Clauses that are “Sata” versus halakhic liability in contracts

The quote I mentioned is taken verbatim from the contract.
Regarding the possibility of allowing another person to use the phone for a short time – in my understanding, this section does not intend to prohibit such use. It seems that the intention of the section is to prevent the transfer of substantial rights, such as ongoing ownership or control, to another person – for example, my son – and not momentary or occasional use.

This creates an internal contradiction that raises doubts: on the one hand, these are the conditions written in the contract; on the other hand, the wording of the contract itself seems unreasonable and at times even disconnected from reality. The question arises whether the halakhic obligation requires that the contract be fulfilled “as written” (AS IS), or whether there is room for discretion, with interpretation in accordance with what a reasonable person would do in this situation.

If the conclusion is that there is room for discretion, then it can be understood that it is permissible to transfer the SIM card for use by a third party (such as a son), and it is even permissible to connect the device to a computer – as it is clear that the author did not really pay attention to these points. If he had insisted on their literal existence, this would have discouraged customers and harmed the business, and therefore it seems that they were included in the contract more as a proviso than as a binding provision.

I answered that, and I will now clarify an important point. There is common sense and it is part of the interpretation of the law and the halakhic interpretation. There is no point in being a halakhic formalist in relation to the law and in relation to contracts in general. The interpretation of a contract also depends on common sense and it is important to apply it. This reminds me of what I once wrote about Dina Demalkuta. Some people treat the law with sanctity as if it were Halacha, because according to Halacha, Dina Demalkuta is Dina. And thus the law becomes a sacred text that must be scrutinized in order to avoid violating it. This is nonsense. The law must be observed as a reasonable secular person observes it. If there is a road with a maximum speed of 90 and you were driving 100, no disaster has happened. You certainly did not commit a halakhic offense. There is also common sense in Halacha, and certainly when Halacha gives validity to external principles (like the law). In such a situation, they must be interpreted and treated as a reasonable secular citizen would do.
Another example, the respect that must be given to the government. There are those who cite the duties towards a king in Halacha and claim that they should be applied towards a president or prime minister, etc. This is, of course, complete nonsense. We are talking about a 'democratic king' (not a monarchical one), and the attitude towards him is determined according to what is accepted in a democracy. There is no need to turn the law into sacred letters and scrutinize them in a formalistic manner.

I agree with the rabbi's words on an intuitive level, but the question arises as to where the line of "common sense" is drawn. It is clear to me that my judgment is not the same as the rabbi's, and I also know quite a few people who, in my opinion, are beginning to think in an unfair way.
As an example, we can bring up the issue of Netflix subscriptions: the company offers a family subscription that is defined for users living under the same roof. In practice, people I know share the subscription with family members who do not live at home, for example a child who got married and moved to another house but still uses the parents' account. On the one hand, it can be argued with common sense that Netflix has difficulty or even cannot enforce this, and therefore it is reasonable to share the account within a family framework. On the other hand, this is contrary to the terms that the company itself has set.
This raises a fundamental difficulty: if we take the approach that every clause has a flexible interpretation, in fact every contract loses its validity, since everyone can interpret the obligation as they wish.

The discussion has lost its meaning. You expect a formal definition of common sense. This is exactly what common sense means, beyond formal thinking.
That's it. I'm done.