Moral fact versus authority
1. It seemed like the rabbi answered this question within the context, but I was unable to actually understand what the answer was. I would appreciate it if you could define the difference for me.
What is the difference between the claim “God is a binding authority” and David Enoch’s claim that every ethical claim is binding because it is binding? Ostensibly, the claim that God is binding on us is an ethical claim that does not require a source and cannot have a source.
2. Regarding the question of who is truly moral, the Kalbarri Finn or Kant. Ostensibly, the question that should be asked is “If both Kant and Finn hate you for some reason, who would you prefer to be on the boat with?” The answer to that would actually be the measure of which of them is truly moral and not just instincts.
1. The difference is the intuition/explanation. After all, at the basis of all justification there must be a principle that in itself has no justification outside of itself (an axiom). An unreasonable axiom must be justified and therefore cannot be accepted. A reasonable axiom can stand on its own. Commitment to a divine command is a reasonable axiom. There is no need for external justification. But commitment to facts that exist somewhere for some reason in the world of ideas does not seem reasonable. Why should I listen and be committed to this collection of stones?
2. You are right that I would answer the second question that Kant is better. But it is not as important as the first. I would prefer to be with the Calabrian Finn (when he doesn’t hate me) because he is nicer and more pleasant.
Can obligation to a divine command be understood as an axiom that also obliges those who claim that there is no such obligation and, from my intuition, see them as inconsistent, or is the one who claims that there is no such obligation exempt from moral concerns and I should not punish them from my position?
He is a free man and an acquittal. No one should be punished for something they don't believe in.
One should not be punished for something one does not believe in, meaning one should not absorb the "reward" component of punishment. Someone who does not use this "reward" component in punishment at all (and rather sees it as a crime) but rather in other components such as deterrence, revenge, and prevention is exempt from needing someone's beliefs.
You assume that it is additive, but that is a wrong assumption. Otherwise rape or accidental death would not have been ruled out. In fact, the combination of the elements of punishment is not additive (meaning it is not a simple or weighted sum of them). You want to punish in order to deter, but if the person himself does not deserve a sanction, then there is no justification for imposing a punishment on him also for deterrence, because the blood of others who will benefit is not redder than the blood of his own who loses (he is punished without deserving it). If he deserves a sanction, only then can the offender be used to deter others.
[If we came to discuss such questions (and not the actual matter of explanation, which of course is not every passive person), rape or accidental murder will be excused because it is more profitable for everyone, all honest people will fear that they will sin by rape or accidental murder and be punished. Just as organs are not harvested from random people. In order to deter, the perpetrator should be punished, of course. And if someone is indicted for the secrets of a righteous person, then indeed the law is that it is like punishing the perpetrator. ]
Enoch's claim is simply a belief in idols.
If God is the cause of everything, then there cannot be other things that obligate you that He did not cause.
(The answer was given regardless of the fact that the concept of “obligate” is a purely psychological concept)
Tirgitz, beyond the fact that I don't agree, I don't understand your method. What bothers you about firing someone who is unaware? Let them be fired for your reasons. Who hates rape?
Because most people are not afraid that they will change their minds and are also afraid that they will make a mistake by force or by mistake. And two more reasons [a] because on the contrary, someone who thinks that in principle it is permissible is even more dangerous in practice than someone who chose evil, “rehabilitating” someone who murdered over a parking dispute is much easier than “rehabilitating” an ideological Palestinian terrorist. [b] This gives people an incentive (subconscious bribe) to hold opinions that allow them things without there being a price tag on forming an opinion; the power of the talkers is practically unlimited and they cannot be trusted.
[Of course, according to the above, there is no need for the penal system to rely on the free choice hypothesis. In my opinion, this is a good indication of a stable system]
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