justified in the essential sense as long as he does not conclude that the correlative factor exists (and even if now he does not hold both G-d and atheism at all)?

And on the basis of these two, we can talk about two propositions that are built on them, but that is another question 🙂

Happy Holidays!

1. I didn't understand the question. If a person comes to the conclusion that there is a God, does he really believe that there is a God? Yes.
2. I didn't understand a word.
Excuse me, but from now on I won't answer anymore.