A question about the physico-theological argument
I would be happy to receive clarification from you on how the appeal regarding the complexity of the Creator that does not require a Creator can be resolved.
Why, in the same way, is it impossible to assume that the laws of nature exist without the need for a Creator?
When you talked about a factory that functions in an exemplary manner through rules written on the wall, you said that it necessarily follows that there is a factory manager who created the rules. But this is exactly an example that can be asked about, who created the factory manager, it cannot be claimed that the manager was there the whole time.
When you say “all things from my experience need a creator,” but the creator is not from my experience, I don’t really understand why the argument can’t also be made about the laws themselves.
The laws of nature are not applicable. If they were applicable then the creator in question could be them. I didn’t say anything about him other than that he is responsible for the mess here.
Is the Creator unaware? Doesn't He plan things? Doesn't He have something like consciousness?
This is a different question and does not arise directly from the physico-theological argument.
So why call him a creator? Surely many atheists would agree that something created the world. The debate is about whether it is something purely, or someone who is able to prepare a plan in advance and then carry it out. In short, why would an atheist care about the physico-theological argument?
Indeed, it is likely that he has desires and plans (although this does not necessarily follow from the argument). But this does not matter to the point of the argument, since either the laws were enacted by him or they themselves have desires and plans (otherwise they cannot be an explanation).
I'm not sure what you mean by the difference between "it follows necessarily from the argument" and "it is probable that".
Let me try to refine the point in a different way. Do you think the physico-theological argument is an argument for the existence of a designer of the world? When I say "designer of the world", I mean an entity that existed when our world did not exist, conceived a possible future in which the world we know with its properties and details existed, and then caused the events that created our world.
I emphasize that such a designer is definitely someone, and not just something inanimate. After all, as far as we know inanimate objects do not think about the future, let alone plan it.
I wrote that the argument proves that there is something that created the world. It is very reasonable to assume that it has desires and plans.
Something, not someone. Is it reasonable to assume that it is someone with desires and plans because of the physico-theological argument? Or is it reasonable to assume it for some other reason? Or in short, why is it reasonable to assume it?
Because if it were mechanical, the explanation would not be sufficient. It itself would require explanation. I think we've exhausted it.
I don't think we've exhausted it.
Why is a mechanical explanation inadequate, and why is the reason for this irrelevant to the design explanation?
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