The servant of God alone is free.
I read the articles of Avd Ha’s, He alone is free, and I really enjoyed the content of the words. But I don’t think that’s what Rihal meant or that’s the explanation in Mimra, “You have no free person except one who deals with Torah.” According to your words, any system with limitations gives room for freedom, and this is also relevant to the New Testament and the cookbook. Of course, the words themselves are correct, but I offer a different suggestion to the words of the Gam’ and Rihal, which does not fall into the problems you presented in Rav Kook’s explanation.
A person has two options: either to choose what is convenient and easy, the animal soul, to choose not to choose (according to your words in several places), or to choose to choose, the divine soul to overcome his nature. The person who engages in Torah has overcome his nature and chosen above it, he has chosen the divine soul – being a person who chooses.
Although, according to the explanation, every time a person chooses good over comfort, he expresses his freedom, but if we assume that the Torah allows a person to reach complete goodness when he fulfills the religious commandment, then it is understandable why the servant of God is alone free, and you have no free person except the one who engages in the Torah.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Sounds the same to me. Indeed, in every system there is freedom, but truth is still important.
The system must be real, even if it is not a condition for freedom.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
1. According to your words, there is a place for freedom in the Torah, “he who engages in the Torah is a free man”, but it is not “that there is no free man except he who engages in the Torah”. Although I am not sure that this is a significant difference.
2. My proposal is different from your explanation. According to your explanation, freedom belongs between limitations, there is freedom between doing this or that, freedom is expressed in the ability to choose this or that. According to my words, freedom is not expressed in the ability, but in the choice itself, I think that whoever chooses good in the choice itself expresses his freedom that he is a person who chooses and not a person subject to his nature. I think the difference between the 2 proposals is significant.
(And I believe that my proposal is more in line with the words of the rabbi, because according to me, one can choose complete goodness only with the Torah, and according to you, there is freedom within limitations and the Torah is also true, but this is not related to each other.)
These are word games. But whatever.
Can you please explain why this is a pun? It's simply a topic that I've been dealing with and trying to understand. In my position, I tried to point out a concrete difference, freedom in ability versus freedom expressed in action. Where am I wrong?
Choosing to do good means that there are two options between which you choose and that there is moral weight to each choice (which is not in your hands). Exactly as I said. Beyond that, it's all semantics. Call freedom the ability or the choice itself, they're just words.
I believe he distinguishes between the ability to choose and the content of your choice. Unlike the Rabbi, he argues that the content of your choice also contributes to freedom, not just the fact that you choose.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
