Lex Specialis

Thank you very much. Since the restriction to the law that only prevents the sweeping abrogation of a rule is also the conclusion according to the interpretation I proposed, then it seems that the matter is agreed upon. [I was awakened to ponder this regarding your use of the law in the matter of causality and choice, that the place of causality will be reduced in favor of the intuition that there is a choice. In other words, I pondered whether the individual commandment is the power of intuition as a whole or the specific intuition. And from there my thoughts jumped around as usual. But I still need to organize my thoughts on the matter, so I did not present it (suddenly it occurred to me that this too is a kind of cold discussion without emotional dimensions, etc.)]

I did not exactly understand whether and how you explained the evidence of the Gemara from Shlaih 24, if we take the reasonable assumption that one of the dayanim can always be appointed as an alternative Shlaih and on the other hand, there is not always another blood savior who will pursue and achieve. Can you come back?

In the case of intuitions, the logic is very similar. Only if one of them is completely nullified, there is room for this consideration. This is truly the situation in the conflict between choice and causality. If we choose causality, the choice is completely nullified, but not vice versa.

What I wrote is that since the Gemara compares a messenger of God to a god, it proves that there is no messenger of God in both. And the comparison itself can still be challenged. I think the explanation is that the Gemara proves from there that even a god who rises has authority, so the son does not become a god. If this is authority, then there is no room to divide this from a messenger of God in terms of the fact that there are alternatives. Now, even in a god, there is an alternative: not to redeem blood (because this is authority).

By the way, it is necessary to discuss whether this is intentional or accidental (even intentionality has a role for the goad). I remember a discussion in the Hemda that deals with this in detail when it discusses the duty of honoring a father for an evil father. If this is intentional, then the father murdered his son and is evil, and therefore the son did not become a goad, and it is proven that there is a duty to honor an evil father during his lifetime (he divides the blame after his death).

Of course, this is proven by the fact that the messenger states that he is a sinner, because it is clear that he is a wicked man who sinned intentionally.

The choice is completely canceled, but the power of intuition in general is not completely canceled. Is what corresponds to the commandment to kill Sabbath desecrators (which cannot be canceled) the specific intuition regarding choice (and therefore the law is applied), or is what corresponds to the commandment to kill Sabbath desecrators the power of intuition in general? It does not seem obvious to me to liken a specific intuition to a specific commandment, and not to liken intuition in general to a specific commandment. I have no argument on this matter.

Apparently, even if it is a case of evil intent, the father made repentance, and then we are obligated to honor him.

But I have an intuition that there is a choice. Why eliminate it if it is possible not to?! The principle is that you give up as few intuitions as possible. You are right if there was a causal intuition specific to a person's value decisions. Then it might have been reasonable.

Just as in conclusion, the commandment of blood redemption that is imposed on me is abolished even though it is possible not to (and the commandment of honoring the father will be fulfilled the rest of the time), why abolish it if it is possible not to? Why is it not true that the principle is that one renounces as few commandments (that are imposed on me) as possible. I agree that it is more reasonable as you say, but it seems that in your eyes it is really self-evident and I have not yet understood that.

I explained that the Gemara says this on the assumption that blood redemption is not a mitzvah but a permission. After all, that is the essence of the discussion. On the side that it is truly a mitzvah, they say that it is reprehensible, and this is for a different reason (You all owe me respect. Unless you distinguish between respect that is the result of the father's expression of will and natural respect).

But I speak according to the conclusion of the Gemara that even if blood redemption is a mitzvah, it does not negate honoring the father, as is proven from the baraita that only in inciting a son harms his father (perhaps inciting is a general teaching from Deitztrich and teaches the opposite that in *all* other cases, including blood redemption, the son will be forgiven. I did not understand it that way). No matter how we interpret the explanations in the Homa and the conclusion in the Gemara, the actual law is that blood redemption, even for a mitzvah, does not negate honoring the father, that is, it does not belong here to the mitzvah. “And it will be explained between a mitzvah and a mitzvah, between a mitzvah and a mitzvah, and the amer, etc.’ “

I didn't understand what was so difficult. The Gemara concludes that if it is a mitzvah then it is a pishita that he does not become a goad, but it now comes to prove that even if it is the son's permission, he does not become a goad, and the proof is from the shlikh yad that, except for instigating, he does not become a goad over his father. In other words, the Gemara compares a goad (in all matters except instigating) to a goad on the side that is a permission, and proves from there that he does not become a goad even if it is a permission.
Why is a goad similar to a permission? Precisely because of your explanation that a goad can choose another goad.

I don't see where the Gemara says such a thing. The Gemara brings two baraitas, one that the blood redeemer is made and one that he is not, telling the reader whether Rabbi Yossi of Galilee (the blood redeemer is a mitzvah and therefore even a son becomes the blood redeemer) or Rabbi Akiva (the blood redeemer is a permission and therefore a son is not made). Then it rejects that even for a mid-mitzvah, a son does not become the blood redeemer (and it is explained between a mid-mitzvah and a mid-mitzvah, who is the minister?) and places the baraita that the blood redeemer is made in a grandson and not in a son. That is, in fact, a son does not become the blood redeemer even for a mid-mitzvah (honoring a father when he is without the father's command rejects the commandment of blood redemption) and this is the Gemara's explanation that he does not become a sheliah beit din (although perhaps this is a special teaching that incites).

Sorry, I reversed the sides. The Gemara came to prove that even a mitzvah does not have permission to be a goad, and proves this from a shliach in a yid. You are making it difficult that a shliach in a yid has the option of choosing another and a goad is commanded over him.
Perhaps the Gemara does not see this as a distinction, since if there is a mitzvah then he can be a shliach in a yid even if another can be chosen. A mitzvah is a kabid, and even if it can be performed by others, the mitzvah still rejects honoring parents. In scholarly terms, this is permitted and not rejected (although, as is well known, I do not distinguish between the two).
Incidentally, to the conclusion that one divides between a son and a son, one sees that there is another option. The grandson can be a goad. Or at least this is also the case, and therefore the comparison to a shliach in a yid is fair.

And can you clarify for me now again why the commandment of blood redemption in this particular person, out of all the people for whom the commandment is defined, is not a lex specialis to reject honoring a father and therefore is not rejecting? [And the particular intuition that there is a choice, out of all the intuitions by virtue of which we hold, is indeed a lex specialis towards the intuition that everything is causal and therefore is indeed ‘rejecting’]

I explained. Because no verse is redundant even if it is told not to shed blood. It is only redundant if the verse remains without content.
If I have an intuition that there is a choice and I have a general causal intuition (not a separate intuition about determinism) then it is better to leave both as they are. If I had a specific intuition about causality in value decisions, I am really not sure I would say ”s.

But why do people believe in intuition at all? It's not that every intuition has its own power (if I understand correctly), but that there are general arguments for the validity of intuition. Therefore, a certain intuition (choice) from among all intuitions is seemingly similar to a certain imposition of the mitzvah on me from among all impositions of the mitzvah. I'm only asking if the claim (that there is a s in choice and there is no s in the blood savior) is simple and clear in your eyes, if it's (only) a decision of the mind this way and not that way, then I don't accept your words.

This is very reasonable in my opinion.
I don't think intuition is a single entity. There are no arguments in its favor because every argument is built on it. It is a human ability that yields many insights. Just as thinking is not a single entity (if it were not, you would have nullified the Torah of L”S).

Understood. Thank you.

I saw a nice formulation of something like the rule ‘lex specialis’ in a baraita in Gemara Sota 14b”b“Wherever you find two readings, one affirms itself and affirms the words of its companion and one affirms itself and nullifies the words of its companion, set aside the one that affirms itself and nullifies its companion and take the one that affirms itself and affirms its companion”.
There are two parts within one verse that are simply contradictory, so one is interpreted with a somewhat expansive interpretation so that there is also room for the other, because if they interpret that one with a narrow interpretation as they probably would have interpreted it were it not for the second part of the verse, then there would be no room for the second part of the verse.

The verse says “And this is the law of the offering, which the sons of Aaron brought before the Lord, before the altar”. Before the altar is interpreted as presenting the offering on the west side of the altar, facing the altar is interpreted as presenting it on the south side of the altar. One Tanna makes a compromise and decides that it is presented in the southwest corner of the altar. But Rabbi Elazar in a baraita does not say this, but first rules out the possibility of arbitrarily choosing between two good options (Rashi will present it to one of them, if he wants to go west, he wants to go south), and says that he will present it in the south and this is still considered ‘before God’ because the priest stands facing the sanctuary (while presenting it in the west is certainly not considered ‘to the face of the altar’). [We see that there are also different methods of interpretation here and we will discuss them and in connection with other cases where two texts deny each other]