Between Performing a Commandment and Responsibility for Its Fulfillment (Column 600)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In the previous column we saw that the definition of the father’s commandment to circumcise his son is the father’s responsibility to ensure that the son is circumcised. It is hard to assume there is a separate commandment of “responsibility for circumcision” placed upon the father—if only because no enumerator of the commandments counts it separately. It is therefore more reasonable that there is a single commandment: that the son be circumcised. In other words, it is the son’s own commandment, but the responsibility for its fulfillment is placed on the father. The father’s obligation is a detail within the mitzvah of circumcision, not a separate commandment. Thus, the mitzvah of circumcision is a result-oriented commandment upon the son (that he be circumcised), and the father is responsible to achieve it. We also saw several ramifications of this definition.

If this is the situation, we have here a rare case in which the mitzvah is fulfilled by the son and through the son, yet the responsibility for it is placed upon the father. In this column I wish to address the very distinction between responsibility for the fulfillment of a mitzvah and the fulfillment itself, and to see it in additional halakhic contexts as well (these matters were discussed in our article in Middah Tovah, 5767, on Parashat Nitzavim–Vayelekh).

The Mitzvah of Hakhel

The Torah commands us regarding the mitzvah of Hakhel in Deuteronomy 31:10–13:

“Moses commanded them, saying: At the end of seven years, at the appointed time of the sabbatical year, on the festival of Sukkot, when all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the place that He will choose, you shall read this Torah before all Israel in their hearing. Assemble the people: men, women, and children, and your sojourner who is within your gates, so that they may hear and so that they may learn and fear the Lord your God and observe to perform all the words of this Torah. And their children who do not know shall hear and learn to fear the Lord your God all the days that you live on the land which you are crossing the Jordan to possess.”

We see that the command includes women and children.

At first glance, children are not commanded in this mitzvah, for minors are exempt from the commandments. Indeed, the Talmud (Chagigah 3a) states:

“‘Assemble the people: the men, the women, and the children.’ If the men come to learn, and the women come to listen, why do the children come? To give reward to those who bring them.”

That is, this is part of educating children. Although the mitzvah of education is rabbinic, it appears that the Torah innovates a specific Torah-level obligation with respect to Hakhel. Even so, it seems there is no obligation upon the children themselves.

Regarding women, however, the Gemara raises no difficulty; it seems to hold that women are indeed obligated in this mitzvah. In fact, the Gemara (Kiddushin 33b) struggles with how women could be obligated, since this is a positive time-bound commandment:

“All positive time-bound commandments… Our Rabbis taught: Which are positive time-bound commandments? Sukkah, lulav, shofar, tzitzit, and tefillin. And which are positive commandments not time-bound? Mezuzah, a parapet [ma‘akeh], returning lost property, and sending away the mother bird.”

“Is this a rule without exception? Behold matzah, rejoicing [on the festivals], Hakhel—these are positive time-bound commandments and women are obligated! And further: Torah study, procreation, and redemption of the firstborn—these are not time-bound, yet women are exempt! Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We do not learn from general principles, even where exceptions are stated, as we learned: ‘With all [foods] we may make an eruv or partnership, except for water and salt.’ Are there not also truffles and mushrooms? Rather, we do not learn from general principles, even where exceptions are stated.”

The Gemara answers that here there is an exception by virtue of the text’s novelty. So rules the Rambam as well (Hilchot Avodah Zarah 12:3):

“All prohibitions in the Torah apply equally to men and women, except for ‘do not destroy [the corners of your beard],’ ‘do not round [the head],’ and the prohibition for a priest to become impure to the dead. And all positive commandments that are from time to time and not constant—women are exempt, except for sanctifying the day [Kiddush], eating matzah on the nights of Passover, eating the Paschal offering and its slaughter, Hakhel, and rejoicing [on the festivals], in which women are obligated.”

This exception still requires explanation: why was the mitzvah of Hakhel excluded? Note that in Sefer HaMitzvot the Rambam lists this as positive commandment 16:

“The sixteenth commandment is that He commanded us to assemble the entire nation in the second day of Sukkot, at the close of the sabbatical year, and to read certain passages from Deuteronomy in their ears. This is His exalted statement (Vayelekh): ‘Assemble the people, the men, the women, and the children,’ etc. And this is the commandment of Hakhel. In the first chapter of Kiddushin (34a), when they said, ‘All positive time-bound commandments—women are exempt,’ the Talmud asked: ‘But there is Hakhel, which is time-bound and women are obligated!’ and concluded, ‘We do not learn from general principles.’ The laws of this commandment—who reads, what is read, and which portions are read in the seventh year—are explained in tractate Sotah (32a, 41a).”

Here he notes that women are obligated despite it being time-bound, but regarding the obligation of children he cites it simply without comment (nor does he mention the Gemara’s statement that it is “to give reward to those who bring them”). One might understand his words to mean that children are actually obligated; or perhaps he took it as obvious that this is only “to give reward to those who bring them,” and only regarding women did he feel the need to explain, since they are truly obligated.

The Words of the Sefer HaChinuch

The Sefer HaChinuch also counts this mitzvah—mitzvah 612. At the end of the mitzvah, where he usually notes who is obligated (men, women, etc.), he does not address who is obligated. He apparently relies on his opening there:

“We were commanded that all Israel—men, women, and children—assemble at the close of the sabbatical year, on the festival of Sukkot, on the second day of the festival, and to read some of the book of Deuteronomy in their ears (i.e., ‘These are the words’). About this it is stated (Deut. 31:12), ‘Assemble the people: the men, the women, and the children…’ And this is the commandment of Hakhel mentioned in the Talmud, as they said in the first chapter of Kiddushin (34a): ‘But there is Hakhel, which is a positive time-bound commandment and women are obligated,’ and they explained at the end of the passage that we do not learn from general principles—that is, the truth is that women are obligated in this mitzvah.”

Those obligated are the entire people (so too the Rambam begins his description above). He also cites the Gemara’s question in Kiddushin, as the Rambam did. It seems that here lies the passage that addresses who is obligated, and therefore he does not repeat it at the end.

At the end, however, he writes (as he does for all commandments):

“One who transgresses this—whether man or woman—and did not come at this appointed time to hear the words of the Torah, and likewise if the king did not wish to read, they have nullified this positive commandment. And their punishment is very great, for this commandment is a strong pillar and a great honor of the religion.”

That is, it seems that both man and woman are obligated in this mitzvah; yet he writes this only with respect to the punishment of one who transgresses it, and not as a statement of who is obligated. It is important to recall that in positive commandments the Chinuch always writes in a fixed formula, e.g., “It applies in every place and at all times to males and females.” Only afterwards does he write who transgresses it and what the punishment is. Here he notes only who transgresses it, not who is obligated in it.

Note further that minors are not included in that clause. He mentions man and woman, but not minors.

The Obligation of Children

The Minchat Chinuch there, §4 s.v. “ve-ṭaf” (“and children”), writes that children are in fact not obligated, and proves it from the Gemara cited above in Chagigah. Further on he concludes from this that although a deaf-mute (cheresh) is exempt from the commandments, a minor who is deaf is nevertheless obligated in Hakhel (even though a cheresh is exempt from the commandments)[1], for the obligation is on his father to bring him, not on the child himself.

But the Turei Even (ad loc., Chagigah) analyzes whether the obligation rests on the father or on the court (beit din), and does not decide:

“‘To give reward to those who bring them’—It is not clear to me upon whom the obligation to bring the children falls: only upon the father, or also upon the court? And if you say only upon the father—the exemption from ‘appearance [re’iyah]’ was derived above by a gezerah shavah from Hakhel (‘appearance’–‘appearance’), and later it also says that therefore the verse ‘remember’ was written to exclude women regarding ‘appearance,’ that we should not learn from Hakhel. If so, the reverse as well: those exempt from ‘appearance’ are exempt from Hakhel by that gezerah shavah. And in the first chapter of Pesachim (8a) Rabbi Ami said: ‘One who has no land is exempt from appearance [re’iyah],’ and it seems [this follows] from ‘No man will covet your land.’ And certainly the verse is concerned with land in the Land of Israel; if so, he is also exempt from Hakhel. Now, if the obligation of bringing the children rests only upon the father—whence would the child have land in Israel if his father is alive? We must be speaking of one whose father died and he inherited land, for the verse of Hakhel is written without qualification, which implies even when the jubilee is in effect. Moreover, the sabbatical year is mentioned in the passage of Hakhel, and there is an opinion in the fourth chapter of Gittin (36b) that the sabbatical year applies only when the jubilee applies; and certainly we should not be stricter with a child than with an adult, who is exempt when he has no land. Since we are [forced] to posit that children are obligated in Hakhel only when their father died and they inherited land, it follows that the obligation is upon the court. [You might counter that] perhaps we are speaking where his father is alive and nevertheless we can find that he has land—in the case where his mother died and she had been an inheriting daughter and he inherited from her, and not his father (according to the opinion that the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic). Alternatively, he was born from a woman violated [i.e., without marriage], etc. Alternatively, after a divorce. And note that the verse says in Hakhel ‘and your sojourner,’ and whence does a convert have land in Israel? If [you say] he purchased, according to the view that ‘ownership of fruits is not like ownership of the body,’ it is not called ‘your land,’ as stated at the end of the fourth chapter of Gittin (48a). And if he married an inheriting Israelite woman and inherited from her, according to the opinion that the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic, what can be said?^(32b) Rather, it must be speaking of a convert whose father and mother converted while he was an Israelite, and he inherited from them.”

He brings a proof from the fact that a minor has no ownership of land—so how would he be obligated in Hakhel? The only possibility is that he inherited land from his father, in which case his father is dead (otherwise how did he inherit during his father’s lifetime?). If the obligation is on the father to bring his son, how can the son be obligated in Hakhel after his death? He proves from here that the obligation to bring the child is on the court (apparently meaning that the obligation is on the child himself, and the court must ensure that he fulfills it; see below). He then rejects this, suggesting that perhaps the mother died according to the view that the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic.

The aforementioned Minchat Chinuch argues against him that this proof is irrelevant. Obviously the minor need not meet the requirements that an adult meets; thus, he need not have land. The obligation is not on him but on his father. From this it may be inferred that the Turei Even held that the obligation is on the minor himself, not on the father. What the Gemara in Chagigah says—“to give reward to those who bring them”—speaks only of the father’s responsibility to bring his son, but the fulfillment of the mitzvah rests on the minor. In other words: if the child does not come, we will sue the father or the court, for they were supposed to ensure the minor’s arrival. But the obligation to come rests upon the minor himself. The Turei Even essentially understands it this way: there is an obligation upon the minor himself, but only if he has land. Therefore, as long as his father is alive the child has no land, and then the mitzvah rests only on the father to bring him. When the father dies, the child has his own land, and then the obligation is upon him. The party responsible to ensure that the obligation is fulfilled is the court or the child himself.

It is not clear, however, why there is an additional mitzvah upon the father while he is alive. Seemingly, in that situation the minor has no obligation at all—period. Only when his father dies and he acquires land would an obligation arise upon him. Especially since, as with circumcision, we do not find that enumerators of the mitzvot list “another mitzvah of Hakhel”—one upon the father, and when the father dies, upon the minor himself. It seems the conclusion is that at least according to the Turei Even there is an obligation upon the minor himself to participate in Hakhel (and perhaps while his father is alive, the father’s land obligates him)[2], and the father’s role is to be responsible that he fulfills this obligation. Responsibility is placed on the father because a minor has no da‘at (legal capacity) and therefore bears no responsibility to fulfill his obligations. This recalls what we saw regarding circumcision: the mitzvah rests upon the minor, but the responsibility that he fulfill it is placed on the father. Only if the father did not fulfill it does the obligation pass to the court and to the minor himself.

We are still left with the difficulty of why halakhic obligations are imposed upon minors at all, since they are exempt from all the commandments. Recall that above we saw a similar difficulty regarding women, who—despite Hakhel being a positive time-bound commandment—are obligated in it. It seems there is something special about Hakhel that obligates all Israel without exception.

Slaves

We discussed minors and women. What about slaves? The Rambam (Hilchot Chagigah, end of ch. 3) writes:

a) It is a positive commandment to assemble all Israel—men, women, and children—at the close of the sabbatical year, when they ascend for the pilgrimage, and to read in their ears from the Torah passages that encourage them in the commandments and strengthen their hands in the true religion, as it says, ‘At the end of seven years… when all Israel comes to appear… assemble the people: the men, the women, and the children, and your sojourner who is within your gates…’

b) Everyone exempt from the pilgrimage-appearance is exempt from the mitzvah of Hakhel—except for women, children, and the uncircumcised. But someone impure is exempt from Hakhel, as it says, ‘when all Israel comes,’ and this one is not fit to come. And it is clear that a tumtum and an androgynos are obligated, for women are obligated.

There is an analogy from those exempt from appearance to those exempt from Hakhel (we saw this also in the Turei Even’s proof above), but only in one direction. There are those exempt from appearance who are nevertheless obligated in Hakhel (women, children, and the uncircumcised). The mitzvah of Hakhel is more inclusive. From here it seems that slaves are exempt from Hakhel.

Indeed, the Lechem Mishneh (ad loc., halacha 2) understood this way, and he asks:

“‘Everyone exempt from appearance is exempt from Hakhel—except for women, children, and the uncircumcised…’ One can ask: why didn’t he also say ‘except for slaves’? For we say in the first chapter of Chagigah (4b) regarding appearance: Why do I need a verse? Since in every mitzvah that a woman is obligated in, a slave is obligated as well—derived from a comparison to the woman… One could answer that here it is different, since the verse says, ‘when all Israel comes to appear,’ which implies that slaves are exempt, as our master wrote above. Still, perhaps our master found this proof elsewhere, for in our Talmud it does not sound this way—from the fact that it asks only ‘whence [the exemption of] slaves?’ and answers by finding a verse ‘before the face of the Master [i.e., God],’ and does not mention this verse at all. I already wrote this above. And what our master wrote—that everyone exempt from appearance is exempt from Hakhel—is derived from what is said there in the first chapter of Chagigah, that we learn ‘appearance’ from Hakhel by a gezerah shavah.”

Note that he prefers the analogy from slaves to women over the analogy between Hakhel and appearance. Seemingly we should learn that slaves are exempt from the analogy to appearance, which should be preferred over the analogy to women.

In conclusion, the Lechem Mishneh explains that this is a limitation learned from the verse “when all Israel comes” (as in 2:1 regarding appearance). This gives us a hint toward solving all the difficulties we have seen so far.

Explaining Women’s Obligation in Hakhel and the Other Difficulties

This is the place to return to our opening question: why does the mitzvah of Hakhel depart from the rule, obligating women despite being time-bound? The answer is that the mitzvah of Hakhel is imposed upon the entire public. It is not a mitzvah imposed separately upon each individual, such that each one would be obligated to fulfill it; rather, the entire public must fulfill it. This is a commandment imposed upon the collective, not directly upon the individuals who comprise it. We saw that this is how the Chinuch and the Rambam begin their words: an obligation upon the entire people.

We can now understand all the difficulties we raised: Women as individuals are exempt from positive time-bound commandments that are imposed on individuals. But this mitzvah is not addressed to private persons; it is addressed to the collective, and therefore all who belong to it become obligated through belonging. The same applies to the obligation of minors.

We saw that the author of the Chinuch does not write who is obligated in the mitzvah, because the definition itself states that it obligates the entire community, and therefore all individuals who belong to it. There is no point in writing, as his usual formula, that “it applies to males and females.” The obligation is not on males nor on females but on the public. This is also why slaves are exempt: they are not part of the public (see the column on “the public” and the word “citizen” in Scripture). This is not related to the gezerah shavah between women and slaves, for these are not obligations upon private persons. This is also the source brought by the Lechem Mishneh from the verse: “when all Israel comes”—whoever is included in “all Israel” is obligated in the mitzvah, and whoever is not—included is not. Women are included; slaves are not.

A woman is obligated in Hakhel as a limb of the collective, whereas a slave is not such a limb so long as he has not converted. It seems for this reason that those exempt from appearance are obligated in Hakhel, except for a deaf-mute, a mute, and an insane person. The problem with these three is that they are not included within “the people” (some due to lack of communication and some due to lack of da‘at; this is not the place to elaborate).

We have thus found the essential feature of the mitzvah of Hakhel that caused it to be exceptional: it is a public mitzvah. Therefore, women are obligated even though it is time-bound. Indeed, the Ba‘al Halakhot Gedolot (Bahag) counts Hakhel among the commandments imposed upon the public (i.e., the “parshiyot”), as the last of them (no. 65):

“These are the sections of statutes and laws entrusted to the public: … (65) the section of Hakhel. These are the sixty-five sections…”

The addressee of the mitzvah is the public, not the individuals within it.

In fact, this is explicit in the verses: “Assemble all the people…” The inclusion of men, women, and children comes immediately afterwards, as a consequence of the mitzvah being addressed to the entire collective. It is perhaps for this reason that the Rambam and the Chinuch chose to mention the halakha obligating women in Hakhel in their basic presentation of the mitzvah, since that halakha expresses the essential nature of this mitzvah.

A Parallel Example: The Mitzvah to Build the Temple

A similar explanation is offered by later authorities regarding the mitzvah to build the Temple. Both the Rambam and the Chinuch write that women are obligated in it, even though it is forbidden to build the Temple at night. That is, it is a “time-bound action,” yet women are obligated (although it does not appear in the lists of exceptions above; this is not the place to elaborate). Here, too, the explanation is that the mitzvah to build the Temple is imposed upon the entire public; consequently, the individuals who comprise it become obligated through that public obligation. Therefore, there is no place to exempt women because of time-boundedness—exactly as with Hakhel.

Two Halakhic Pathologies

The major novelty is that at the end of his words the Chinuch nevertheless finds it necessary to state that one who transgresses it has nullified this positive commandment and that his act is severe. That is, here there is an additional innovation: although the party obligated in the mitzvah is the collective, if someone fails to fulfill it, he nullifies it. Although he is not the party obligated, he is certainly the party responsible for the mitzvah’s fulfillment, and therefore he is punished for its non-fulfillment. The reason is that if one imposes an obligation upon the public, it will likely not be fulfilled: each will cast the matter upon his fellow, and no one will perform it—“a pot belonging to partners is neither hot nor cold” (see Eruvin 3a and parallels). Therefore, the halakha imposes responsibility upon every individual to shoulder the burden so that the public will fulfill its duty. This responsibility is expressed in the fact that an individual who fails to shoulder the burden is considered to have nullified a positive commandment—even though the mitzvah’s fulfillment is not imposed upon him (but upon the public). Thus it emerges that the individual cannot “fulfill” the mitzvah, but he can nullify it.

Let us sharpen this further. If all Israel goes up to Jerusalem for the Hakhel assembly, then the mitzvah was certainly fulfilled. But suppose Yosef ben Shimon did not go up with them to Jerusalem—has he nullified the mitzvah? Seemingly not, for he is not the party obligated in the mitzvah; the public is, and the public did fulfill it. Yet just as parents or the court are responsible for the fulfillment of a minor’s mitzvah, the individuals are responsible for the fulfillment of the collective’s mitzvah. This means that although a private person cannot fulfill the mitzvah (he can at most be included within its collective fulfillment),[3] he can certainly nullify it.

This is a pathological situation in which a mitzvah can be fulfilled (by the public) and nullified (by a particular individual) simultaneously. From a different angle we see another pathology: the party obligated in the mitzvah is not the party responsible and punished for its non-fulfillment.

We can now understand why the author of the Chinuch does not mention minors among those who “nullify the mitzvah” if they do not come to Jerusalem for Hakhel. The reason is that even if the Turei Even is correct that they are themselves obligated in the mitzvah, the responsibility for fulfillment is certainly not imposed on them, but on the parents or the court. Therefore, they cannot be counted among those punished for nullifying the mitzvah. Indeed, even the Turei Even himself, although he sees minors as personally obligated in Hakhel, places the responsibility for bringing them upon the father or upon the court.

This is also why the Chinuch mentions men and women regarding punishment, not regarding the obligation itself. Although the obligation is imposed upon the public, the punishment is imposed upon each individual; therefore, here it is appropriate to note that both women and men incur punishment if they do not come.

More on the Split Between Obligation and Responsibility

We have seen that, in obligations imposed upon minors, responsibility is placed on the parents or on the court. This is the case regarding Hakhel and also regarding circumcision, as we saw in the previous column. In Hakhel this phenomenon appears in two aspects: the father’s responsibility for his son, and the responsibility of the individuals for the public’s duty. In both instances there is a split between the party obligated in the mitzvah and the party responsible for its fulfillment.

From here we may expect that such splits will appear in other obligations imposed upon minors and upon the public. Indeed, as we shall now see, such a split does appear in other halakhic contexts of this kind. We will now examine the law of education (ḥinukh), which resembles circumcision—where the fulfillment rests upon the minor and the responsibility upon the father. Afterwards we will see a similar example regarding communal obligations, paralleling what we saw regarding Hakhel. There we will see the two novelties we encountered with Hakhel: the separation between the one obligated and fulfilling and the one responsible for fulfillment, and the possibility that the mitzvah is fulfilled even while someone is liable for its nullification.

A. The Split Regarding Minors: The Mitzvah of Ḥinukh (Education)

As is well known, Rashi and Tosafot disagree on the definition of the mitzvah of ḥinukh. In Berakhot 20b the general rule is brought that one who is not obligated in a matter cannot discharge the obligation of the many. There the question is raised whether women are obligated by Torah law in Birkat HaMazon (Grace after Meals) or only rabbinically:

“Come and hear: They indeed said: a son may recite [Birkat HaMazon] for his father, a slave for his master, and a woman for her husband; but the Sages said: cursed is the man whose wife and children bless him. Granted, if you say [a woman’s obligation is] by Torah law, a Torah-level obligation can discharge a Torah-level obligation; but if you say [it is] rabbinic, a rabbinic-level [obligation] cannot discharge a Torah-level [obligation]! And according to your reasoning: is a minor a bar-ḥiyuva (obligated person)? Rather, what are we dealing with here? Where [the father] ate only a rabbinic measure; then one with a rabbinic-level [obligation] can discharge [another’s] rabbinic-level [obligation].”

If we assume that a woman is not obligated by Torah law, we must set the case as one in which she discharges only someone who ate a rabbinic measure. And what of a minor? His obligation is by virtue of ḥinukh, which is rabbinic. Clearly he cannot discharge an adult who is obligated by Torah law; but an adult who ate only a rabbinic measure (less than a kebeitzah, e.g., a kezayit)—seemingly a minor could discharge him. It may be that what is written there applies only to a woman if her obligation is rabbinic, but not to a minor (though this is not the plain sense of the Gemara).

Rashi there (s.v. “shi‘ura”) writes:

“A rabbinic measure—such as a kezayit according to Rabbi Meir, and a kebeitzah according to Rabbi Yehudah; for by Torah law it says, ‘you shall eat and be satisfied and bless,’ and at such a measure one is not obligated except rabbinically; therefore a minor, obligated rabbinically, can discharge an adult [obligated] rabbinically.”

A minor who ate the requisite measure is obligated rabbinically (by ḥinukh), and therefore can discharge an adult who ate less than the requisite measure and is likewise obligated rabbinically. As noted, this is indeed the plain sense of the Gemara.

However, the Ramban in Milchamot and other Rishonim omit this clause and hold that a minor cannot discharge his father’s obligation, for he himself is not even rabbinically obligated to bless. The mitzvah of ḥinukh is imposed upon the father, not upon the minor. So writes Rashi himself in Berakhot 48a. The Gemara there teaches that one who ate a kezayit can discharge others’ obligation in Birkat HaMazon. We see that one who is obligated rabbinically can discharge others—even those obligated by Torah law.

And Rashi there (s.v. “ad she-yo’khal”) writes:

“‘Until he eats a kezayit of grain’—From the time he eats a kezayit of grain he can discharge others’ obligation, even though a kezayit is a rabbinic measure, as stated in chapter ‘Mi She-Meitu’ (20b). Since he is obligated rabbinically, he is called ‘obligated in the matter’ and can discharge the many. If you ask: regarding a minor who has reached the age of ḥinukh, did we not say otherwise? There [the minor] is not even obligated rabbinically; the obligation rests upon his father to educate him. The Ba‘al Halakhot Gedolot ruled that only if they [the listeners] ate a kezayit or a kebeitzah like him may he discharge them; but if they ate to satiety, he cannot discharge them. This cannot be maintained: King Yannai and his company ate to satiety, and Shimon ben Shetaḥ discharged them—even though he acted on his own. The reason was only that he had not eaten a kezayit of grain; but had he eaten a kezayit of grain, so too [he could have discharged them].”

That is, a minor who ate the measure (a kebeitzah) is not considered obligated even rabbinically, since the mitzvah of ḥinukh rests on his father; therefore he cannot discharge the many—even if they are obligated rabbinically. How then does he explain Berakhot 20b? Apparently a minor may discharge his father if the father ate only a rabbinic measure, but he cannot discharge others at all.

Tosafot there (s.v. “ad she-yo’khal”) disagree:

“This explanation is difficult: in any case, since he is not [obligated] by Torah law, he should not be able to discharge others who are obligated [by Torah law]. Moreover, it is forced to say that a minor who has reached the age of ḥinukh is not considered obligated even rabbinically; for if he is not obligated even rabbinically, how can he discharge his father?”

“Rather, it seems we should distinguish: a minor, who is not a subject of Torah-level obligation at all—even if he ate to satiety—cannot be called ‘obligated in the matter,’ and therefore cannot discharge one who ate a Torah-level measure. But an adult, who is a subject of Torah-level obligation when he eats to satiety, is called ‘obligated in the matter’ even if he did not eat at all—as we say in Rosh Hashanah (29a): ‘All blessings—though he has fulfilled, he can discharge—except for the blessings over bread and wine’; the reason is that ‘all Israel are guarantors for one another.’ The same applies to Birkat HaMazon: even though he has fulfilled [his own obligation], he can discharge [others], as I explained; and for a kezayit of grain, it is sufficient that he can say, ‘we have eaten of His [God’s] bounty.’”

In other words, according to Tosafot a minor who ate to satiety is considered obligated rabbinically and can discharge adults who are obligated rabbinically. This dispute recurs also regarding Megillah and elsewhere.

Tosafot’s view is very difficult. First, minors are exempt from mitzvot—how can we obligate them rabbinically? The authority of the Sages stems from “do not depart [from what they tell you]” (lo tasur), and minors are exempt from that as well.[4] Moreover, in Nazir 29 we find a discussion whether only the father is obligated to educate his son or also the mother. If so, it is proven that the obligation of ḥinukh rests upon the parents, not upon the child.

In Kehillot Yaakov (Sukkah §2) this is all discussed; his claim is that even Tosafot agree there is an obligation upon the father, but in their view there is also an obligation upon the minor. This indeed answers the difficulty from Nazir, but not the very notion of a rabbinic obligation upon the minor. Beyond that—whence do we derive a double obligation upon both child and parents? Are there two mitzvot of ḥinukh?

It seems that according to Tosafot we can, after all, make demands upon the minors themselves—only that responsibility (and therefore liability) cannot be placed upon them. There are opinions that even Torah-level obligations are imposed upon them and that they are merely exempt from punishment (see Pri Megadim, “Peticha Kollelet,” and others). If so, the obligation of ḥinukh appears to join the halakhic contexts we encountered above, in which obligations are imposed upon the minor but the responsibility for their fulfillment is placed upon the parents—just as in Hakhel and in circumcision. Thus, here too there are not two different obligations but a single one: the fulfillment is by the minor, and the responsibility for fulfillment is upon the father. The reason, as we saw, is that responsibility cannot be imposed upon a minor, for he lacks da‘at.[5]

B. The Split Regarding the Public: Torah Reading

There are several indications that the mitzvah of Torah reading is a reenactment of the Giving of the Torah. Therefore, it is a mitzvah imposed upon the public, for the Torah was received by the public. But there are two types of public mitzvot that require a quorum of ten. The Mishnah (Megillah 23b) does not list the reading of the Megillah among matters requiring ten, but it does list Torah reading. The Ramban in Milchamot explains: Megillah is a mitzvah imposed upon the individual, but it must be done within a quorum of ten; by contrast, Torah reading is a mitzvah imposed upon the ten themselves. The halakhic consequence is that the Megillah may be read together with nine others who have already read, but the Torah may not.

A common practical difference drawn from this concerns whether an individual may leave the Torah reading in the middle: if the mitzvah is public, the individual may leave the reading in the middle, leaving the public to fulfill its obligation. In such a case the public—the addressee of the mitzvah—fulfills its obligation, and he, as an individual, is not obligated and may therefore leave and not read at all. In the case of Megillah, at least according to the Ramban, this is of course not possible.

But in light of the picture we have sketched, it would seem that this is forbidden even in Torah reading. Though the mitzvah is imposed upon the public, the individual is obligated in the responsibility that the public fulfill its duty. Because of that he must remain and participate in the reading, even though the mitzvah is imposed on the public. In other words: an individual who remains for the reading does not thereby “fulfill a mitzvah,” but if he leaves he nullifies the mitzvah. This is precisely what we saw above regarding Hakhel.

Indeed, this can be seen in an apparent contradiction some later authorities found in the Mishna Berura. In §135:14, the Shulchan Aruch discusses bringing a Torah scroll to someone who does not have one (e.g., prisoners). In the Bi’ur Halakha there he writes:

“Accordingly, the same would apply to prisoners—what would be the difference? In practice, it appears that even according to the Mordekhai, who forbids [bringing a scroll] even to one coerced [to be absent], he speaks only of individuals imprisoned who wish to gather a quorum of ten there for Torah reading—this is what he forbids [and not as the Or Zarua appears to permit, allowing a sick person to gather ten and bring a scroll to him]; the reason being that by law the obligation of Torah reading does not fall upon an individual when he cannot go to the beit midrash. But when there are ten there—since the obligation of the reading has fallen upon them and they cannot leave and go after it—even the Mordekhai would agree that one must bring them a Torah scroll to read from…”

Here he writes that the obligation of Torah reading does not fall upon the individual, and therefore one should not bring a Torah scroll to him. But for ten prisoners upon whom the obligation has fallen, one must bring a scroll to them so they can read.

On the other hand, in the laws of Torah reading (§146:2), the Bi’ur Halakha writes:

“‘And some permit studying silently’—This is the view of Tosafot and the Rosh. In truth, this view is very difficult: how does studying silently help so that he will not nullify the Torah reading for the other listeners? He too is commanded to hear the Torah reading; and if he studies his studies, he will not pay attention to hear what the reader reads. Even if there are ten who are listening, what does that help regarding him? For upon every single person the obligation of Ezra’s enactment rests. Indeed, the early authority, the author of Shibbolei HaLeket, already wondered at this view (siman 39, cited by the Beit Yosef), and for this reason he rejected it from the halakha. If not for my fear, I would say that this view speaks where he has already fulfilled his own obligation of Torah reading, and nevertheless reading aloud is forbidden so as not to disturb the other listeners. And likewise the view of the Ba‘al Halakhot Gedolot cited afterwards would also be speaking only in such a case.”

Here we see that in his opinion the obligation rests upon each and every person; therefore he wonders how one can permit someone to study silently during the Torah reading—even if there are ten others listening to the reader.[6] His words here seemingly contradict what he wrote in §135.

It is customary to explain his view like the Ramban—that the obligation of Torah reading is upon every individual, only that it must be done within a quorum. But in §135 that is clearly not his view (and in the second comment in §146 he explicitly writes that it is not so). It therefore seems better to explain that the obligation is indeed upon the public, but—as with every public obligation—there is a responsibility placed upon each individual that the public fulfill its duty. Therefore, an individual who abandons the reading has not fulfilled his responsibility, even though the obligated party is the public, not the individual. And in §135 we are speaking of a prison where there is no public; then, indeed, there is no obligation upon the individual to read and no need to bring him a Torah scroll.

Accordingly, Torah reading resembles Hakhel: both are public obligations, yet alongside them there is an individual duty of responsibility to shoulder the burden so that the public fulfills its duty. He is not the one who “fulfills the mitzvah” of Torah reading, but he is forbidden to abandon the reading even if there are ten others. Without imposing responsibility upon individuals, each of the other ten could likewise abandon the reading, and the mitzvah of reading would not be fulfilled. Therefore, an individual is forbidden to leave even when ten others are present.

A Note Regarding the Mitzvah of Circumcision

We have seen that in various contexts there is a split between the party who fulfills the mitzvah and the one responsible to ensure its fulfillment. This occurs when obligations are imposed upon minors or upon the public, since in both cases the obligated party cannot bear responsibility. If we return to the mitzvah of circumcision discussed in the previous column, we will see that it is exceptional compared to other mitzvot in which there is a split between fulfillment and responsibility. In circumcision, even the mitzvah upon the son himself is only a responsibility. The mitzvah is that every Jew be circumcised, and the act is only a means to the end—a way to achieve the desired state. The one responsible for this is the father, and after him the son.

According to this definition, even the son does not truly “fulfill” the mitzvah (else, why impose it upon the father to circumcise him as a minor, rather than leaving it to him to fulfill his own mitzvah when he grows up?). All Israel are responsible that every Jew be circumcised—the father, the court, and after them the son. In any case, for the father it is certainly an obligation of responsibility; regarding the son, this requires discussion.

[1] This sounds rather absurd, since the deaf person cannot hear; thus, regardless of his halakhic obligations he cannot fulfill the mitzvah (unless the mitzvah is merely to be present at the assembly). It resembles requiring someone deaf to be “educated” to hear the sound of the shofar.

[2] If so, the Turei Even’s proof falls, of course, and this requires further analysis.

[3] Therefore, a private person who goes off to wage a Don Quixote-style war to conquer the Land of Israel is most likely not fulfilling a mitzvah. It is a mitzvah imposed upon the public; thus, an individual cannot fulfill it. He can, at most, nullify it (by not participating in the war waged by the public).

[4] Note, however, the case of a blind person (summa) according to opinions that he is obligated in mitzvot rabbinically; later authorities have already discussed this.

[5] See also Rabbi Ḥayyim’s novellae on the Rambam (Hilchot Korban Pesach ch. 5) regarding a minor who reached majority between two Passovers. He proves that according to the Rambam the minor fulfills the mitzvah of the Paschal offering but bears no obligation. In our terms: he bears no responsibility to fulfill. According to this, the distinction resembles the distinction proposed here: responsibility is not imposed upon the minor, though he has the capacity to perform mitzvot.

[6] In the following comment there, however, he seems to write again that it is a public obligation. He notes that, unlike in prayer, we do not find regarding Torah reading that one who did not read may gather ten others who already read and then read with a quorum. Prayer is an individual obligation to be performed within a public framework, whereas Torah reading is an obligation upon the public. Perhaps this corresponds to differing views among the early authorities.