In collaboration with the Leibowitzian concept of morality, according to the rabbi
In the SD
Hello Rabbi,
I’m currently watching a series on YouTube about Halacha and morality (which is excellent, by the way, thank you very much!). I was very bothered by the problem that the rabbi presented in Leibowitz’s conception of morality as an atheistic category, according to which it is a kind of “Z” in collaboration as soon as one accepts it as binding (and even the possibility that it is a “Z” in collaboration on the halakhic level!).
Since this is a rather radical statement for the rabbi, I would like to try to understand what the rabbi’s definition of this category is. Every object in the reality of my life that is not a divine directive is automatically a ez? If we follow Leibovitzian examples – if I want to marry a certain woman rather than an unknown one, or, for example, as the rabbi says, I choose the value of health over the value of pleasure when I go on a diet, I am doing what I am doing because God cares about it (even if God cares – is that the reason why I do it?).
I will summarize this with another quote from Leibowitz himself regarding another topic, which is Zionism. Leibowitz is quoted as saying (unfortunately, I only found this on Wikiquote and not in the writings) that he is a Zionist for two reasons: a. God wants us to live in Palestine (an interesting claim in light of the fact that in other places he objects to the commandment to settle in Palestine, such as the Maimonides’s Pasha), b. Leibowitz’s desire to live in a Jewish state, or in a quote that I do recognize from the writings, “we are fed up being ruled by goyim.” Is such Zionism, in the opinion of Rabbi Bachai, in collaboration with only because it explicitly gives reasons beyond the reason that it is God’s will? If I have ever heard such a claim with such radicalism, it was only in the article “Aqabat D’Mashicha” by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, in which he calls nationalism and socialism “foreign works,” and the rest of his words are well known.
In addition to this bewilderment, the rabbi explained that for the Chazva, morality is subject to halakha. Perhaps I misunderstood the rabbi, but from the Chazva’s perspective, we can see that the Chazva’s claim is more similar to that of Rav Kook, although slightly different, and that is that we are simply confused and do not know what the “correct” morality is, such as a mistaken perception of reality in other areas. Am I right that the rabbi’s opinion is different?
Again, sorry for the length, unfortunately this is my way…
Any source that is not God and yet gives validity to binding values is included in “foreign worship” in this sense. Other explanations that are not on the value plane (such as we fed up) are not relevant to the discussion. If I do X because I am obligated and the source of the obligation is not God, this is sharing. If I do it because I want to (I feel like it), then no.
Regarding the Chazo’a, I think I explained it there. I noted that the Chazo’a is unfairly criticized, but I use his name as a title for this approach.
Thank you very much, Rabbi!
And yet I am not sure that the division is completely sharp, probably with Leibowitz himself, who used the concepts of “value” and ”I like” mixed up (although the Rabbi also referred to this and in any case, he did). In any case, I do feel that there are also levels of “obligation” that I at least perceive as being outside of God and the perception is that they are obligatory. For example, “dina demalchuta dina” is a Torah statement, but it is taught as such from a sabrah. Will the Rabbi claim that this sabrah is also divine in origin? It is possible to hang everything on it, but does the Rabbi really think so?
Besides, there is another point that I forgot to clarify – The Rabbi emphasized several times, and rightly so, that it is impossible to accept the authority of any source of authority without something external to that source of authority. Otherwise, this is either a false assumption or simply nonsense. According to this, if we accept the assumption that there is no source of authority other than God, what is the source of God's authority? Similarly, if we accept something that requires us to listen to God, a contradiction arises here.
And regarding the prophecy, I understood that the rabbi was speaking out against the notion that the prophecy denies morality as a value in general, and not just that we are mistaken about what morality is. But beyond the "maybe", it really seems that there is no real evidence.
I am explaining my position, not Leibowitz's. Indeed, a Jew who worships G-d, gives all value in his life because G-d expects it of him. Specifically regarding Dina Demalchuta, this is a pishta, since this is an explicit halakha.
Your argument leads to an infinite regress. It is clear that at the beginning of the chain there must be a source of validity that does not need another source to establish it. God is by definition such a source. Therefore, in the Torah, judges are called God, because God is the one who must be obeyed by virtue of being who He is (and not necessarily because He is just). What I called formal authority as distinct from essential authority. The concept of God means an entity with unconditional authority that does not need anything outside of it to receive validity.
Things in reality have no value.
Any giving of value is a lie and a falsehood. Therefore, عظ.
Giving value comes from man's need to be enslaved to something.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
