The Divine Source of the Torah

So much for the opening paragraph. I will now briefly address the sections that follow.

1. This is not personification. Anyone who creates something probably does so for some purpose. I may be wrong, but the burden of proof is on those who claim otherwise. This is the logical starting point. It also adds to the tradition that has come down to us that this is indeed the case. The question of the delay of billions of years does not bother me. What He wants is realized by the entire process in which people are created and do all sorts of things. There is no necessity for all of this to take place at any moment. This entire process is the realization of His will. Remember that a billion years from His perspective is no different than a second.

2. I agree. The content of the Torah does not convince me of its divinity.

3. This is not strange. I also suggested a logic in this policy, and first and foremost these are the facts. Over the generations, prophecy and miracles have disappeared.

4. Indeed, I too have questioned the value of the Torah. Although in its time it had value, since the morality and values of humanity were greatly influenced by it. But today, I have questioned the value of studying the Torah itself. But I swear that I am. Regarding the ability to derive things from the Torah, I assume that in the past there were tools that were lost to us (such as the qualities of the sermon).

Regarding “there must be a revelation that goes beyond morality”, your entire argument is based on the fact that God could not have created the world and thus there was no need to be moral. Again, I see a bit of personification here, but your explanation is also unconvincing, He could have created the effect of observing the laws even without humans observing the laws, of course you will explain that it is probably impossible, it seems weak to me anyway. You once brought up in the name of Rabbi Kook that God cannot be redeemed because He is perfect. Maybe He only wants morality from us so that He can redeem Himself through us, what do you say?

3. The facts are that today there are no miracles. More likely, there never were any miracles. You are forced to insist that this has changed. Miracle stories and myths have always existed in all cultures and miracles are slowly “disappearing” as science advances, trends think critically.

In your choice to follow Orthodox Judaism as it has taken shape today, you are a bit “apologetic”: I know you are biased because of how you were raised. I am not at all sure that we have the whole truth. I feel that you also feel the evidential weakness of the divine origin of Judaism, I do not remember you expressing yourself in a similar way in any other discussion, after all, there are always biases and psychological considerations that can affect a philosophical discussion or any discussion about a different truth claim, am I wrong?

As stated, the question of anthropomorphism is incorrect (in my opinion). This is a simple assumption that is correct for any entity. Of course, it is not necessary, and it is possible that a non-human factor acts differently. But a priori it makes sense not necessarily for a person, until proven otherwise. Therefore, the burden of proof is on those who claim otherwise.
It is impossible to achieve results without humans creating them, since they are supposed to be created by choice. It is not for nothing that we were given free will. This indicates that the goals were not the bottom lines, otherwise they would have programmed us to reach them and that was it. God probably wants us to choose to do the right thing and not just do it.
The possibility that morality is the goal for us and all of this is intended to complete God does indeed exist. And yet the conclusion that morality in itself cannot be the goal is correct. However, now according to your proposal, we have several options: 1. Perhaps the goal is the completion of God that is accomplished by morality. 2. And maybe there is another purpose. We have received a tradition that the purpose is different, and therefore there is no reason to adopt the first option.
3. As for the likelihood that there have never been miracles, I disagree. See in the series of Torey 671-3 on David Hume's witness argument against miracles. If you accept the assumption that there is a God, it seems to me that the claims about miracles are no longer unfounded on their face. That is why I always make sure to create the entire chain, from the philosophy about the existence of God to the religious commitment. [By the way, the creation of the world is itself a miracle, meaning that something must have happened once that is not happening today. My claim is that creation is a continuous process, and concerns not only the first point in time. Today we are in a situation where the world already exists everywhere and there is no need for miracles. See again in the above Torey.]
The fact that there were myths and miracles in many cultures is a counterargument? Doesn't this strengthen the claim that there really were miracles? It's like the claim that many cultures testify to the flood and therefore it is clearly a myth. In my opinion, if many cultures say this, it strengthens the fact that there was indeed a flood. Although in principle, of course, it could be a myth, the mere existence of evidence certainly does not weaken the authenticity of the claim but rather strengthens it.
Beyond that, the question is to what extent the evidence and traditions about it are reliable (in terms of the number of people present, the accuracy of transmission, the details, the survival of the content of the tradition, and so on).

Regarding your last comment, I think the ”apology” that you saw in my words is just a question of intonation.
I have written explicitly several times that the arguments in favor of the existence of God are philosophical and objective, while the arguments in favor of a specific tradition like ours are by definition weaker. But this is due to the very nature and type of the arguments and therefore does not indicate a fundamental weakness. The subject is not philosophical but historical, and ancient history at that. Do you expect me to present objective philosophical evidence in a non-philosophical field? As we know, it is difficult to reach clear conclusions in such matters, and as we know, it is also more easily biased by the various influences on the person formulating the conclusions (me). Just as psychology does not enjoy the same validity as physics or chemistry. This is not necessarily because psychologists are stupid but because of the nature of the field. Therefore, this weakness is not a reason to reject the use of psychology outright. We have nothing better in these fields.
Therefore, what I am saying here is not an apology but a sober and honest description of the situation. This is indeed the case. What is there to apologize for? Because of the nature of the field, we have to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. If I have reached a conclusion that is supposed to be revelation, then I must choose the most probable of the various revelation options before me. That is what I have done.
Beyond that, I added that I assume that others in other cultures and religions also did as they understood, and I am aware of the possible biases in me as well. Therefore, I argued that although in my eyes it is truly the most reasonable, exclusivity still seems to me like a discourse for internal purposes, and God does not come in discord with His creatures. Whoever finds Christianity more reasonable should be a Christian. If you choose to see this as an apology, then fine. This is just an intonation as stated. See my column on PEER DISAGREEMENT for more information.

Regarding the question of whether there is a normative goal and that is morality and there is no need for revelation, in the fifth notebook the answer is that without revelation we would not understand that morality is not teleological (and therefore revelation is necessary), and here the answer is that there is no a priori expectation of revelation but that in fact there was. It seems that the difference between the answers is in the question of whether we will accept the most probable revelation, even if it is not so probable, or whether we will accept only a probable revelation.
A. Is the answer from the notebook still correct in your opinion?
B. Why, without revelation, would we see morality this way and the revelation that actually took place at Sinai helps us see it differently? Do you think that an atheist who is committed to morality is not only a secret believer in God but also a secret believer in revelation?

Quote from the notebook:
It is possible, but it still seems to be a revelation. Without it, we would see morality as something teleological, that is, as a system of principles intended to correct society and nothing more. Therefore, even if there is no “religious” system beyond morality, the need for revelation remains.

Quoting the relevant part of the answer above:
The possibility that morality is the goal for us and that all of this is intended to complete God does indeed exist. And yet the conclusion that morality in itself cannot be the goal is correct. But now, according to your suggestion, we have several options: 1. Perhaps the goal is the completion of God that is accomplished by morality. 2. Perhaps there is another goal. We have received a tradition that the goal is different, and therefore there is no reason to adopt the first option.

That answer assumes that a person's knowledge of the purpose of morality is important, and that it is not enough that he acts morally. I am not sure about this. Therefore, the answer here should be added.
As for the question of revelation: My argument is that this is why there is an expectation that there will be a revelation. This does not have to correspond to what actually happened in the revelation. After all, in practice we also received additional purposes beyond morality, and therefore all of this is irrelevant. This argument is an a priori argument that comes to support the fact that a revelation is expected, and therefore if a tradition reaches us, we must believe it.
Beyond that, the revelation at Sinai tells us that there is a Torah command to do what is right and good. A Torah command is something that is beyond social correction (in my opinion).

But according to the answer here, revelation is not expected, but only that there is a basis for revelation (so it is not like a teapot).

According to the answer, revelation is certainly expected here, but there is also the possibility that its content will be only the theological dimension of morality (and perhaps not even that, if theology does not require intention). In any case, even if there is no necessity for revelation, there is still an apparent expectation of revelation here that strengthens the credibility of the tradition that reports its occurrence. As you wrote, it is no longer a pot of tea, and that is an understatement.