Question about the Doubt and Statistics lesson #5
Sh. B. You said (around minute 43) that assuming the normal kashrut of a witness means that we have no indication that he is not telling the truth, and therefore he is trustworthy even in the law of souls, whereas when there is a side to suspect him, such as that he lied a week after his testimony, we rely only on presumption and this is not sufficient for the law of souls. However, with regard to two groups of witnesses who deny the za’za, as stated by Rav Huna 22:32, each of whom comes in a pa’a and testifies, we did not find in the Rambam (Edot 22:1) a distinction between mamunot and nefshot. In the niddushei of the RiM, Yevamot 122:1, he wrote in an explanation and in a simple manner that the za’za is for nefshot.
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Hello. I thought the lesson was about Halacha thought, not about your private speculations about what the dayanim would do in practice. Now I also found in Tos’ Ri”d in B”b not in E”b that the same is true even in souls (this is how the old man quoted there explains it, and Ri”d does not disagree with him on this point) and also in Manchat Shlomo Ch”a Si’ Pb. Although the truth that I found is that Chief Yosef Ishkapa Ch”m Si’ does not act according to your words that souls will not be relied upon, for the sake of the law this does not simplify the issue and the first ones.
In general, do you know of an explicit source in the Acharonim that distinguishes, as you say, between a situation in which there is no reason to be content and a situation in which contentment is decided by majority and strength, etc.?
You thought and you were right. My answer is not descriptive but normative. It is possible that all the judges of the world will think differently. I argued that a reasonable and normal judge should act this way.
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